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Digital signatures and public-key encryption (PKE) are fundamental primitives in public-
key cryptography designed to provide non-repudiation and confidentiality. Efficient sig-
nature and PKE schemes and their security in the standard security models have been
extensively studied. Nowadays, public-key cryptography has many applications and one
of them is in cloud storage. Cloud storage is the storage service provided by the cloud
server for the users to store their data. Since the data is uploaded to the server instead of
being maintained locally, the integrity of the uploaded data is one of the users’ primary
concerns. Cloud auditing is a technique for users to check data integrity.
The standard security models of signature and PKE schemes describe an idealized and
simplified game, where the adversary receives a public key (and a challenge ciphertext for
a PKE scheme). In a more realistic security model, the adversary should receive multiple
public keys (and multiple challenge ciphertexts for a PKE scheme). This is to reflect
the fact that there are large numbers of users and ciphertexts generated for each user in
practice and the adversary can choose any user or ciphertext to attack. In cloud auditing,
the user first divides the data into blocks and generates a tag on each block. The user then
uploads the data and tags to the cloud server. An auditor, who audits the data integrity,
generates a challenge from the user’s public key and interacts with the cloud server to
complete the auditing process. In a scenario where the data is uploaded by multiple users
and the tag can be generated by anyone among them, the auditor generates a challenge
from the public key of the user who generates the tag. The identity privacy is leaked to the
auditor. To preserve the identity privacy, privacy-preserving cloud auditing is proposed.
In this thesis, we carry out studies in the following two aspects.
• Study the security of signature and PKE schemes in more realistic security models,
namely, in the multi-user setting with corruptions and multi-ciphertext setting.
• Construct privacy-preserving cloud auditing schemes with improved efficiency in
terms of the size of tags.
Our contributions are summarized as follows.
In the first part of this thesis, we focus on tightly secure public-key cryptographic
schemes. A scheme is tightly secure if the reduction loss from its security to the hardness
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assumption is a constant. Tightly secure schemes enjoy the advantage that the selection of
the security parameter can be optimal to achieve a certain security level. Currently, there
exist some problems that remain unsolved with regard to the security in these more realis-
tic security models. For example, efficient tightly (other than CPA) secure PKE schemes
in the multi-ciphertext setting and tightly secure key-unique schemes in the multi-user
setting with corruptions. Our contributions related to this part are three-fold. First, in
Chapter 3, we introduce a paired-simulation technique and present a tight IND-CCA1 se-
curity proof of Cramer-Shoup encryption scheme in the multi-ciphertext setting. This is in
contrast to current observations that PKE schemes with limited-entropy secret keys can-
not achieve tight security (Hofheinz et al. Crypto 2012, Gay et al. Crypto 2017). Second,
in Chapter 4, we generalize the key generations of public-key cryptography and extend
this definition to a two-level framework. We demonstrate how to construct tightly secure
key-unique schemes in the multi-user setting with corruptions under the extended frame-
work. This circumvents the current impossibility results of tight reductions for key-unique
schemes (Bader et al. Eurocrypt 2016). Third, in Chapter 5, we study constructing tightly
secure key-unique schemes in the multi-user setting with corruptions from the one-more
variants of the standard assumptions. We show that such constructions are possible by
presenting a signature scheme and a PKE scheme based on the one-more computational
Diffie-Hellman assumption. This is a supplement to current impossible tight reduction
result (Bader et al. Eurocrypt 2016).
In the second part of this thesis, we construct privacy-preserving cloud auditing schemes
with improved efficiency in terms of the size of tags. The tag of a scheme is compact if
it consists of only a small constant number of elements. A scheme with compact tags
has a substantial influence on the storage efficiency since the tags will be uploaded to-
gether with the data to the cloud server. Currently, a traditional scheme that applies the
ring signature or group signature techniques encounters the limitation that the tag is not
compact. Our contributions related to this part are three-fold. First, in Chapter 6, we
propose a privacy-preserving cloud auditing scheme without resorting to the ring signa-
ture or group signature techniques. The tag of our scheme is compact which consists of
only one group element. Second, in Chapter 7, we combine our first construction and the
technique of Lagrange interpolation on the exponents to yield a threshold scheme. In a
threshold scheme, each user generates a tag piece and the cloud server needs at least a
threshold number of tag pieces on each block to complete an auditing process. The tag
piece of the threshold scheme is as compact as our first construction. Third, in Chapter 8,
we put forward a certificateless scheme by combining our first construction and the key
extraction technique in Waters identity-based encryption (IBE) scheme. A certificateless
scheme simplifies the certificate management problem while avoids the key-escrow prob-
lem of an identity-based scheme. The tag of the certificateless scheme is also as compact
as our first construction.
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The origin of public-key cryptography can be traced back to 1970s. The notion was first
put forth in the seminal work of Diffie and Hellman in 1976 [35]. In contrast to the
symmetric cryptography where a previously shared key is used between users, each user
in a public-key system has a pair of keys, namely a public key pk and a secret key sk.
The public key is published, and the secret key is kept privately by the user. There are
two representative cryptographic primitives in public-key cryptography, namely digital
signatures and public-key encryption (PKE).
• Digital signatures. In a digital signature scheme, a user generates a signature on a
message with his/her secret key sk. Any user can verify the validity of the signature
with the user’s public key pk. Only the user who holds the secret key sk is able to
generate a valid signature. This guarantees the non-repudiability of the signature.
• Public-key encryption. In a PKE scheme, any user can encrypt a message with a
user’s public key pk to generate a ciphertext for the user. Only the user who holds
the corresponding secret key sk can decrypt the ciphertext to recover the message.
This guarantees the confidentiality of the messages.
At the very beginning of the development of public-key cryptography [40, 83, 88],
the proposed scheme is believed to be secure if no attack is found against the scheme.
Later, a more formal analysis paradigm [46] was introduced, where a security model is
defined to abstract the adversary’s attacking capabilities and goal. Early examples of
the security models include the existential unforgeability against chosen-message attacks
(EUF-CMA) security [47] of a signature scheme by Goldwasser et al. and the semantic
security [46], which had been proven to be equivalent to the indistinguishability against
1
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chosen-plaintext attack (IND-CPA) [45] of a PKE scheme by Goldwasser and Micali.
Other fundamental security notions include strong unforgeability [6] of signature schemes
and chosen-ciphertext attack [84, 86] for PKE schemes. Specifically, the security model
is defined as a game between a challenger and an adversary. The adversary receives
the public parameter of the scheme and a public key. It can make some queries to the
challenger and the challenger generates the results from the secret key and returns these
results to the adversary. Finally, the adversary outputs its attack, such as a forged signature
or a guess of the challenger ciphertext.
The provable security of a public-key cryptographic scheme refers to a proof (e.g.
through a reduction) that the scheme is secure in the security model if a mathematical
hardness assumption holds. Specifically, we prove that if there exists an adversary A has
advantage εA in breaking the proposed scheme, then we can construct an efficient algo-
rithm (simulator) B that has advantage εB in solving the hardness problem. Since the
hardness problem is believed to be infeasible to solve, so is the security of the scheme. As
pointed out in [35] by Diffie and Hellman and in the textbook [81] by Lindell and Katz,
provable security has become the essence of modern cryptography and transformed this
subject from an art into a science.
In a concrete security reduction, the statement that εB =
εA
L is proved, where L is re-
ferred to as the reduction loss. Ideally, the reduction loss L equals to 1. However, we
cannot achieve such an ideal reduction loss for most schemes. If the reduction loss of a
scheme is a small constant, we say the scheme is “tightly secure”. Otherwise, if the re-
duction loss is related to the number of adversary’s queries, we say the security is “loose”.
The security level that a scheme achieves can be measured by the adversary’s time com-
plexity in breaking the scheme. Meanwhile, the time complexity of solving a hardness
problem is determined by the size of the security parameter in generating the public pa-
rameter where the problem is defined. Therefore, the security level that a scheme achieves
is related to the security parameter and the reduction loss. The security parameter, in turn,
is selected according to the security level we aim to achieve and the reduction loss.
Reduction loss is one of the most important factors in evaluating the “quality” of a
security reduction. The reason is that tightly secure schemes have the advantage that
the selection of the security parameter can be optimal to achieve a certain security level.
Otherwise, we have to select a larger security parameter to compensate for the reduction
loss. For example, suppose we aim to achieve 80-bit security level and the security loss
of the scheme is 230. Instead of selecting the security parameter, where the hardness
problem has 80-bit complexity, the proper security parameter should be selected such that
the hardness problem has 110-bit complexity. More details about public-key cryptography
and security reduction can be found in [52, 93].
The EUF-CMA [47] security model and IND-CPA [46], IND-CCA [84, 86] security
models are standard security models of signature and PKE schemes. In these security
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models, the adversary receives one public key and tries to break the scheme (e.g. forge a
signature or distinguish a ciphertext) without accessing the secret key. Efficient construc-
tions of signature schemes [2, 14, 31, 74] and PKE schemes [33, 40] and their security
in the standard security models have been extensively studied in the literature. However,
there are large numbers of users in a system and each user receives many ciphertexts. The
standard security models describe an idealized and simplified environment while a more
realistic security model should be defined in the multi-user setting and multi-ciphertext
setting to reflect the fact in practical applications.
1.1.2 Cloud Storage and Auditing
Cloud storage is the storage service provided by the cloud servers, where the users upload
their data instead of storing the data locally. Nowadays, cloud storage is gaining popular-
ity due to its widely recognized advantages, such as large storage volume, comparatively
low service fee, global accessibility, and continuous upgrades of hardware. There are
many popular cloud storage platforms like Amazon S3 (Amazon Simple Storage Service),
Google Cloud, Microsoft OneDrive, and Apple iCloud.
Although there are various cloud storage platforms that provide different services, they
have one common feature, i.e. the price is charged according to the storage volume.
A brief summary of different storage service prices is listed in Table 1.1 as followsa.
Therefore, saving as much storage space as possible has profound economic benefits.
Table 1.1: A Summary of Popular Storage Service Prices
Platform Price (per month)
Amazon S3 Standard Storage 0.023/GB (< 50TB)
Microsoft OneDrive 5GB Free, 50GB 1.99
Google Cloud 0.026/GB
Apple iCloud 5GB Free, 50GB 0.99, 200 GB 2.99
In spite of the aforementioned advantages, cloud storage also faces many challenges
in practice, such as ensuring the integrity of the uploaded data. After a user uploads the
data to the cloud server, the maintenance of data is out of the user’s control. Assuring
that the uploaded data is well-stored is one of the users’ primary concerns. Otherwise,
it shall cause significant impacts on the availability of storage service. For example,
the Amazon S3 platform encountered a service disruption on Feb. 28th, 2017b. This
event caused the system to be unable to respond to the basic operations include get, list,
put, and delete requests from users during the service disruption. Furthermore, when an
accident occurred, the cloud server might try to conceal its failure for reputation reasons.
Therefore, there should have a mechanism in checking the integrity of the uploaded data.
aThe default region is united states and the currency is US dollar.
bData from Amazon’s technical report (available at: https://aws.amazon.com/cn/message/41926/)
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Cloud auditing is the cryptographic solution to the above security issue. Ateniese et al.
introduced the notion of provable data possession (PDP) [7], which is an efficient protocol
to verify that the cloud server has retained data without retrieving the data from the server.
Similar techniques for auditing include proofs of retrievability (PoR) [70], and proofs of
storage (PoS) [8]. The user first divides the data into blocks and then generates a tag for
each block. Both the data and the tags are uploaded to the cloud server. Moreover, the
PDP protocol also considered public auditability, which means that the protocol can be
run between the cloud server and a third party. In such a cloud auditing system, there
is a third-party auditor (TPA) who is responsible for auditing data integrity on behalf of
other users. In an auditing process, the TPA generates a challenge from the users’ public
key and sends the challenge to the cloud server. Then, the server generates a response
from the stored data and tags of the user and returns the response to the TPA. At last, the
TPA verifies the response and returns the auditing result to the user. Taking the limited
computing resources of the users into consideration, delegating the auditing task to the
TPA avoids the users from suffering the heavy overhead of performing the PDP protocol.
The introduction of the TPA eases the users’ burden in performing the auditing task. At
the same time, it also brings new security risks. For example, in a cloud auditing system
where the data is uploaded by multiple users and the tag can be generated by anyone
among them. During an auditing process, the TPA generates a challenge from the public
key of the user who generates the tag. Therefore, a curious TPA can learn the identity
privacy of the user who uploads the data among the multiple users. In many applications
like an electronic voting system, the anonymity of the user is required. Privacy-preserving
cloud auditing was introduced to deal with this security issue. In a privacy-preserving
cloud auditing scheme, the TPA can only audit the data integrity for the user while cannot
learn the identity of the user who uploads the data during an auditing process.
1.2 Revisited Multi Security and Auditing Privacy
The standard security models, such as EUF-CMA security of signature schemes and IND-
CPA security of public-key encryption (PKE) schemes have been introduced in the last
section. The security models in the multi-user setting and multi-ciphertext setting is a
natural generalization of the standard security models. It considers a scenario where the
adversary receives multiple public keys and multiple challenge ciphertexts. Then, the
adversary tries to attack the scheme.
The seminal studies on solutions to auditing data integrity in cloud storage, such as
provable data possession [7], proofs of retrievability [70], and proofs of storage [8] have
also been introduced in the last section. Privacy-preserving cloud auditing allows the
third-party auditor (TPA) to audit the data for the user while preserves the identity privacy
against the TPA during an auditing process.
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In this section, we give a review of the fundamental work in the security in the multi-
user setting and multi-ciphertext setting and the constructions of privacy-preserving cloud
auditing schemes. Other work that are related to the research topics in this thesis will be
recapped individually in the “Related Work and Research Gap” section in each chapter
from Chapter 3 to Chapter 8.
Security of PKE Schemes in the Multi-Ciphertext Setting. The standard security
model of a PKE scheme is defined in a simplified scenario, where the adversary receives
a public key and a challenge ciphertext and it tries to distinguish the challenge ciphertext.
In practice, there are many users within a system and each user receives many cipher-
texts. The security model of PKE schemes in the multi-user and multi-ciphertext setting
was first introduced by Bellare et al. in [13], together with the following general relation-
ship between the adversary’s advantage in the standard security models AdvA and in the
multi-user and multi-ciphertext setting AdvmulA .
AdvmulA ≤ n ·Qenc ·AdvA,
where n and Qenc denote the number of users in the system and the challenge ciphertexts
the adversary is allowed to receive, respectively. This result guarantees that the advan-
tage of the adversary in the multi-user and multi-ciphertext setting remains negligible as
long as the size of n and Qenc is polynomial w.r.t. the security parameter. At the same
time, the security also loses a factor of n ·Qenc. Particularly, two improved security re-
ductions for the ElGamal encryption [40] and the Cramer-Shoup encryption [33] schemes
are given. Namely, the reduction loss of the ElGamal encryption in the multi-user and
multi-ciphertext setting is constant and independent of the number of users or the chal-
lenge ciphertexts. The reduction loss of the Cramer-Shoup encryption [33] is independent
of the number of users but is dependent of the number of the challenge ciphertexts.
Other notable work in the literature include the first construction of tightly secure PKE
scheme [61] proposed by Hofheinz and Jager, the first pairing-free (almost) tight construc-
tion [41] proposed by Gay et al., and the (almost) tight construction [42] proposed by Gay
et al. that achieves both compact public key and compact ciphertext simultaneously. In
[61], the author first proposed a simulation-sound non-interactive zero-knowledge proof
system for group equations with tight security. This zero-knowledge proof system is the
core building block. Then, combining the Naor-Yung double encryption paradigm [84]
with the tight zero-knowledge proof yields the tightly secure PKE scheme in the multi-
user and multi-ciphertext setting. However, this scheme is comparatively inefficient since
the ciphertext consists of hundreds of group elements. In [41], the security in the multi-
ciphertext setting is considered. This security model can be seen as a special case where
the adversary is allowed to adaptively receive multiple challenge ciphertexts but can only
receive one public key. As pointed out by Gay et al. [41], the proof in the multi-ciphertext
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setting can be generalized to the multi-user and multi-ciphertext setting in a straightfor-
ward manner if the underlying assumption is re-randomizable. Therefore, the main chal-
lenge in constructing tightly secure PKE schemes lies in the multi-ciphertext setting. An
alternative way in achieving tight security is by applying the BCHK transformation [22]
introduced by Boneh et al. to derive a tightly secure PKE scheme from an identity-based
encryption scheme. Examples are [42, 41]. The advantages of this technique lie in the ef-
ficiency of the proposed schemes. Both of the two schemes achieve compact ciphertexts,
which consist of a constant number of group elements. In particular, the public key of the
construction in [42] is also compact. Nevertheless, both the two schemes achieve (almost)
tight security, which means that the reduction loss is not a constant, yet it is only related
to the security parameter but not the adversary’s queries.
Security in the Multi-User Setting. The study of the security of signature schemes [39]
and PKE schemes [13] in the multi-user setting can be traced back to the early 2000s.
In [11], a stronger security model of signature schemes in the multi-user setting with
corruptions was introduced. In this model, the adversary not only receives multiple public
keys but can also adaptively make corruption queries (i.e. query the secret key of the
public key it chooses). Its goal is to break the security of the proposed scheme with
regard to an uncorrupted public key. Such a security model is the strongest definition
that considers the most powerful adversary. Tightly secure signature schemes [10, 11,
44] and PKE schemes [33] in the multi-user setting with corruptions are achievable in
the literature. On the other hand, all these schemes are not key-unique, which means that
given a public key, there exist multiple valid secret keys. Bader et al. [12] presented an
extensive study of the impossibility results of tight reductions in the multi-user setting
with corruptions for key-rerandomizable (e.g. key-unique is a special example of key-
rerandomizable) public-key cryptographic schemes. Bader et al. first described a new
meta-reduction technique, which extended the applications of the seminal work by Coron
[32]. Then, by applying this meta-reduction technique, the following impossible result
for the security of a scheme from the multi-user setting with corruptions to the standard
security model is presented.
If the scheme is key-rerandomizable (e.g. key-unique, which means that there exists a
unique secret key for each public key), then a security loss that is linear in the number of
users is impossible to avoid, i.e. AdvmulA ≥ n ·AdvA.
Privacy-Preserving Cloud Auditing Schemes. Many efforts have been devoted to achiev-
ing privacy-preserving cloud auditing schemes. In particular, the schemes in [36, 98]
apply the ring signature technique and the scheme in [96] applies the group signature
technique. These schemes are more practical for a cloud auditing system compared with
their counterparts that require sharing the same key among all the users or a fully-trusted
third party. In [98], Wang et al. first extended the ring signature scheme [24] proposed by
Boneh et al. to a privacy-preserving homomorphic authenticator. Then, following the con-
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structing paradigm by Shacham and Waters [89], the homomorphic authenticator is trans-
formed into a privacy-preserving cloud auditing scheme. The tag generation algorithm
of the proposed auditing scheme is similar to the ring signature scheme, where the input
of the algorithm includes all the public keys of the users within a group. The challenge
algorithm also takes as input all the public keys and hence achieves the privacy-preserving
property. The limitation of this paradigm is that the number of elements that comprise the
tag is linear with the number of the users. In other words, the tag of the scheme is not
compact due to the utilization of the ring signature technique. We say the tag of a scheme
is compact if it consists of only a small constant number of elements. This limitation is
shared in the subsequent work [36]. In [96], Wang et al. proposed a privacy-preserving
cloud auditing scheme with constant-size tags. The main building block is a homomorphic
authenticable group signature (HAGS) scheme. The HAGS scheme is extended from the
group signature scheme [21] introduced by Boneh et al. that has constant-size signatures.
Then, following the paradigm [89] again, a privacy-preserving cloud auditing scheme is
achieved from the HAGS scheme. Here, the privacy-preserving property is guaranteed
by the group signature scheme and the tag generation algorithm of the proposed auditing
scheme is similar to the group scheme. Although the size of the tag is constant (since the
size of a signature in [21] is constant), it is still not compact. Specifically, a tag consists of
11 elements, namely 4 elements in a source pairing group G, 1 element in a target pairing
group GT , and 6 elements in group Zp.
1.3 Aims and Contributions of This Thesis
This thesis comprises two parts of contributions as follows.
In the first part of this thesis, we study the tight security reductions of public-key en-
cryption (PKE) schemes in the multi-ciphertext setting and key-unique public-key cryp-
tographic (including both signature and PKE) schemes in the multi-user setting with cor-
ruptions. This part fills the research gap of some problems that remain unsolved with
regard to the security of public-key cryptography in more realistic security models. Our
contributions are three-fold, namely
1. In Chapter 3, we introduce a paired-simulation technique, which is a simulation
technique for security reduction of the ciphertext indistinguishability security of a
PKE scheme to a decisional assumption. We prove that if a scheme can be pro-
grammed satisfying the requirements of paired-simulation technique, then the se-
curity reduction can be tight with a reduction loss of merely 2. In the literature, it
is generally believed (e.g. Hofheinz et al. [61], Gay et al. [42]) that if the secret
key of a PKE scheme has limited entropy, such as Cramer-Shoup encryption, then
the scheme is difficult to achieve tight (even CPA) security in the multi-ciphertext
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setting. To demonstrate its applications, we present a tight IND-CCA1 security
reduction of Cramer-Shoup encryption in the multi-ciphertext setting.
2. In Chapter 4, we take an insight into the key generations in public-key cryptog-
raphy and discuss the requirements of achieving tight security in the multi-user
setting with corruptions. We notice that these requirements inherently do not hold
for some schemes (e.g. key-unique schemes). This is in accordance with the im-
possibility results of tight reductions by Bader et al. [12]. To further study possible
constructions, we extend the key generations of public-key cryptographic schemes
to obtain a different framework. To demonstrate its applications, we illustrate how
to construct tightly secure key-unique schemes under the extended framework. This
circumvents the impossibility results of tight security for key-unique schemes.
3. In Chapter 5, we studied possibilities of constructing tightly secure key-unique
schemes from one-more assumptions. The impossibility results of tight reductions
by Bader et al. [12] include tight reductions to non-interactive assumptions. On the
other hand, the one-more variants of assumptions [17], such as one-more compu-
tational Diffie-Hellman (n-CDH) have been found various applications. However,
whether it is possible to have tightly secure key-unique schemes from the one-more
assumptions or the impossibility results also hold for these assumptions remains
unknown. We give an affirmative answer to this question. Specifically, we propose
a signature and a PKE schemes that are key-unique and tightly secure under the
n-CDH assumption in the multi-user setting with corruptions. Our results can be
seen as a supplement to the impossible reduction results in [12].
In the second part of this thesis, we explore the constructions of privacy-preserving
cloud auditing schemes with compact tags. This part fills the research gap of that tra-
ditional privacy-preserving cloud auditing schemes resorting to ring signature and group
signature techniques share the limitation that the tag is not compact. Our contributions
are three-fold, namely
1. In Chapter 6, we propose a privacy-preserving cloud auditing scheme [106] with
compact tags. We achieve this goal because the tag generation algorithm of our
scheme does not apply the ring signature or group signature techniques. As a re-
sult, the tag generation is as efficient as the proof of retrievability scheme [89]
proposed by Shacham and Waters. The tag of our scheme consists of only one
group element, which is as compact as BLS signature scheme [25]. In addition, our
scheme achieves information-theoretical anonymity against the third-party auditor
(TPA) during an auditing process. This means that the TPA cannot get any more
advantage in distinguishing the user who uploads the data than randomly guessing
even it has unbounded computational power.
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2. In Chapter 7, we put forward a threshold privacy-preserving cloud auditing scheme
with compact tags. Threshold cryptography was first introduced by Desmedt et
al. [34], where multiple users are involved in the system and running the scheme
algorithm like decrypting a ciphertext or signing a message requires more than a
threshold number of users to participate. In our scheme, every user generates the
tags individually and the cloud server needs at least a threshold number of tags to
respond to the challenge during an auditing process. Our scheme enjoys the ad-
vantages of both privacy-preserving cloud auditing and threshold cryptography. We
combine our basic privacy-preserving cloud auditing scheme [106] and Shamir’s
secret sharing [90] with the Lagrange interpolation on the exponent technique to
achieve this goal. Therefore, the tag generation algorithm and the size of the tag are
as efficient as our basic auditing scheme.
3. In Chapter 8, we present a certificateless privacy-preserving cloud auditing scheme
with compact tags. Certificateless cryptography [5] was introduced by Riyami and
Paterson to simplify the certificate management in traditional public-key infrastruc-
ture (PKI) setting while avoiding the inherent key-escrow problem in identity-based
cryptography. Our scheme combines the private key extraction technique of Waters
identity-based encryption scheme [105] and our basic privacy-preserving cloud au-
diting scheme [106]. Therefore, the tag is as compact as the basic scheme and the
tag generation algorithm only requires an additional group operation in the group
of elliptic curve points compare with the basic scheme.
1.4 Structure of This Thesis
The background, motivation, and contributions of our research are briefly introduced in
this chapter. The rest of this thesis is organized as follows.
In Chapter 2, we give a review of the necessary preliminaries required in later chap-
ters, which include the definitions of digital signatures and public-key encryption (PKE),
system components of cloud auditing, basic mathematical knowledge, and fundamental
complexity assumptions.
Chapter 3, Chapter 4, and Chapter 5 constitute the first part of this thesis. We study
the tight security of PKE schemes in the multi-ciphertext setting, constructions of tightly
secure key-unique schemes in the multi-user setting with corruptions from standard as-
sumptions and one-more variants of standard assumptions in Chapter 3, Chapter 4, and
Chapter 5, respectively.
Chapter 6, Chapter 7, and Chapter 8 constitute the second part of this thesis. We explore
constructions of privacy-preserving cloud auditing schemes in the public-key infrastruc-
ture (PKI) setting, threshold setting, and certificateless setting in Chapter 6, Chapter 7,
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and Chapter 8, respectively.
In Chapter 9, we conclude this thesis and discuss the future work.
Chapter 2
Preliminaries
2.1 Foundations of Public-Key Cryptography
In this section, we review the basic notions of public-key cryptography, which include the
algorithm definitions and security models of digital signatures and public-key encryption.
2.1.1 Definitions of Digital Signatures
Definition 2.1 (Digital Signatures). A digital signature scheme is composed of four al-
gorithms, namely the parameter generation algorithm, key generation algorithm, signing
algorithm, and verification algorithm. These algorithms are denoted by Setup, KeyGen,
Sign, and Verify, respectively. The detailed description comes as follows.
• Setup(1λ ): On input a security parameter λ , the parameter generation algorithm
outputs the public parameter PP, which includes the definitions of the public and
secret key spaces PK×SK, message spaceM, and signature space S.
• KeyGen(PP): On input the public parameter PP, the key generation algorithm
outputs a public and secret key pair (pk,sk) ∈ PK×SK.
• Sign(PP, pk,sk,m): On input the public parameter PP, public key pk, secret key
sk, and a message m ∈M, the signing algorithm outputs a signature σ ∈ S on the
message m signed by the secret key sk.
• Verify(PP, pk,m,σ): On input the public parameter PP, public key pk, message
m, and a signature σ , the verification algorithm outputs the verification result of
signature σ , namely “accept” or “reject”.
Correctness. The correctness requirement of a digital signature scheme states that for any
public and secret key pair (pk,sk) generated by the key generation algorithm KeyGen, any
11
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message m from the message spaceM, and a signature σ signed by the key pair (pk,sk)
from the signing algorithm Sign, it holds that
Verify(PP, pk,m,σ) = “accept”.
Remark 2.1. In many constructions of digital signature schemes, the input of the signing
algorithm Sign requires only the public parameter PP, secret key sk, and message m.
Nevertheless, in some schemes (e.g. our construction presented in Sec. 5.3.1), the signing
algorithm Sign additionally takes the public key pk as input. This modification does not
affect the efficiency or security of the proposed scheme. To have a more general definition,
we define the input of the signing algorithm Sign includes the public key pk. If the public
key pk is not required during generating a signature, we will not include the public key
pk in the description of the scheme construction explicitly otherwise.
The standard security notion of digital signature schemes is existential unforgeability
against chosen-message attacks (EUF-CMA). The security model is defined through a
game between a challenger C and an adversary A. It consists of three phases, namely
• Setup. C runs the parameter generation algorithm Setup to generate the public
parameter PP and key generation algorithm KeyGen to generate a public and secret
key pair (pk,sk). Then, it returns the public parameter PP and public key pk to A.
• Signing Query. A can adaptively make signing queries on any messages. On
receiving a signing query on a message m ∈M, C runs the signing algorithm Sign
with the secret key sk as input to generate a signature σm on message m and returns
σm to A.
• Forgery. A outputs a signature σm∗ on message m∗.
We say A wins the game if it never makes a signing query on message m∗ and the
signature σm∗ is valid, i.e.
Verify(PP, pk,m∗,σm∗) = “accept”.
Definition 2.2 (EUF-CMA Security). A digital signature scheme is (t,qs,ε)-secure in the
EUF-CMA security model if for any probabilistic polynomial-time adversary A that runs
within time t and makes at most qs signing queries, its advantage in winning the above
game is at most ε , i.e.
AdvEUF-CMAA = Pr
[
Verify(PP, pk,m∗,σm∗) = “accept”
∣∣∣ (m∗,σm∗)←A]≤ ε.
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2.1.2 Definitions of Public-Key Encryption
Definition 2.3 (Public-Key Encryption). A public-key encryption scheme is composed of
four algorithms, namely the parameter generation algorithm, key generation algorithm,
encryption algorithm, and decryption algorithm. These algorithms are denoted by Setup,
KeyGen, Encrypt, and Decrypt, respectively. The detailed description comes as follows.
• Setup(1λ ): On input a security parameter λ , the parameter generation algorithm
outputs the public parameter PP, which includes the definitions of the public and
secret key spaces PK×SK, plaintext space P , and ciphertext space CT .
• KeyGen(PP): On input the public parameter PP, the key generation algorithm
outputs a public and secret key pair (pk,sk) ∈ PK×SK.
• Encrypt(PP, pk,m): On input the public parameter PP, public key pk, and a mes-
sage m ∈P , the encryption algorithm outputs a ciphertext CT ∈ CT of the message
encrypted by the public key.
• Decrypt(PP,sk,CT): On input the public parameter PP, secret key sk, and a ci-
phertext CT, the decryption algorithm outputs the decryption result of ciphertext
CT, namely a message m ∈ P or an error symbol ⊥.
Correctness. The correctness requirement of a public-key encryption (PKE) scheme
states that for any public and secret key pair (pk,sk) generated by the key generation al-
gorithm KeyGen, any message m from the plaintext space, and a ciphertext CT encrypted
by the public key pk from the encryption algorithm Encrypt, it holds that
Decrypt(PP,sk,CT) = m.
The standard security notion of PKE schemes is ciphertext indistinguishability against
adaptive chosen-ciphertext attack (IND-CCA). The security model is defined through a
game between a challenger C and an adversary A. It consists of four phases, namely
• Setup. C runs the parameter generation algorithm Setup to generate the public
parameter PP and key generation algorithm KeyGen to generate a public and secret
key pair (pk,sk). Then, it returns the public parameter PP and public key pk to A.
• Challenge. A chooses and submits two messages m0,m1 ∈ P to C. C tosses a
random coin coin ∈ {0,1} and runs the encryption algorithm Encrypt with public
key pk as input to encrypt message mcoin. It generates the challenge ciphertext CT∗
and returns CT∗ to A, where CT∗ = Encrypt(PP, pk,mcoin).
• Decryption Query. A can adaptively make decryption queries on any ciphertexts
except for the challenge ciphertext CT∗. On receiving a decryption query on a
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ciphertext CT ∈ CT , C runs the decryption algorithm Decrypt with the secret key
sk as input to get the decryption result and returns the decryption result to A.
• Guess. Finally, A outputs its guess coin′.
We say A wins the game if it correctly guesses the coin value, i.e. coin′ = coin.
Definition 2.4 (IND-CCA Security). A PKE scheme is (t,ε)-secure in the IND-CCA secu-
rity model if for any probabilistic polynomial-time adversary A that runs within time t,
its advantage in winning the above game is at most ε , i.e.
AdvIND-CCAA =
∣∣∣∣Pr[coin′ = coin ∣∣ coin′←A(CT∗)]− 12
∣∣∣∣≤ ε.
2.2 Components of a Cloud Auditing System
There are three entities involved in a cloud auditing system, namely the cloud server, user,
and third-party auditor (TPA). The cloud server provides the storage space to store users’
data. The user generates a tag for each data block with the secret key and the uploads
the tags with the data to the server. The auditing process is an interaction between the
TPA and cloud server. The TPA first generates a challenge and sends the challenge to the
cloud server. Then, the cloud server computes a response and returns the response to the
TPA. Next, the TPA verifies the response and returns the verification result to the user.
The framework is described in Fig. 2.1.
Figure 2.1: Main Entities in a Cloud Auditing System
Definition 2.5 (Cloud Auditing Scheme). A cloud auditing scheme is composed of six
algorithms, namely the parameter generation algorithm, key generation algorithm, tag
generation algorithm, challenge algorithm, response algorithm, and verification algo-
rithm. These algorithms are denoted by Setup, KeyGen, TagGen, Challenge, Respond,
and Verify, respectively. The detailed description comes as follows.
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• Setup(1λ ): On input a security parameter λ , the parameter generation algorithm
outputs the public parameter PP, which includes the definitions of the public and
secret key spaces PK×SK, file block space F , and tag space T .
• KeyGen(PP): On input the public parameter PP, the key generation algorithm
outputs a public and secret key pair (pk,sk) ∈ PK×SK.
• TagGen(PP,sk, i,m): On input the public parameter PP, secret key sk, index i, and
a message m ∈F , the tag generation algorithm outputs a tag σ ∈ T on message m.
• Challenge(PP, pk,I): On input the public parameter PP, public key pk, and a set
I of indexes, the challenge algorithm outputs a challenge ∆.
• Respond(PP,∆,M,Σ): On input the public parameter PP, challenge ∆, and the
corresponding stored messages M and tags Σ, the response algorithm outputs a
response Π.
• Verify(PP,∆,Π): On input the public parameter PP, challenge ∆, and response Π,
the verification algorithm outputs the verification result, i.e. “accept” or “reject”.
Correctness. The correctness requirement of a cloud auditing scheme states that for any
public and secret key (pk,sk) generated by the key generation algorithm KeyGen, any
challenge ∆ generated by the public key pk and index set I, and the response Π generated
by the challenge ∆, the corresponding messages M and tags Σ, it holds that
Verify(PP,∆,Π) = “accept”,
where M = {mi ∈ F | i ∈ I} are the stored messages and Σ = {σi | i ∈ I} are tags on the
messages M generated by the secret key sk from the tag generation algorithm TagGen.
2.3 Mathematical Foundations
In this section, we review some mathematical foundations to make this thesis more self-
contained. These definitions which include the foundations of algebra and the complexity
assumptions will be used throughout the rest of this thesis. Modern public-key crypto-
graphic schemes are mainly constructed using various algebraic structures, such as group,
ring, and lattice. The definitions of group and a powerful tool named bilinear map (pair-
ing) defined over different groups are reviewed as follows.
2.3.1 Group
Definition 2.6 (Group). A group G is a set together with a binary operation “·” that
satisfies the following requirements.
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• Closure: for any elements g,h ∈G, g ·h ∈G;
• Associativity: for any elements g,h,u ∈G, (g ·h) ·u = g · (h ·u);
• Identity Element: there exists an element 1G ∈ G, s.t. for any element g ∈ G,
1G ·g = g ·1G = g;
• Inverse Element: for any element g ∈ G, there exists an element g−1 ∈ G, s.t. g ·
g−1 = g−1 ·g = 1G.
In practice, two types of algebraic structures are widely used to construct groups for
cryptographic schemes, namely the modular multiplication group and the elliptic curve
group. A set of integers modulo p is denoted by Zp = {0,1, . . . , p− 1}. A modular
multiplication group denoted by Z∗p is a group of integers modulo p and relatively prime to
p, i.e. Z∗p = {x | x ∈ Zp,gcd(x, p) = 1}. The group operation “·” is integer multiplication
modulo p. In particular, if p is a prime, then Z∗p = {1,2, . . . , p− 1}. An elliptic curve
group denoted by E(Fq) is a group of points on an elliptic curve E defined over a finite
field Fq plus an additional point at infinity. The group operation “·” is point addition
defined over the elliptic curve.
2.3.2 Bilinear Map
Bilinear map (pairing) was first formally suggested to construct cryptographic schemes
by Boneh and Franklin [23] and has been found numerous applications since then.
Definition 2.7 (Bilinear Map [23]). A bilinear map is defined over three groups G1,G2,GT
of the same order p, where g1,g2 are generators of groups G1,G2 and e : G1×G2→GT
denotes the bilinear map operation, if the following requirements are satisfied.
• Bilinearity: for any exponents a,b ∈ Zp, e(ga1,gb2) = e(g1,g2)ab;
• Non-degeneracy: there exists generators g1,g2, such that e(g1,g2) 6= 1GT ;
• Computability: for any exponents a,b ∈ Zp, computing e(ga1,gb2) is efficient.
Most known bilinear maps are constructed from mapping two points on the elliptic
curve groups into an element in a subgroup of the extension field Fqk , which can be
divided into two categories, namely symmetric pairing and asymmetric pairing. In par-
ticular, a symmetric pairing (i.e. G1 =G2) maps two points from the same group into an
element of the target group GT . In this thesis, we denote the pairing groups of a symmet-
ric pairing as PG = (G,GT ,e, p,g), where groups G,GT are of order p, element g is a
generator of group G, and e stands for the pairing e : G×G→ GT . The pairing groups
of an asymmetric pairing are denoted by PG = (G1,G2,GT ,e, p,g,g2), where groups
G1,G2,GT are of order p, elements g,g2 are generators of groups G1,G2, and e stands
for the pairing e : G1×G2→GT .
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2.4 Complexity Assumptions
In this section, we review some complexity assumptions defined over the aforementioned
algebraic structures. These assumptions and their variants presented in later chapters are
the basis of the schemes proposed in this thesis.
2.4.1 Computational Assumptions
The computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) assumption [35] is one of the most fundamental
hardness assumptions in modern cryptography. It is defined over a group (G, p,g), where
p is the order of the group and g is a generator.
Definition 2.8 (CDH Problem [35]). For group (G, p,g), the CDH problem is to compute
the group element gab, given (g,ga,gb) ∈G, where a,b ∈ Zp are random exponents.
We say the CDH assumption holds in group G if for any probabilistic polynomial-time








where negl(λ ) denotes a negligible function with respect to the security parameter.
The bilinear Diffie-Hellman (BDH) assumption is a natural extension of the CDH as-
sumption to pairing groups PG= (G,GT ,e, p,g) with a symmetric pairing.
Definition 2.9 (BDH Problem [23]). For pairing groups PG= (G,GT ,e, p,g), the BDH
problem is to compute the group element e(g,g)abc, given (g,ga,gb,gc)∈G, where a,b,c∈
Zp are random exponents.
We say the BDH assumption holds in pairing groups PG if for any probabilistic polynomial-








where negl(λ ) denotes a negligible function with respect to the security parameter.
2.4.2 Decisional Assumptions
The complexity assumptions reviewed before state that it is intractable to compute a solu-
tion to a problem. These assumptions are also referred to as computational assumptions.
A decisional version of the hardness assumption is a variant which asks to distinguish
whether an element from the problem instance is a correct solution or a random element.
Similar to the CDH assumption, the decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) assumption is
defined over a group (G, p,g), where p is the order of the group and g is a generator.
Chapter 2. Preliminaries 18
Definition 2.10 (DDH Problem [18]). For group (G, p,g), the DDH problem is to distin-
guish a given tuple of elements (g,ga,gb,gd) to be a “true” DDH tuple (i.e. gd = gab) or











The standard security of public-key encryption (PKE) schemes is ciphertext indistin-
guishability against chosen-ciphertext attack (IND-CCA) as defined in Definition 2.4
(page 14). The security in the multi-user and multi-ciphertext setting was first introduced
by Bellare et al. in [13]. This security model is a natural extension of the IND-CCA
security, which reflects the fact that there are many users within a system employs a PKE
scheme and every user receives many ciphertexts in practice.
The security model in the multi-ciphertext setting can be seen as a special case where
the adversary is allowed to adaptively query the challenge oracle but only receives one
public key. As pointed out by Gay et al. [41], the proof in the multi-ciphertext setting can
be generalized to the multi-user and multi-ciphertext setting in a straightforward manner if
the underlying assumption is re-randomizable. This result was also indicated by previous
work [13, 61, 65]. For example, Bellare et al. [13] proved that the security of Cramer-
Shoup encryption is tight regardless of the number of users, but loses a factor of Qenc
in the multi-ciphertext setting. Here, Qenc is the number of challenge ciphertexts the
adversary receives. Therefore, the main challenge in constructing tightly secure PKE
schemes remains in the multi-ciphertext setting. In this chapter, the security of a PKE
scheme refers to the security in the multi-ciphertext setting without explicit statement.
Security reduction is one of the most profound techniques in demonstrating the prov-
able security of a public-key cryptographic scheme. As for the security reduction of the
ciphertext indistinguishability security based on a decisional assumption, we construct a
simulator that runs a simulation from a given problem instance to interact with the adver-
sary. In the core of a traditional security reduction, the simulation is either indistinguish-
20
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able from the real scheme (Real) or equivalent to a one-time pad (OTP) depending on the
given instance. In this chapter, we refer to it as the Real-or-OTP structure. In the Real
case, the adversary has advantage AdvPKE(A) in breaking the simulation. In the OTP
case, the adversary has no advantage in breaking the simulation from the information-
theoretical security. The difference between the adversary’s advantage of the two cases is
the simulator’s advantage in distinguishing the instance, i.e. Adv(B) = Ps ·AdvPKE(A),
where Ps denotes the probability that we can construct such a simulation.
3.1.2 Related Work and Research Gap
We can find many constructions of public-key encryption (PKE) schemes with tight se-
curity in the literature. The first fully-tight IND-CCA2 secure encryption scheme under a
standard assumption was proposed by Hofheinz et al. [61]. Its main limitation is that the
number of group elements in the ciphertext depends on the security parameter. The work
by Abe et al. [3] also shares this inefficiency. Constructions with compact ciphertexts are
achievable [58, 59, 77, 79] with almost-tight security. The number of group elements in
the public key of [77, 79] depends on the security parameter. The constructions of [58,
77, 79] rely on bilinear pairing.
The first pairing-free PKE scheme with tight security was proposed by Gay et al. [41].
The ciphertext is compact, while the number of group elements in the public key depends
on the security parameter. To solve this issue, another construction was recently proposed
by Gay et al. [42], combining the techniques of [41, 58]. It enjoys both compact ciphertext
and short public key. Nevertheless, both the two constructions only achieve almost-tight
security.
There are many approaches to achieving a tight security proof in the random oracle
model, such as the Fujisaki-Okamoto transformation [37], modified optimal asymmetric
encryption padding (OAEP) [16], twin Diffie-Hellman problem [28], and iterated random
oracle [53].
In the context of tightly secure identity-based encryption (IBE) schemes built upon
standard assumptions, Chen et al. proposed the first almost-tight IBE scheme [30] in the
single-user, single-ciphertext setting. Blazy et al. introduced a generic transformation
from affine MAC to IBE with almost-tight security [15]. By extending the technique of
[30], the first almost-tightly secure IBE scheme in the multi-user and multi-ciphertext
setting was proposed in [65]. In [9, 48], the constructions in prime-order groups were
presented independently, which can also be transformed into almost-tightly CCA-secure
PKE schemes. The ciphertext overhead is constant (12 and 10 elements respectively).
The schemes in [48, 49] are based on the k-Lin assumption with almost-tight security.
Recently, Chen et al. came up with an IBE scheme [29] in a composite-order group with
constant size master public key, secret keys, and ciphertext. Its reduction loss isO(log q),
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where q denotes the number of secret keys and challenge ciphertexts the adversary is
allowed to hold.
Research Gap. Unlike other schemes, ElGamal encryption is both efficient and achieves
fully-tight (CPA) security in the multi-ciphertext setting as proved by Bellare et al. [13].
However, how to derive a security reduction for efficient schemes with fully-tight security
(other than CPA) remains unknown as noted by Hofheinz et al. [61]. In short, the reason
is that the entropy of the secret key is normally limited. As a main observation in the
literature [41, 42], which states that
During the simulation of multiple ciphertexts, the information of the secret key is gradu-
ally leaked to the adversary, which makes the reduction fail.
Next, we give a more meticulous analysis. In the multi-ciphertext setting, the adver-
sary receives multiple challenge ciphertexts. The core of a tight security reduction is
constructing a simulation satisfying the Real-or OTP structure, i.,e. all the challenge ci-
phertexts are either indistinguishable from the real scheme or equivalent to one-time pads.
In practice, the main difficulty lies in constructing the simulation that all the challenge ci-
phertexts are equivalent to one-time pads. As pointed out in [42] and [61], Cramer-Shoup
encryption [33], Kurosawa-Desmedt encryption [76], and many schemes from hash-proof
system suffer from the problem that the entropy of the secret key is limited. As a result,
the simulation of Real-or-OTP structure can only be constructed for a limited number
of challenge ciphertexts. Otherwise, the information of the secret key will be gradually
leaked through these ciphertexts and hence there is no guarantee that all the challenge
ciphertexts are equivalent to one-time pads.
Taking Cramer-Shoup encryption scheme as an example, a traditional security reduc-
tion works as follows. We briefly review Cramer-Shoup encryption at first. For group G
with generator g1,g2 of order p, secret key is x1, x2, y1, y2, z ∈ Zp, the public key is
c = gx11 ·g
x2




2 , h = g
z
1,
with hash function H : {0,1}∗ → Zp. To encrypt a message m ∈ G, choose r ∈ Zp at
random and compute
(u1, u2, e, v) = (gr1, g
r
2, h
r ·m, cr ·dr·µ),
where µ = H(u1,u2,e). The ciphertext CT= (u1,u2,e,v).
The simulator simulates the scheme from a DDH instance, namely (g,ga,gb,gs). It sets
g1 = g,g2 = ga, selects z1,z2 ∈ Zp,coin ∈ {0,1} at random and computes h = gz11 · g
z2
2 .
The simulation of public key (c,d) is the same as the real scheme. W.l.o.g., we assume
that the adversary submits two pairs of messages (m0,m1) and (m′0,m
′
1). To answer these
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two queries, the simulator first re-randomizes the instance to obtain two DDH instances,
(g,ga,gb1,gs1) and (g,ga,gb2,gs2).
Then, it constructs the challenge ciphertexts (we omit the description of v) as follows,
CT= (u1, u2, e) =
(
gb1, gs1, (gb1)z1 · (gs1)z2 ·mcoin
)
,





gb2, gs2, (gb2)z1 · (gs2)z2 ·m′coin
)
.
From the random self-reducibility of DDH assumption, if the given instance is true, (i.e.
s= a ·b mod p), the two re-randomized instances are also true, (i.e. s1 = a ·b1 mod p,s2 =
a ·b2 mod p). We have
CT=
(






















For random b1,b2 ∈ Zp, it is easy to see that the two challenge ciphertexts are indistin-
guishable from the real scheme.
On the other hand, if the given instance is f alse, (i.e. s and b are random), the two
re-randomized instances are also f alse, (i.e. s1,b1,s2,b2 are random). From the two
challenge ciphertexts, the adversary holds the following equations
b1 · z1 + s1 · z1 = logg1e/mcoin,
b2 · z2 + s2 · z2 = logg1e
′/m′coin.
For random b1,s1,b2,s2, the determinant of the coefficient matrix b1 · s2 − b2 · s1 6= 0
with overwhelming probability. It can easily compute the secret key z1,z2 used in the
simulation. From public key h, it can distinguish the ciphertexts.
Overall, the challenge ciphertexts are not equivalent to one-time pads if the given in-
stance is f alse. The simulation cannot achieve Real-or-OTP structure when the adversary
receives two or more challenge ciphertexts. In other words, the adversary does not even
need decryption queries to distinguish the challenge ciphertexts, i.e. the simulation fails
in the CPA model.
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3.1.3 Our Contributions
We introduce a paired-simulation technique, which is a simulation technique for security
reductiona of the IND security of a PKE scheme to decisional assumptions. The advantage
of this technique is that if a scheme can be programmed with paired simulations satisfying
the corresponding requirements, then the reduction loss is a small constant, namely 2.
This immediately yields a fully-tight security proof for the PKE scheme. To be more
precise, in a traditional security reduction, we construct a simulation of the Real-or-OTP
structure. In the paired-simulation technique, we construct two different simulations,
namely Simulation 0 and Simulation 1. The Paired-Simulation theorem (Theorem 3.1,
page 28) shows that if these two simulations fulfill the requirements of Paired-Simulation
structure (Fig. 3.1, page 26) and the simulator randomly chooses one simulation to interact
with the adversary, its advantage in solving the underlying decisional problem is about ε2 ,
where ε is the adversary’s advantage in breaking the IND security of the PKE scheme.
To demonstrate the applications of the paired-simulation technique, we present the fol-
lowing security proof as an example, which is believed to be difficult to achieve with a
traditional security reduction. Specifically, we revisit the security of Cramer-Shoup en-
cryption in the multi-ciphertext setting and prove that it achieves fully-tight IND-CCA1
security. This result also provides an answer to the problem of deriving a fully-tight se-
curity (other than CPA) proof by Hofheinz et al. [61]. In light of this result, we have the
following observation.
A secret key with limited entropy of a PKE scheme does not necessarily hinder the scheme
from achieving a tight security in the multi-ciphertext setting.
3.2 Preliminaries
Recall that a public-key encryption (PKE) scheme (Definition 2.3, page 13) consists of
four algorithms, namely the parameter generation algorithm Setup, key generation algo-
rithm KeyGen, encryption algorithm Encrypt, and decryption algorithm Decrypt. The def-
inition of ciphertext indistinguishability against adaptive chosen-ciphertext attack (IND-
CCA) security in the multi-ciphertext setting [41] of PKE schemes is revisited as follows.
Definition 3.1 (IND-CCA Security [41]). The security model of IND-CCA security of a
PKE scheme is defined through the following game between a challenger and an adver-
sary.
• Setup: The challenger runs the parameter generation algorithm Setup to generate
the public parameter PP and key generation algorithm KeyGen to generate a public
aWe choose security reduction to represent the technique because it is more clear to capture the core
idea. Alternatively, it can be instantiated as game hopping. Please refer to Fig. 3.2 (Sec. 3.3.2, page 28).
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key and secret key pair (pk,sk), initializes an empty set Cenc = /0, and tosses a
random coin ∈ {0,1}. The challenger returns the public parameter PP and public
key pk to the adversary.
• Decryption: The adversary adaptively submits a ciphertext CT to the decryption
oracle DecO(·). The challenger returns the decryption result Decrypt(PP,sk,CT)
if CT /∈ Cenc, or ⊥ otherwise.
• Challenge: The adversary adaptively submits two messages (m j0,m j1) from the
plaintext space to the challenge oracle EncO(·, ·). The challenger creates the chal-
lenge ciphertext CT j = Encrypt(PP, pk,m jcoin), returns CT j to the adversary, and
updates Cenc = Cenc∪{CT j}.
• Guess: Finally, the adversary outputs its guess coin′ ∈ {0,1}.
The advantage of adversaryA is defined as Advind-ccaPKE (A) = |Pr[coin′ = coin]−1/2|. We
say the PKE scheme is IND-CCA secure if for any PPT adversary A, its advantage is a
negligible function negl(λ ) of the security parameter λ .
As for the IND-CCA1 security, the security model is similar to the IND-CCA security
model, except for the limitation that the adversary cannot query the decryption oracle
when it starts querying the challenge oracle, namely Cenc 6= /0.
3.3 Contribution 1: Paired-Simulation Technique
In this section, we introduce a paired-simulation technique that can be applied in a secu-
rity reduction of the ciphertext indistinguishability (IND) security based on a decisional
assumption. The reduction loss of this technique is 2, which is a constant and immediately
yields a fully-tight security reduction.
3.3.1 A Generalized Definition of Decisional Assumptions
A decisional problem is a problem that can be known as a true-or-false question based
on the given instance. For example, in the definition of decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH)
problem, an instance (g1,ga1,g
b
1,gd) asks whether it is a true instance meaning gd = g
ab
1 or
a false instance meaning that gd is a random group element. In this chapter, we treat the
answer space of a decisional problem as {case 0,case 1} instead of {true, f alse}. This is
to exactly reflect our definition of the problem, which is a variant of the DDH problem.
Given a problem instance I, we use I0 and I1 to denote a case 0 instance and case 1
instance, respectively. A(I0) = 0 means that given a case 0 instance, the algorithm A
correctly distinguishes it to be case 0. Similarly, A(I1) = 0 means that the algorithm
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A distinguishes the instance incorrectly. W.l.o.g., we assume that an algorithm can cor-
rectly distinguish the instance with probability no less than it incorrectly distinguishes the
instance, i.e. Pr[A(I0) = 0]≥ Pr[A(I1) = 0].
Definition 3.2 (A Decisional Assumption). We say a decisional assumption generated
under a security parameter λ holds if for any PPT adversary A, we have
Adv(A) = Pr[A(I0) = 0]−Pr[A(I1) = 0] = negl(λ ),
which is a negligible function of the security parameter λ .
3.3.2 Tight IND Security Based on Decisional Assumptions
We first provide a technical overview of how paired-simulation works. Suppose there
exists an adversary who has advantage ε in breaking a proposed PKE scheme in the
IND security model. In the security reduction, given a decisional problem instance, the
simulator decides whether the problem instance belongs to case 0 or case 1.
In the paired-simulation technique, instead of constructing one simulation of Real-or-
OTP structure, the reduction works with two simulations of the Paired-Simulation struc-
ture (shown as Fig. 3.1 below). Note that the Paired-Simulation structure does not require
any simulation to have Real-or-OTP structure. The simulator randomly selects one of the
two simulations to interact with the adversary.
Figure 3.1: Paired-Simulation Structure
case 0: case 1:
Simulation 0 one-time pad (OTP) dummy scheme (Dummy)
Simulation 1 real scheme (Real) dummy scheme (Dummy)
indistinguishable
The requirements of paired-simulation structure are as follows.
1. If the instance is case 0, then the challenge ciphertexts in Simulation 0 work as one-time pads.
2. If the instance is case 0, then Simulation 1 is indistinguishable from the real scheme.
3. If the instance is case 1, then the two simulations could be neither indistinguishable from the real
scheme nor equivalent to one-time pads as long as they are indistinguishable. We refer to such a simu-
lation as “dummy scheme”.
There are three simulation results of the Paired-Simulation structure corresponding to
three different advantages of the adversary. In the one-time pad case, the adversary’s
advantage is 0. In the real scheme case, its advantage is AdvPKE(A). Suppose the adver-
sary’s advantage could be any value η in the two indistinguishable “dummy schemes”.
For simplicity, we first assume that the adversary sets η = 0 or η = AdvPKE(A) in the
following analysis.
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If η = 0, then the simulator gains no advantage from Simulation 0 because the differ-
ence of the adversary’s advantages is 0. However, the adversary’s advantage is AdvPKE(A)
and 0 in the two cases of Simulation 1, which makes Simulation 1 equivalent to the Real-
or-OTP structure. Since the simulator randomly selects one of these two simulations, the




Similarly, if η = AdvPKE(A), then the simulator gains no advantage from Simulation 1




The formal proof that the simulator’s advantage is always half as the adversary’s advan-
tage regardless of its advantage η in the “dummy scheme” simulations is given in the
Paired-Simulation theorem (Theorem 3.1, page 28). Therefore, it immediately yields a
fully-tight security reduction with a reduction loss of 2.
An Alternative View. We take an alternative view of the paired-simulation technique
as sequences of games (a.k.a. game hopping proof technique) and show how it works.
In a traditional security reduction, the simulation is programmed such that it is either
indistinguishable from the real scheme (Real) or the challenge ciphertext is equivalent to
a one-time pad (OTP) depending on the decisional instance. The two cases, namely Real
and OTP can be seen as two games (Game 0 and Game 1). In Game 0, i.e. the Real
case, the adversary’s advantage is its actual advantage in breaking the scheme. In Game
1, i.e. the OTP case, it is straightforward to see that the adversary’s advantage is 0. This is
the “target probability” we are seeking in game hopping. Since the decisional problem is
indistinguishable, the two games form a transition based on indistinguishability. In other
words, the adversary’s advantage in breaking the scheme (in Game 0) is negligibly close
to 0 (in Game 1).
On the other hand, the paired-simulation technique constructs two simulations. Sim-
ulation 1 is programmed to be two cases, namely Real case or Dummy case. The two
cases can be seen as two games (Game 0 and Game 1). Moreover, simulation 0 is also
programmed to be two cases, namely OTP case or Dummy case. The two cases can also
be seen as two games (Game 3 and Game 2). The two simulations are simulated from
the decisional instance. Therefore, Game 0 and Game 1 form a transition based on in-
distinguishability, at the same time, Game 3 and Game 2 also form a transition based on
indistinguishability. The paired-simulation technique requires that the two dummy cases
are indistinguishable, i.e. Game 1 and Game 2 form a transition based on bridging step.
These transitions are shown in Fig. 3.2 below. As a result, the adversary’s advantage in
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breaking the scheme (in Game 0) is negligibly close (twice the advantage of the decisional
assumption) to 0 (in Game 3).
case 0: case 1:
Simulation 0 OTP (Game 3) IND Transition←−−−−−−−−−−− Dummy (Game 2)xBridging Step
Simulation 1 Real (Game 0) IND Transition−−−−−−−−−−−→ Dummy (Game 1)
Figure 3.2: Game Transitions in Paired-Simulations
Next, we present the formal proof of the paired-simulation theorem.
Theorem 3.1 (Paired-Simulation Theorem). Suppose two simulations, namely Simulation
0 and Simulation 1 satisfying the following conditions are constructed.
• The challenge ciphertext returned to the adversary is equivalent to a one-time pad
except with a negligible probability negl1(λ ), if the simulator runs Simulation 0
and the instance is case 0.
• The simulation is indistinguishable from the real scheme from the adversary’s view
except with a negligible probability negl2(λ ), if the simulator runs Simulation 1
and the instance is case 0.
• Simulation 0 and Simulation 1 are indistinguishable from the adversary’s view ex-
cept with a negligible probability negl3(λ ) if the instance is case 1.






ε−negl1(λ )−negl2(λ )−2 ·negl3(λ )
)
in solving the decisional problem, where ε is the adversary’s advantage in breaking the
PKE scheme in the IND security model.
Proof of Theorem 3.1. The simulator programs the security reduction as follows. Given
a decisional problem instance, the simulator B randomly chooses δ ∈ {0,1} and runs the
simulation as follows to receive the adversary’s guess coin′. Notice that if the adversary
aborts the interaction without any output, the simulator will randomly choose coin′ as the
adversary’s guess.
• If δ = 0: The simulator runs the Simulation 0 to interact with the adversary. The
simulator outputs the answer to the problem instance as{
case 1 if coin′ = coin,
case 0 if coin′ 6= coin.
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• If δ = 1: The simulator runs the Simulation 1 to interact with the adversary. The
simulator outputs the answer to the problem instance as{
case 0 if coin′ = coin,
case 1 if coin′ 6= coin.
Note that the simulator outputs the answer in opposite order in the two simulations.
This completes the simulation. We now analyze the correctness of this reduction. As
discussed earlier, we name both the two simulations as a dummy scheme simulation if the
instance is case 1.
According to the simulation result defined in the theorem, it is not hard to analyze the
probability of coin′ = coin or coin′ 6= coin in every case individually. In the one-time pad
case (I0 ∧ δ = 0), the challenge ciphertext is equivalent to a one-time pad except with a
negligible probability negl1(λ ). Suppose the adversary has advantage η1 in guessing coin
if the simulation fails to achieve one-time pad. We have
Pr[coin′ = coin | (I0∧δ = 0)] = (1−negl1(λ )) ·
1
2















In the real scheme case (I0 ∧ δ = 1), the simulation is indistinguishable from the real
scheme except with a negligible probability negl2(λ ). Suppose the adversary has advan-
tage η2 in guessing coin if the simulation fails to achieve real scheme. We have
Pr[coin′ = coin | (I0∧δ = 1)] = (1−negl2(λ )) · (
1
2











In the dummy scheme case, two simulations are indistinguishable except with a negligible
probability negl3(λ ). Suppose the adversary sets its advantage to be η3 in guessing coin
Chapter 3. Paired-Simulation Technique and Its Applications 30
in the “dummy scheme” simulationb. We have

















Pr[coin′ = coin | (I1∧δ = 1)] = (1−negl3(λ )) · (
1
2











From Definition 3.2, the simulator’s advantage in solving the decisional problem is
Adv(B) = Pr[B(I0) = 0]−Pr[B(I1) = 0]. (3.1)
By analyzing the two parts separately and from the above deduction, we have




·Pr[B(I0) = 0 | δ = 0]+
1
2




·Pr[coin′ 6= coin | (I0∧δ = 0)]+
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·Pr[B(I1) = 0 | δ = 0]+
1
2




·Pr[coin′ 6= coin | (I1∧δ = 0)]+
1
2




















Combining the above two probabilities and Eq. (3.1), Theorem 3.1 follows readily. 
bIf the adversary distinguishes two simulations with a negligible probability, then for the worst case, it
will set its advantage to be 0 if it distinguishes δ = 0; or ε if it distinguishes δ = 1 such that the reduction
will not work. That is, the probability Pr[coin′ = coin] is the same no matter whether the instance is case 0
or case 1.
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3.4 Contribution 2: Tight IND-CCA1 Security of Cramer-
Shoup Encryption
In this section, we first introduce a variant of the decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) as-
sumption, which we call left-or-right DDH (LR-DDH) assumption. Then, we present
a fully-tight IND-CCA1 security reduction of Cramer-Shoup encryption following the
paired-simulation technique.
3.4.1 Left-or-Right Decisional Diffie-Hellman (LR-DDH) Assumption
The definition of LR-DDH assumption and the analysis of its hardness and random self-
reducibility come as follows.
Definition 3.3 (LR-DDH Assumption). Suppose the group G of prime order p with gen-
erator g1 is generated by the group generation algorithm GGen(1λ ). For random expo-
nents a,b,s ∈ Zp with s 6= a · b mod p, algorithm A distinguishes an LR-DDH instance
(g1,ga1,g
b









We say the LR-DDH assumption holds if for any PPT adversary A,
Advlr-ddhGGen (A) = Pr[A(g1,ga1,gb1,ga·b1 ,gs1) = 0]−Pr[A(g1,ga1,gb1,gs1,ga·b1 ) = 0] = negl(λ ),
which is a negligible function of the security parameter λ .
A comparison between the DDH assumption and LR-DDH assumption is given in
Fig. 3.3. It is easy to see that given a tuple of four group elements, it must be either
a case 0 or a case 1 DDH instance. However, given a tuple of five group elements, it
could be neither a case 0 nor a case 1 LR-DDH instance. For example, if both g4,g5 in
(g1,ga1,g
b
1,g4,g5) are random and other than g
a·b
1 . In this chapter, we call such a tuple an
invalid LR-DDH instance.



























Figure 3.3: Comparison of the DDH and LR-DDH Assumptions.
Theorem 3.2. Suppose there exists an algorithm A that has advantage Advlr-ddhGGen (A) in
solving the LR-DDH problem, then we can construct an algorithm B that has advantage
AdvddhGGen(B) = 12 ·Adv
lr-ddh
GGen (A) in solving the DDH problem.
Proof of Theorem 3.2. The algorithm B solves the DDH problem by interacting with the
algorithm A as follows. Given a DDH instance (g1,ga1,gb1,gd), it randomly generates gs
′
1
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such that gs
′
1 6= ga·b1 and gs
′
1 6= gd .c Then, it tosses a random coin θ ∈ {0,1} and generates










1 , gd), if θ = 1.
After receiving the guess θ ′ fromA, algorithm B outputs the answer to the DDH instance
as follows. {
case 0, if θ ′ = θ ,
case 1, if θ ′ 6= θ .
We have the following analysis.










s′, ga·b1 ) is an LR-DDH instance of case 1, if θ = 1.
Therefore, A has advantage Advlr-ddhGGen (A) in distinguishing the given instance.
• When the DDH instance is case 1, i.e. gd = gs1, then both gs1 and gs
′
1 are random
elements in G other than ga·b1 . As a result, we have (g1, ga1, gb1, gs1, gs
′







1 ) is an invalid LR-DDH instance, if θ = 1.
Given such an invalid LR-DDH instance, since gs and gs
′
are both random, the
adversary has no advantage in guessing the instance. In particular, the adversary
has no advantage in guessing the instance generated under θ = 0 or θ = 1.
From Definition 3.2, the advantage of algorithm B in solving the DDH problem is
AdvddhGGen(B) = Pr[B(g1,ga1,gb1,ga·b1 ) = 0]−Pr[B(g1,ga1,gb1,gs1) = 0]. (3.2)







1 = gd , repeat this procedure. For random a





event happens, algorithm B can immediately distinguish the given instance with probability 1. If ga′1 6= ga1,
then gs
′
1 is random and not equal to g
a·b
1 . For the rest of this chapter, we omit this event for simplicity without
explicit statement.
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By analyzing two parts separately, according to the above deduction, we have
Pr[B(g1,ga1,gb1,ga·b1 ) = 0]
= Pr[θ = 0] ·Pr[A(g1,ga1,gb1,ga·b1 ,gs
′













































= Pr[θ = 0] ·Pr[A(g1,ga1,gb1,gs1,gs
′



















Combining the two probabilities and Eq. (3.2), Theorem 3.2 follows readily. 
Definition 3.4. We define two functions namely the instance generation function and the
instance re-randomization function as follows.
• I(g1,a,b,s,c)→ (g1,g2,g3,g4,g5): Taking as input the generator g1 of G, three
random exponents a,b,s∈Zp and a random coin c∈{0,1}, the instance generation














1 ), if c= 1.
• RF(g1,g2,g3,g4,g5)→ (g1,g2,g′3,g′4,g′5): Taking as input an LR-DDH instance,























5) generated from the instance generation function I(g1,a,b,s,c)
and the instance re-randomization function RF(g1,g2,g3,g4,g5), respectively, the fol-
lowing conditions hold.
• There exists (b′,s′ ∈ Zp,c′ ∈ {0,1}), s.t. I(g1,a,b′,s′,c′)→ (g1,g2,g′3,g′4,g′5);
• c′ = c;
• (b,s,b′,s′) are random and independent in Zp.
Proof of Theorem 3.3. Let b′ = b · t1 + t2,s′ = s · t1 + a · t2. If the instance is generated
from I(g1,a,b,s,c = 0), i.e. (g1,g2,g3,g4,g5) = (g1,ga1,gb1,ga·b1 ,gs1), according to the
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Since s 6= a ·b, then s′ 6= a ·b′. Therefore, we have
I(g1,a,b′,s′,c′ = 0)→ (g1,g2,g′3,g′4,g′5).







1 ), we have I(g1,a,b′,s′,c′ = 1)→ (g1,g2,g′3,g′4,g′5). Overall, there ex-
ist (a,b′,s′,c′), s.t. I(g1,a,b′,s′,c′)→ (g1,g2,g′3,g′4,g′5), and c′ = c.







1 0 0 0
0 1 0 0
0 0 b 1








The determinant of the coefficient matrix is a · b− s 6= 0, which means that the tuple
(b,s,b′,s′) are random and independent because (b,s, t1, t2) are random and independent
in choice. This completes the proof of Theorem 3.3. 
3.4.2 Scheme Construction
The construction of Cramer-Shoup encryption [33] is reviewed as follows.
• SetupCS(1λ ): The parameter generation algorithm runs as follows. It chooses a
group G of order p and two generators g1,g2 ∈G. It outputs the public param-
eter PP= (G, p,g1,g2).
• KeyGenCS(PP): The key generation algorithm runs as follows. It randomly
selects x1,x2,y1,y2,z ∈ Zp. Then, it computes
c = gx11 ·g
x2




2 , h = g
z
1.
Next, it chooses a hash function H : {0,1}∗→ Zp from the family of universal
one-way hash functions. The public key pk = (g1,g2,c,d,h,H) and the secret
key sk = (x1,x2,y1,y2,z).
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• EncryptCS(PP, pk,m): Given a message m ∈ G, the encryption algorithm first
chooses a random r ∈ Zp and computes
(u1, u2, e, v) = (gr1, g
r
2, h
r ·m, cr ·dr·µ),
where µ = H(u1,u2,e). The ciphertext CT= (u1,u2,e,v).
• DecryptCS(PP,sk,CT): Given a ciphertext CT = (u1,u2,e,v), the decryption






If this condition does not hold, the decryption algorithm outputs a special rejec-
tion symbol ⊥. Otherwise, it outputs m = e/uz1.
3.4.3 Security Analysis
Theorem 3.4. If the LR-DDH assumption holds in G, then CS is IND-CCA1 secure.
Namely, for any adversary A, who has advantage Advind-cca1CS (A) in breaking PKE en-
cryption CS , there exists an algorithm B that breaks the LR-DDH assumption within time











where Qenc,Qdec are the number of times A queries EncO(·, ·), DecO(·) respectively,
poly(λ ) is independent of T(A), and p is the order of group G.
Proof of Theorem 3.4. Suppose the simulator B receives an LR-DDH problem instance
(g1, g2, g3, g4, g5) = (g1, ga1, g
b
1, g4, g5) ∈G.
Its goal is to determine whether the instance is case 0, i.e. (g4,g5) = (ga·b1 ,g
s
1) or case 1,
i.e. (g4,g5)= (gs1,g
a·b
1 ). It first runs the instance re-randomization functionRF(g1,g2,g3,g4,g5)
Qenc times to get Qenc LR-DDH instances,
RF(g1, g2, g3, g4, g5)→ (g j1, g j2, g j3, g j4, g j5) = (g1, ga1, g
b j
1 , g j4, g j5),








1 ). These in-
stances will be used to simulate the challenge ciphertexts later.
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Following the paired-simulation technique, the simulator constructs two simulations,
namely Simulation 0 and Simulation 1. Then, it tosses a random coin δ ∈ {0,1}. If
δ = 0, it runs Simulation 0; otherwise, it runs Simulation 1. The detailed description of
the two simulations is given next.
Setup: The simulator generates and returns the public key pk as follows.
• Initialize an empty set Cenc = /0, randomly choose x1,x2,y1,y2 ∈ Zp, coin ∈ {0,1},
and generate public key c,d in the same way, where
c = gx11 ·g
x2





• Generate public key h differently as follows.
Simulation 0
select z1,z2 ∈R Zp,




select z ∈R Zp,
compute h = gz1
• Choose a hash function H : {0,1}∗→G and return pk = (g1,g2,c,d,h,H).
Decryption: The adversary can adaptively submit a ciphertext CT = (u1,u2,e,v) to the
decryption oracle DecO(·). The simulator responds as follows.
• Verify the ciphertext in the same way. Namely, the simulator first checks whether
CT ∈ Cenc. If CT ∈ Cenc, it returns a rejection symbol ⊥; otherwise, it computes






= v. If the equation does not
hold, it returns ⊥.
• Otherwise, decrypt the ciphertext differently as follows and return m.
Simulation 0




compute m = e/uz1
Challenge: After the Decryption phase, the adversary can adaptively submit a pair of
messages (m j0,m j1) to the challenge oracle EncO(·, ·). The simulator uses the j-th re-
randomized instance (g j1,g j2,g j3,g j4,g j5) to generate the j-th challenge ciphertext CT j
as follows and returns CT j to the adversary.
• Compute e j differently as follows.
Simulation 0






compute e j = gzj3 ·m jcoin
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• Compute the other parts in the same way. Namely, the simulator sets u j1 = g j3, u j2 =
g j4, computes





and updates Cenc = Cenc∪{CT j}, where CT j = (u j1,u j2,e j,v j).
Guess: Finally, the adversary outputs its guess coin′ ∈ {0,1}.
Following the paired-simulation technique, the simulator outputs its answer to the LR-
DDH instance as follows.
• δ = 0: If coin′ = coin, it outputs case 1; otherwise, outputs case 0.
• δ = 1: If coin′ = coin, it outputs case 0; otherwise, outputs case 1.
This completes the description of the two simulations with the corresponding solution to
the LR-DDH instance. In the rest of the proof, we analyze that these two simulations
fulfill the Paired-Simulation structure. According to the Paired-Simulation theorem, The-
orem 3.4 follows readily. 
Lemma 3.1. If the instance is case 0, every challenge ciphertext in Simulation 0 is equiv-
alent to a one-time pad.
Proof of Lemma 3.1. According to Theorem 3.3, if the LR-DDH instance is case 0, then
the re-randomized instances are case 0, i.e.







where s j is random and independent in Zp, for j = 1, . . . ,Qenc. The structure of the
challenge ciphertexts is summarized in Fig. 3.4.







u j1 = g j3
u j2 = g j4










u j1 = g
b j
1
u j2 = g
b j
2
e j = g
b j·z1+ s j ·z2
1 ·m jcoin





Figure 3.4: Structure of Challenge Ciphertext CT j = (u j1,u j2,e j,v j)
From Fig. 3.4, we can see that the randomness s j only appears in e j and is unknown to
the adversary. The decryption oracle does not leak any information of s j to the adversary
because the secret key z1,z2 used in the simulation are independent of s j. All s j, for
j = 1, · · · ,Qenc are random and independent. Therefore, every challenge ciphertext is
equivalent to a one-time pad. This completes the proof of Lemma 3.1. 
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Lemma 3.2. If the simulator runs Simulation 1 and the instance is case 0, then the simu-
lation is indistinguishable from the real scheme following the security model.
Proof of Lemma 3.2. We analyze the differences of each phase between the simulation
and the real scheme separately.
In the Setup phase, the simulator generates the public key in the same way as the real
scheme. They are therefore indistinguishable in terms of the public key.
In the Decryption phase, the simulator simulates the decryption in the same way as the
real scheme. They are therefore indistinguishable in terms of the decryption.
In the Challenge phase, the challenge ciphertexts are generated as follows.
real scheme (r j ∈R Zp)
u j1 = g
r j
1
u j2 = g
r j
2
e j = hr j ·m jcoin
v j = cr j ·dr j·µ j





u j1 = g j3
u j2 = g j4
e j = gzj3 ·m jcoin





Let the randomness r j used in the encryption algorithm of the real scheme equal the
random exponent b j of the j-th re-randomized instance, it is easy to see that












e j1 = gzj3 ·m jcoin = (g
z
1)
b j ·m jcoin = hr j ·m jcoin,









b j · (gy11 ·g
y2
2 )
b j·µ j = cr j ·dr j·µ j .
Therefore, the simulation is indistinguishable from the real scheme in terms of the chal-
lenge ciphertexts.
Overall, if the simulator runs Simulation 1 and the instance is case 0, then the simulation
is indistinguishable from the real scheme following the security model. This completes
the proof of Lemma 3.2. 
Lemma 3.3. Simulation 0 and Simulation 1 are indistinguishable from the adversary’s
view except with a negligible probability Qdecp−Qdec+1 , if the instance is case 1.
Proof of Lemma 3.3. We analyze the differences of each phase between the two simula-
tions separately.
In the Setup phase, public key h is generated differently as follows.
Simulation 0
select z1,z2 ∈R Zp,




select z ∈R Zp,
compute h = gz1
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1 are both random from G.
Therefore, the Setup phases of the two simulations are indistinguishable.
In the Decryption phase, the decryption result is computed differently as follows.
Simulation 0




compute m = e/uz1
Denote the discrete logarithm of u1 to g1 and u2 to g2 as w1 and w2, respectively. Consid-
ering two possible conditions, namely w1 = w2 and w1 6= w2, we prove that if w1 = w2,
then the decryption results of both simulations are identical and hence indistinguishable.
If w1 6=w2, then the ciphertext will be rejected in both simulations except with a negligible
probability Qdecp−Qdec+1 .
• w1 = w2. In Simulation 0, we have e/(uz11 · u
z2





w1 = e/hw1; and in
Simulation 1, we have e/uz1 = e/(g
z
1)
w1 = e/hw1 . Therefore, the decryption results
on the ciphertexts satisfying w1 = w2 are identical.
• w1 6= w2. The adversary needs to compute v = ux1+y1·µ1 ·u
x2+y2·µ
2 for the ciphertext
CT= (u1,u2,e,v) to be accepted in decryption query. We have
logg1v = w1 · x1 +w2 ·a · x2 +w1 · y1 ·µ +w2 ·a · y2 ·µ.
Given the public key, the adversary holds
c = gx11 ·g
x2
2 , i.e. logg1c = x1 +a · x2,
d = gy11 ·g
y2
2 , i.e. logg1d = y1 +a · y2.
In the IND-CCA1 security model, the adversary only holds the public key (without
seeing the challenge ciphertexts) during the Decryption phase. Therefore, all the
components related to secret key x1,x2,y1,y2 can be reformulated as
(logg1v, logg1c, logg1d) =
w1 a ·w2 w1 ·µ a ·w2 ·µ1 a 0 0








There exists a 3× 3 sub-matrix of the coefficient matrix, whose determinant is
non-zero. Therefore, v is random and independent from the equations the adver-
sary holds. Alternatively, the adversary can randomly select v′ from G such that v′
equals v. For Qdec decryption queries, the success probability of generating such an
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Therefore, Simulation 0 and Simulation 1 are indistinguishable in terms of decryption
except with a negligible probability Qdecp−Qdec+1 .
In the Challenge phase, e j of the challenge ciphertext is generated differently as
Simulation 0






computes e j = gzj3 ·m jcoin
According to Theorem 3.3, if the instance is case 1, then the re-randomized instances are
case 1, i.e.






1 ), for j = 1, . . . ,Qenc.
It is easy to see that in Simulation 0,









b j ·m jcoin = hb j ·m jcoin,
and in Simulation 1,
e j = gzj3 ·m jcoin = (g
z
1)
b j ·m jcoin = hb j ·m jcoin.
Therefore, the two simulations are identical and hence indistinguishable in terms of the
challenge ciphertexts.
Overall, Simulation 0 and Simulation 1 are indistinguishable from the adversary’s view
except with a negligible probability Qdecp−Qdec+1 , if the instance is case 1. This completes
the proof of Lemma 3.3. 
3.5 Chapter Summary
Efficient and tightly secure public-key encryption (PKE) schemes [40, 33] in the standard
security models (single-user and single ciphertext setting) had been extensively stud-
ied. The main challenge of constructing tightly secure PKE schemes lies in the multi-
ciphertext setting against chosen-ciphertext attack.
In this chapter, we explored the tight security reductions of PKE schemes in the multi-
ciphertext setting. We analyzed the requirement of achieving tight security applying a
traditional security reduction for a PKE scheme and demonstrated why it is hard to have
a tight reduction taking Cramer-Shoup encryption as an example. Currently, increasing
the entropy of the secret key is a main technique to achieve tight security and it is widely
believed that a scheme with limited entropy secret key is hard to meet tight security. Mo-
tivated by the above observation, we introduced a paired-simulation technique. Unlike a
traditional security reduction, the paired-simulation technique constructs two simulations
with different requirements in the security proof. This technique can be applied for a tight
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ciphertext indistinguishability (IND) security of a PKE scheme to a decisional assump-
tion with a reduction loss of merely 2. To demonstrate its advantages, we presented a
tight IND-CCA1 security proof of Cramer-Shoup encryption. This is in contrast to pre-
vious observations that a scheme with limited entropy secret key, such as Cramer-Shoup
encryption and Kurosawa-Desmedt encryption cannot achieve tight security.
Chapter 4
Tightly Secure Key-Unique Public-Key
Cryptographic Schemes in the
Multi-User Setting with Corruptions
4.1 Introduction
4.1.1 Background
In standard security models of public-key cryptographic schemes, the adversary receives
one public key and tries to break the scheme without accessing the secret key. In prac-
tice, there are a large number of users in a cryptographic system. The adversary could
attack any target among these users in the system. The security models in the multi-user
setting are natural generalizations of the standard security models. The models consider
more realistic threats in practice, where the adversary receives multiple public keys and
chooses one as the challenge public key. The security models of signature and public-
key encryption (PKE) schemes in the multi-user setting were introduced in [39] and [13],
respectively.
The security models in the multi-user setting with corruptions (MU-C) give the adver-
sary more powerful capabilities. Informally speaking, it allows the adversary to adaptively
corrupt at most all the public keys except the challenge public key it chooses. An MU-C
security model is the strongest version that considers the most powerful adversaries. In
this chapter, we concentrate on the MU-C security of public-key cryptographic schemes
and the security of a scheme refers to the MU-C security without explicit statement.
It had been shown [44, 13] that a signature or PKE scheme secure in the standard
security model implies the security in the MU-C security model. Specifically, if a scheme
is (t,ε)-secure in the standard security model, then it is (t,ε ′,N,N−1)-secure in the MU-
C security model, where ε ′ ≤N ·ε and N denotes the number of public keys the adversary
receives. This means that for a public-key cryptographic scheme, the reduction loss of
42
Chapter 4. Tightly Secure Key-Unique Public-Key Cryptographic Schemes in the
Multi-User Setting with Corruptions 43
the scheme in the MU-C model is at most N compared with the security in the standard
security model. In an asymptotic point of view, the MU-C security holds and yet it is not
tight.
4.1.2 Related Work and Research Gap
Many efforts have been devoted to constructing tightly secure schemes, such as digital
signature schemes [4, 10, 11, 60, 61, 74, 77] and public-key encryption (PKE) schemes
[3, 41, 42, 43, 60, 61, 77, 79]. These schemes available in the literature are examples
of concrete constructions. However, there still lacks a study on how to generally achieve
tight security in public-key cryptography. Furthermore, it is believed that a reduction
loss of N is optimal for many schemes. For example, the impossibility results of tight
reductions in [12] proved that the security of key-uniquea schemes must lose a factor of
N. We first review the impossibility results (Theorem 6 and Theorem 8 in [12]), which
includes the existential unforgeability against chosen-message attacks (MU-EUF-CMA-
C) security of a signature scheme and indistinguishability against chosen-plaintext attack
(MU-IND-CPA-C) security of a PKE scheme as follows.
Theorem 4.1. Any reduction from breaking a non-interactive complexity assumption to
breaking the MU-EUF-CMA-C security of a signature scheme that provides efficient key
re-randomization loses a factor that is linear in the number of public keys the attacker is
provided.
Theorem 4.2. Any reduction from breaking a non-interactive complexity assumption to
breaking the MU-IND-CPA-C security of a public-key encryption scheme that provides
efficient key re-randomization loses a factor that is linear in the number of public keys the
attacker is provided.
4.1.3 Our Contributions
Motivated by the above observations, we take an insight into the key generations in public-
key cryptography and the requirements of achieving tight security. Furthermore, we study
the possibilities of constructing tightly secure schemes that can circumvent the aforemen-
tioned impossibility results.
In this chapter, we generalize the key generation algorithms of public-key cryptographic
schemes. The process is depicted as a one-level tree (cf. Fig. 4.1(a)). Specifically, it picks
randomness R and computes the key pair (pk,sk) from two functions Fpk,Fsk. We analyze
the requirements of key generations to achieve tight security and show that the require-
ments inherently cannot be satisfied in certain schemes, such as key-unique schemes.
aThe impossibility result applies to key-rerandomizable schemes. A key-unique scheme is a special case
of key-rerandomizable schemes. For simplicity, we use key-unique schemes as examples in this chapter.
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(a) A Traditional Scheme (b) The Extended Definition
Figure 4.1: Comparison of the Two Generalized Definitions
To further study possible tightly secure constructions, we extend the generalization of
key generations in public-key cryptography to obtain a different framework. The struc-
ture is a two-level tree (cf. Fig. 4.1(b)), which could be seen as a two-round iteration of





from two functions Fpk,Fsk. Then, it takes the level-1 secret key sk[1]




from two functions Gpk,Gsk. We
propose a general construction of a scheme under the extended generalization by com-
bining two traditional schemes. To demonstrate its applications, we show that tightly
secure key-unique schemes are achievable following the general construction. Two con-
crete examples, namely a signature and a PKE schemes are presented. This circumvents
the current impossibility results.
4.2 Preliminaries
Recall that a digital signature scheme (Definition 2.1, page 11) consists of four algo-
rithms, namely the parameter generation algorithm Setup, key generation algorithm Key-
Gen, signing algorithm Sign, and verification algorithm Verify. The definition of existen-
tial unforgeability against adaptive chosen-message attacks in the multi-user setting with
corruptions (MU-EUF-CMA-C) security [12] of signature schemes is revisited as follows.
The security model of a signature scheme is defined as a game between a challenger C
and an adversary A. It includes four phases, namely Setup, Corruption Query, Signing
Query, and Forgery.
• Setup. C runs the parameter generation algorithm Setup to generate the public
parameter and the key generation algorithm KeyGen to generate N public and secret
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key pairs. Then, it returns the public parameter and N public keys to A.
• Corruption Query. A can adaptively make a corruption query (at most N − 1
times) on a public key. C returns the corresponding secret key to A.
• Signing Query. A can adaptively make a signing query on a message under an
uncorrupted public key. C runs the signing algorithm Sign with the corresponding
secret key as input and returns the signature to A.
• Forgery. A outputs a signature Σm∗ on message m∗ under public key pk∗.
We say A wins the game if it never makes a corruption query on pk∗, a signing query
on m∗ under pk∗, and Σm∗ is valid. The advantage of the adversary is defined to be the
probability that it wins the game.
Definition 4.1 (MU-EUF-CMA-C Security [12]). A signature scheme is (t,qs,ε,N,N−1)-
secure in the MU-EUF-CMA-C security model if for any probabilistic polynomial-time
adversary A that runs within time t and makes at most qs signing queries, its advantage
is at most ε .
The existential unforgeability against chosen-message attacks in the multi-user setting
without corruptions (MU-EUF-CMA) security is a special case of the above definition,
where the adversary cannot make corruption queries.
Recall that a public-key encryption (PKE) scheme (Definition 2.3, page 13) consists
of four algorithms, namely the parameter generation algorithm Setup, key generation
algorithm KeyGen, encryption algorithm Encrypt, and decryption algorithm Decrypt. The
definition of ciphertext indistinguishability against adaptive chosen-ciphertext attack in
the multi-user setting with corruptions (MU-IND-CCA-C) security [12] of PKE schemes
is revisited as follows.
The security model of a PKE scheme is defined as a game between a challenger C and
an adversary A. It includes five phases, namely Setup, Corruption Query, Decryption
Query, Challenge, and Guess.
• Setup. C runs the parameter generation algorithm Setup to generate the public
parameter and the key generation algorithm KeyGen to generate N public and secret
key pairs. Then, it returns the public parameter and N public keys to A.
• Corruption Query. A can adaptively make a corruption query (at most N − 1
times) on a public key. C returns the corresponding secret key to A.
• Decryption Query. A can adaptively make a decryption query on a ciphertext
under an uncorrupted public key. C runs the decryption algorithm Dec with the
corresponding secret key as input and returns the decryption result to A.
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• Challenge. A selects two messages (m0,m1) from the plaintext space and a public
key pk∗ to be challenged. C randomly picks one message and runs the encryption
algorithm Enc with pk∗ as input to generate the challenge ciphertext CT∗. Then, it
returns CT∗ to A.
• Guess. A outputs a guess of which message is encrypted to generate the challenge
ciphertext.
We say A wins the game if it never makes a corruption query on pk∗, a decryption query
on CT∗ under pk∗, and its guess is correct. The advantage of the adversary is defined to
be the probability that it wins the game minus 12 .
Definition 4.2 (MU-IND-CCA-C Security [12]). A PKE scheme is (t,ε,N,N−1)-secure
in the MU-IND-CCA-C security model if for any probabilistic polynomial-time adversary
A that runs within time t, its advantage is at most ε .
The security of indistinguishability against chosen-plaintext attack in the multi-user
setting with corruptions (MU-IND-CPA-C) is a special case of the above definition, where
the adversary cannot make decryption queries.
4.3 Contribution 1: A Generalized Definition of Key Gen-
erations in Public-Key Cryptography
In public-key cryptography, such as a signature scheme or a public-key encryption (PKE)
scheme, a pair of public and secret keys are generated. In this section, we first generalize
the key generation algorithms of public-key cryptographic schemes. The structure of how
the key pairs are generated is an essential condition that determines how the schemes
achieve tight security. In addition to key generations, the algorithms that conduct the
cryptographic function together constitute the schemes.
Definition 4.3. The key generation process of a public-key cryptographic scheme can be
generalized as the following two probabilistic algorithms, namely the parameter genera-
tion algorithm Setup and key generation algorithm KeyGen.
• Setup(1λ ): The parameter generation algorithm takes as input the security pa-
rameter λ and outputs the public parameter PP, which includes the definitions of
the randomness space R, public and secret key spaces PK×SK, and a pair of
deterministic functions Fpk :R→PK, Fsk :R→SK.
• KeyGen(PP): The key generation algorithm takes as input the public parameter PP
and works as follows.
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– Pick randomness R ∈R.
– Compute the public key pk and secret key sk as
pk = Fpk(R), sk = Fsk(R).
It outputs the key pair (pk,sk).
Next, we give three examples of the key generation algorithms from three public-key
cryptographic schemes in Table 4.1.
Table 4.1: Examples of Key Generation Algorithms
PP (G, p,g,g2)
BLS sig [25] R = α Fpk(R) = gα Fsk(R) = α
Waters IBE [105] R = α Fpk(R) = gα Fsk(R) = gα2
GJ sig [44] R = (c,zc,g1−c) Fpk(R) = (gzc,g1−c) Fsk(R) = (c,zc)
4.3.1 Definition of Key-Uniqueness
We first give an informal review of key-unique schemes. If given a public key, there is
only one unique corresponding secret key, then the scheme is key-unique. Otherwise, it
is key non-unique. Some examples are given below.
• Key-unique. In BLS signature scheme [25], a public key is pk = gα from the public
key space G. Since there is only one value α from the secret key space Zp, such
that gα = pk, BLS signature scheme is key-unique.
• Key non-unique. In GJ signature scheme [44], a public key consists of two group
elements pk = (g0,g1). Since there are more than one tuple (c,zc) from the secret
key space {0,1}×Zp, such that gzc = gc, the scheme is key non-unique. To be
more precise, given a public key pk = (g0,g1), there are two possible secret keys,
namely, (0, logg g0) and (1, logg g1).
Definition 4.4 (Key-Unique Schemes). We say a public-key cryptographic scheme is key-
unique, if the pair of functions Fpk,Fsk associated with the pair of public and secret keys
satisfy the following property. Given a public key pk, for any randomness R0,R1 satisfy
that Fpk(R0) = Fpk(R1) = pk, it holds that Fsk(R0) = Fsk(R1) = sk.
4.3.2 Requirements of Achieving Tight Security
In a traditional public-key cryptographic scheme, the public and secret key pair are gener-
ated from the key generation algorithm as shown in Fig. 4.1(a). In the security reduction,
the core part is the simulation of public keys returned to the adversary. Basically, there
are two options, namely
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• Embed Technique: It uses the given problem instance to simulate the public key.
In this case, the adversary’s attack can help the simulator to solve the problem but
the simulator does not know the corresponding secret key. In other words, it cannot
respond to the corruption query.
• Compute Technique: It selects the randomness and computes the key pair from
functions Fpk,Fsk. In this case, the simulator can respond to the corruption query.
However, the adversary’s attack cannot help the simulator to solve the problem
instance since the attack is irrelevant to the instance (which is not embedded into
the public key).
Note that there are some tightly secure schemes [10, 11, 44] that apply a technique differ-
ent from either of the above two strategies in simulating public keys. In this chapter, we
call it partially embed technique.
• Partially Embed Technique: The public key consists of two elements and the secret
key corresponds to one of them. To simulate the public key, the simulator embeds
the problem instance into one element and computes the other element from func-
tion Fpk. In this case, the simulator can respond to the corruption query, while the
adversary’s attack is helpful with probability 12 . This yields a tight security proof
with a reduction loss of 2.
To sum up, the partially embed technique is practical and efficient. However, it requires
that the public key consists of two elements and the secret key corresponds to either one
of them. In other words, for a given public key, there exists more than one secret key.
As a result, the partially embed technique does not work for key-unique schemes. In the
MU-C security model, the adversary receives N public keys and is allowed to adaptively
corrupt at most N− 1 public keys. For key-unique schemes, there are only two options
in simulating the public keys. In general, the simulator randomly selects one public key
to embed the problem instance and computes the other N − 1 key pairs from the key
generation algorithm. If the adversary happens to choose the public key that embedded
with the problem instance as the challenge public key, then the simulator can correctly
respond to all the corruption queries and the adversary’s attack can help the simulator to
solve the problem. This happens with probability 1N and causes a reduction loss of N.
Since for a given public key there is only one secret key, the simulator must either embed
the problem instance or compute from function Fpk to simulate the public key. Therefore,
guessing one public key to embed the problem instance is inevitable and hence there is a
reduction loss of N for key-unique schemes.
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4.3.3 Difficulties in Achieving Tight Security for Key-Unique Schemes
Known constructions with tight security [10, 11, 44] available in the literature apply the
partially embed technique. Specifically, the public key consists of two elements. To
simulate the public keys, the simulator embeds the problem instance into one element
and compute the other element from the function Fpk. These schemes share the same
feature that given a public key, there are more than one corresponding secret keys. In
other words, the partially embed technique does not work for key-unique schemes. It
seems that a key-unique scheme inherently cannot achieve tight security.
4.4 Contribution 2: An Extended Definition and Its Ap-
plications
In this section, we extend the generalized key generations in public-key cryptography to
a different framework. The structure consists of two levels, which could be seen as a
two-round iteration of the traditional key generations.
Definition 4.5. The key generation process of a public-key cryptographic scheme can be
generalized as the following two probabilistic algorithms, namely the parameter genera-
tion algorithm Setup and key generation algorithm KeyGen.
• Setup(1λ ): The parameter generation algorithm takes as input the security param-
eter λ and outputs the public parameter PP, which includes the definitions of the
randomness space R, level-1 public and secret key spaces PK[1]×SK[1], one pair
of deterministic functions Fpk :R→PK[1], Fsk :R→SK[1] for level-1 keys, level-2
public and secret key spaces PK[2]×SK[2], and one pair of deterministic functions
Gpk : SK[1]→PK[2], Gsk : SK[1]→ SK[2] for level-2 keys. The public key space
PK and secret key space SK are defined as
PK = PK[1]×PK[2], SK = SK[1].
• KeyGen(PP): The key generation algorithm takes as input the public parameter PP
and works as follows.
– Pick randomness R ∈R.
– Compute the level-1 public key pk[1] and secret key sk[1] as
pk[1] = Fpk(R), sk[1] = Fsk(R).
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, sk = sk[1].
It outputs the key pair (pk,sk).
4.4.1 Advantages of the Extended Definition
The extended definition consists of two levels of keys and two pairs of functions, which
allows us to combine two traditional schemes to obtain a scheme under this extended
framework. The level-1 secret key sk[1] is defined as the secret key and does not directly
involve in the functional algorithms of the scheme. Meanwhile, the level-2 secret key
sk[2] actually takes part in the functional algorithms and is independent of the secret key.
Such a separation is the core technique that makes it possible to construct tightly secure
key-unique schemes.
4.4.2 A General Construction
Next, we propose a general construction of a scheme under the extended framework from
two traditional schemes. We first illustrate how the key generation algorithm works,
which is an essential part of the construction. Then, we give concrete examples of how to
construct signature and encryption schemes.
In the general construction, the two traditional schemes involved are a signature scheme
Π and a specific cryptographic scheme Ψ (e.g. a signature or encryption scheme). The
signature scheme Π is used to generate the level-1 key pair. In particular, the public key
of Π is the level-1 public key pk[1] and the level-1 secret key sk[1] is defined to be the
signature on pk[1] (i.e. treat pk[1] as a message and generates a signature on pk[1] with the
secret key of Π). The cryptographic scheme Ψ is used to generate the level-2 key pair in a
straightforward way. In case that the signature space of Π and the randomness space of Ψ
do not match, an additional hash function that maps a level-1 secret key to the randomness
of scheme Ψ is applied before computing the level-2 key pair. The procedure is illustrated
in Fig. 4.2 and the detailed description comes as follows.
Given a signature scheme Π= (SetupΠ,KeyGenΠ,SignΠ,VerifyΠ) (cf. Definition 2.1)
and a specific cryptographic scheme Ψ = (SetupΨ,KeyGenΨ), we can construct a
two-level public-key cryptographic scheme as follows.
Chapter 4. Tightly Secure Key-Unique Public-Key Cryptographic Schemes in the
Multi-User Setting with Corruptions 51
Figure 4.2: A High-Level Description of the General Construction
• Setup(1λ ): It first runs the parameter generation algorithm SetupΠ of the signa-
ture scheme Π to generate public parameter PPΠ, which includes the definitions
of the randomness spaceRΠ, key spaces PKΠ×SKΠ, signature space S , and a
pair of functions FΠpk,F
Π
sk . Then, it sets the randomness space R, level-1 public
and secret key spaces PK[1]×SK[1], and functions Fpk,Fsk as
R= SKΠ, PK[1] = PKΠ, SK[1] = SΠ, Fpk = FΠpk, Fsk = SignΠ.
Next, it runs the parameter generation algorithm SetupΨ of scheme Ψ to gen-
erate public parameter PPΨ, which includes the definitions of the randomness
space RΨ, key spaces PKΨ×SKΨ and a pair of functions FΨpk,FΨsk . Then, it
selects a hash function H : SK[1]→RΨ and sets the level-2 public and secret
key spaces PK[2]×SK[2] and functions Gpk,Gsk as
PK[2] = PKΨ, SK[2] = SKΨ, Gpk = FΨpk, Gsk = FΨsk .
Finally, it sets the public and secret key spaces as
PK = PK[1]×PK[2], SK = SK[1]
and outputs the public parameter PP= (PPΠ,PPΨ,H) with the corresponding
definitions of spaces and functions.
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• KeyGen(PP): The key generation algorithm works as follows.
– Pick randomness R ∈RΠ and compute Fpk(R),FΠsk (R).
– Set the level-1 public key pk[1] = Fpk(R) and compute the level-1 secret










and the level-2 public key pk[2] = Gpk(h).





, sk = sk[1].
It outputs the key pair (pk,sk).
To construct a signature scheme (Setup,KeyGen,Sign,Verify) (cf. Definition 2.1, page
11) following the general construction, a signature schemes Π and another signature
scheme SIG = (SetupΨ,KeyGenΨ,SignΨ,VerifyΨ) are required. The parameter genera-
tion algorithm Setup and key generation algorithm KeyGen are depicted as above. The
signing algorithm Sign and verification algorithm Verify are as follows.
• Sign(PP,sk,m): The signing algorithm takes as input the public parameter PP,
secret key sk and a message m and works as follows.
– Parse the public parameter PP as (PPΠ,PPΨ,H).
– Compute h = H (sk) and the level-2 secret key sk[2] = Gsk(h).
– Run the singing algorithm SignΨ of scheme SIG with sk[2] as input to gen-
erate a signature Σm = SignΨ(PPΨ,sk[2],m).
It output the signature Σm on message m.
• Verify(PP, pk,m,Σm): The verification algorithm takes as input the public pa-
rameter PP, public key pk, message m, and a signature Σm and works as follows.




– Run the verification algorithm VerifyΨ of scheme SIG with pk[2] as input
to get the verification result VerifyΨ(PPΨ, pk[2],m,Σm).
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It outputs the verification result, namely “accept” or “reject”.
To construct a public-key encryption (PKE) scheme (Setup,KeyGen,Enc,Dec) (cf.
Definition 2.3, page 13) following the general construction, a signature schemes Π and a
PKE scheme PKE = (SetupΨ,KeyGenΨ,EncΨ,DecΨ) are required. The parameter gen-
eration algorithm Setup and key generation algorithm KeyGen are depicted as above. The
encryption algorithm Enc and decryption algorithm Dec are as follows.
• Enc(PP, pk,m): The encryption algorithm takes as input the public parameter
PP, public key pk and a message m and works as follows.




– Run the encryption algorithm EncΨ of scheme PKE with pk[2] as input to
generate a ciphertext CT= EncΨ(PPΨ, pk[2],m).
It output the ciphertext CT of message m.
• Dec(PP,sk,CT): The decryption algorithm takes as input the public parameter
PP, secret key sk, and a ciphertext CT and works as follows.
– Parse the public parameter PP as (PPΠ,PPΨ,H).
– Compute h = H (sk) and the level-2 secret key sk[2] = Gsk(h).
– Run the decryption algorithm DecΨ of scheme PKE with sk[2] as input to
get the decryption result DecΨ(PPΨ,sk[2],CT).
It outputs the decryption result, i.e. a message m or an error symbol ⊥.
4.4.3 Security of the General Construction
Theorem 4.3. Suppose the hash function H in the general construction is a random ora-
cle. If the following conditions are satisfied, namely
1. Π is (t1,qs,ε1,N)-secure in the MU-EUF-CMA security model.
2. Ψ is (t2,ε2,N,N−1)-secure in the MU-C security model.
3. FΨsk in scheme Ψ is an identity map.
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Then, the scheme constructed from the general construction is (t,ε,N,N− 1)-secure in
the MU-C security model, where
t ≈min{t1, t2}, ε ≤max{ε1,ε2}.
Proof of Theorem 4.3. Suppose there exists an adversary A who can (t,ε,N,N − 1)
break the proposed scheme from the general construction, we construct a simulator B that
can approximately (t,qs,ε,N) break the signature scheme Π or (t,ε,N,N−1) break the
cryptographic scheme Ψ.
B first acts as an adversary against the signature scheme Π and cryptographic scheme
Ψ. The challenger returns the public parameters PPΠ,PPΨ, N public keys of
(





and N public keys of
(




to B. The challenger also provides the following ora-
cles for B to query, namely a signing oracleOΠsign for the signature scheme Π, a corruption
oracle OΨcorr, and a signing oracle OΨsign or a decryption oracle OΨdec depends on whether
the scheme Ψ is a signature scheme or PKE scheme. B controls the random oracle H and
interacts with A as follows.
Setup. B sets the randomness space, key spaces, and functions as described in the general







, for i ∈ [1,N]
of the scheme to A.
Hash Query. B maintains an initially empty list LH of structure (X ,UX), where X refers
to the query and UX refers to the value returned to A. On receiving a query on X from
A, B first checks whether list LH contains the tuple (X ,UX). If yes, it returns UX to A.
Otherwise, it selects a random UX ∈ RΨ, returns UX to A and inserts the tuple (X ,UX)
into list LH . It is easy to see that B can correctly respond to all the hash queries from A.
Note that for a query X , B can verify whether it is a valid signature on any level-1
public key pkΠi (pk
Π
i is also treated as the message) under public key pk
Π
i by running
the verification algorithm VerifyΠ. If VerifyΠ(PPΠ, pkΠi , pk
Π
i ,X) = “accept”, then X is a
forged signature on message pkΠi under public key pk
Π







attack against the signature scheme Π.
Corruption Query. B maintains an initially empty list Lsk of structure (Y,UY ), where Y
refers to the query and UY refers to the value returned to A. On receiving a corruption






from A, for i ∈ [1,N], B first checks whether list
Lsk contains the tuple (Y,UY ). If yes, it returns UY to A. Otherwise, it makes a signing
query on public key pkΠi (pk
Π
i is also treated as the message to be signed) under public
key pkΠi to the signing oracle OΠsign. The challenger returns signature ΣpkΠi to B. Then, B
makes a corruption query on public key pkΨi to the corruption oracle OΨcorr.
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• If B queried the corruption oracle no more than N−1 times, the challenger returns






into list LH .
• If B queried the corruption oracle more than N−1 times, the challenger rejects the
corruption query and B aborts.
Note that function FΨsk : RΨ → SKΨ is an identity map. Therefore, secret key skΨi is
also the correct randomness that used to compute the secret key. From the general con-











and a hash query on ΣpkΠi afterwards, then the simulation is indistin-





is inserted into list LH after
the corruption query.
B aborts if it makes more than N−1 corruption queries to the corruption oracle OΨcorr.
According to the security model,A can make at most N−1 corruption queries. Therefore,
B can correctly responds to all the corruption queries from A.
Signing/Decryption Query. Depends on whether the proposed scheme is a signature or
PKE scheme, A can adaptively make signing or decryption queries under uncorrupted
public keys.
• To construct a signature scheme, scheme Ψ is a signature scheme. On receiving a




, B makes a sign-
ing query on m under pkΨ to the signing oracle OΨsign. The challenger returns the
signature Σm = SignΨ(PPΨ,skΨ,m) to B and B forwards Σm to A.
• To construct a PKE scheme, scheme Ψ is a PKE scheme. On receiving a decryption




, B makes a decryption
query on CT under pkΨ to the decryption oracle OΨdec. The challenger returns the
decryption result DecΨ(PPΨ,skΨ,CT) to B and B forwards the result to A.
It is easy to see that B can correctly respond to all the signing or decryption queries.
Challenge. If the proposed scheme is a PKE scheme, scheme Ψ is a PKE scheme. A





lenged. Then, B forwards m0,m1 and pkΨ to the challenger as a challenge to the PKE
scheme Ψ. The challenger returns a ciphertext CT∗, which is a ciphertext of a message
randomly picked between m0,m1 encrypted by pkΨ. Next, B forwards CT∗ to A as the
challenge ciphertext.
Forgery/Guess. Depending on whether the proposed scheme is a signature or PKE
scheme, A outputs an attack against the scheme.
• If the proposed scheme is a signature scheme, scheme Ψ is a signature scheme. A
outputs its forgery of a signature Σ∗m on message m
∗ under an uncorrupted public
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. B forwards (pk∗
Ψ
,m∗,Σ∗m) to the challenger as its forgery
against the signature scheme Ψ.
• If the proposed scheme is a PKE scheme, scheme Ψ is a PKE scheme. A outputs
its guess “0” or “1” of the challenge ciphertext CT∗. B forwards the guess from A
to the challenger as its guess against the PKE scheme Ψ.
This completes the description of the simulation and how B breaks scheme Π or Ψ with
the help of A. Next, we analyze the advantage of B.
Indistinguishability of the Simulation. The public parameter PPΠ,PPΨ and public keys(










are generated by the challenger. The signature ΣpkΠi and
the result returned as the responses to a corruption query and a signing/decryption query
are computed by the challenger. Moreover, B can correctly respond to all the queries with-
out abort. Therefore, the Setup, Corruption Query, and Signing/Decryption Query
phases are indistinguishable from the real scheme. Next, we discuss what will happen
during the Hash Query phase.







response ΣpkΠi , and then makes a hash query on X = ΣpkΠi , the simulation is indis-
tinguishable from the real scheme as analyzed before.
• If A first makes a hash query on a valid signature X = ΣpkΠi , receives the response
(i.e. a random UX ∈RΨ), and then checks whether UX is correct from FΨpk(UX) and
pkΨi , the simulation is no longer indistinguishable from the real scheme. Never-
theless, B outputs the query X as a forged signature against scheme Π as analyzed
before.
Advantage of B. Since A has advantage ε in breaking the proposed scheme. One of the
following two events will happen with probability ε .






and then a hash query on
X = ΣpkΠi , then the simulation is indistinguishable from the real scheme. A outputs
an attack against the proposed scheme and B forwards the attack to the challenger
to break the cryptographic scheme Ψ.







then B forwards the tuple
(




as a forgery to the challenger to
break the signature scheme Π.
Overall, B has advantage ε in breaking the signature scheme Π or the scheme Ψ after
interacting with A. This completes the proof of Theorem 4.3. 
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Discussions. In the general construction, the secret key of the scheme is a signature of
the signature scheme Π. The signing algorithm SignΠ of scheme Π is only run for once to
generate the level-1 secret key sk[1]. The security of the proposed scheme from the general
construction is dependent on the security of scheme Π and the cryptographic scheme Ψ.
Therefore, we have the following observations.
• A (one-time) signature scheme Π is enough for the general construction.
• If the signature scheme Π is uniqueb, then the proposed scheme following the gen-
eral construction is key-unique.
• If both the scheme Π and scheme Ψ are tightly secure, then the proposed scheme
following the general construction is tightly secure.
Based on the above observations, combining a tightly secure (multi-user setting without
corruptions) unique signature scheme and a tightly secure (not necessarily key-unique)
cryptographic scheme as building blocks, we can construct schemes that are both tightly
secure and key-unique.
4.5 Contribution 3: Tightly Secure Key-Unique Schemes
The extended generalization of key generations in public-key cryptography provides a
general construction by combining two traditional schemes. In this section, we demon-
strate that tightly secure key-unique cryptographic schemes (including signature scheme
and public-key encryption (PKE) scheme) are achievable. As analyzed before, the build-
ing blocks are a tightly MU (multi-user without corruptions) secure unique signature
scheme Π introduced in [51], a tightly MU-C secure signature scheme SIG introduced
in [44], and a tightly MU-C secure encryption scheme PKE presented in Section 4.5.2.
An asymmetric bilinear map (cf. Definition 2.7, page 16) is defined over three cyclic
groups of the same order. We denote the pairing groups by PG= (G1,G2,GT , p,e,g,g2),
where p is the order of the groups, e stands for the bilinear map e : G1×G2→ GT , and
g,g2 are generators of groups G1,G2, respectively.
Recall that the computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) assumption (Definition 2.8, page
17) states that given elements (g,ga,gb) from group G, it is intractable to computed gab.
The computational co-Diffie-Hellman (co-CDH) assumption is the natural generalization
of the CDH assumption to two different source groups (G1,G2) of an asymmetric pairing
e : G1×G2→GT . Specifically, the co-CDH problem introduced by Boneh et al. in [26]
is defined over groups G1,G2 of pairing e, where an isomorphism ψ : G2 → G1 exists.
The problem is to compute ga ∈G1, given g ∈G1,g2,ga2 ∈G2.
bA signature scheme is unique if, for a given message and public key, there is only one unique valid
signature.
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If there is no isomorphism, then the co-CDH problem [26] is defined as given g,ga,gb ∈
G1 with g2,ga2 ∈G2 to compute gab.
Definition 4.6 (co-CDH Problem). For pairing groups PG= (G1,G2,GT , p,e,g,g2), the
co-CDH problem is to compute gab ∈ G1 given g,ga,gb ∈ G1 and g2,ga2 ∈ G2, where




We say the co-CDH assumption holds in pairing groups PG, if for any probabilistic
polynomial-time algorithmA, its advantage in solving the co-CDH problem is negligible.
4.5.1 An Example of Signature Scheme
A unique signature scheme Π = (SetupΠ,KeyGenΠ,SignΠ,VerifyΠ) that is tightly secure
in the MU-EUF-CMA security model introduced in [51] is described as follows.
• SetupΠ(1λ ): The parameter generation algorithm takes as input the secu-
rity parameter λ and a small integer n. It chooses pairing groups PG =
(G1,G2,GT , p,e,g,g2), where the co-CDH assumption holds. Then, it sets the




RΠ = Zp, PKΠ =G2, SKΠ = Zp, FΠpk(α) = gα2 , FΠsk (α) = α.






• KeyGenΠ(PPΠ): The key generation algorithm takes as input the public param-
eter PPΠ and works as follows.
– Pick randomness α ∈RΠ
– Compute the public key pk and secret key sk as
pk = gα2 , sk = α.
It outputs the key pair (pk,sk).
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• SignΠ(PPΠ,sk,m): The signing algorithm takes as input the public parameter
PPΠ, secret key sk, and a message m. It outputs the signature Σm on m as
Σm =
(




HΠ(m)α ,HΠ(m ‖ Σ1m)α , . . . ,HΠ(m ‖ Σn−1m )α ,HΠ(m ‖ Σnm)α
)
,
where Σim = (σ1,σ2, . . . ,σi) and Σm is equivalent to Σ
n+1
m .
• VerifyΠ(PPΠ, pk,m,Σm): The verification algorithm takes as input the public
parameter PPΠ, public key pk, message m, and a signature Σm. It outputs the








HΠ(m ‖ Σim), pk
)
, for i ∈ [1,n].
Otherwise, it outputs “reject”.
Lemma 4.1. Suppose HΠ is a random oracle and qΠ is the maximum number of hash
queries made by the adversary. If for any PPT adversary, its advantage in breaking the








secure in the MU-EUF-CMA security model.
The signature scheme Π is tightly secure in the EUF-CMA (single-user) security model
as proved in [51]. The security proof in the MU-EUF-CMA security model (multi-user
setting without corruptions) is similar. The core idea is to re-randomize the co-CDH
problem instance for the simulation.
Proof of Lemma 4.1. Suppose there exists an adversary A who can (t,qΠ,ε,N) break




in solving the co-CDH problem. B takes as input a co-CDH instance
(g,ga,gb,g2,ga2) from pairing groups PG and its goal is to compute gab. It controls the
random oracle HΠ and computes the solution from one of the hash queries made by A as
follows.
Setup. B picks random (x1, . . . ,xN) ∈ Zp and computes the public keys
pk j = (ga2)
x j , for j = 1, . . . ,N.
B returns the public parameter PPΠ and the public keys (pk1, . . . , pkN) to A. Note that
the secret key sk j for pk j is a · x j, which is an unknown value to B.
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also maintains an initially empty list LΠ of the following structure
(X , IX ,TX ,OX ,UX ,yX).
The items in the list refer to the input, identity, type, order index, response and secret
information of a hash query. B responds as the procedure in [51], i.e.
1. It first determines the identity IX that makes the query, namely A or B.
2. Then, it determines the type of the query, if IX = A and X = m ‖ Σim, where Σim
contains i valid signature blocks under any public key, then it sets TX = i. Otherwise,
it sets TX =⊥.
3. Next, it determines the order index OX of the query.
4. Finally, it selects a random yX ∈ Zp and computes the response as follows. If
(TX ,OX) = (δ ,k), it sets UX = (gb)yX . Otherwise, it sets UX = gyX .
The simulation of Hash Query follows the proof strategy in [51].
Signing Query. A can adaptively make signing queries on any message m under any
public key pk j. B responds to the signing values as in [51].
• If a hash query that contains m is never queried before, then the tuples(




, for i ∈ [1,n+1]




)sk j = (gyi−1m )a·x j = (ga)yi−1m ·x j .
• If A has queried rm types of hash queries that contains the message m, namely
m ‖ Σ0m,m ‖ Σ1m, . . . ,m ‖ Σrmm , for some rm ∈ [0,n] that is adaptively controlled by A,
then for the tuple (m ‖ Σrmm ,A,rm,OX ,UX ,yX).
– If (rm,OX) = (δ ,k), B aborts because the valid signature block







contains gab, which is not computable by B and B cannot correctly respond to
the query.
– If (rm,OX) 6= (δ ,k), then the signature block σrm+1 is computable by B as
σrm+1 = H (m ‖ Σrmm )
sk j = (gyX )a·x j = (ga)yx·x j .
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The simulation of Signing Query follows the proof strategy in [51]. If B can respond to
a signing query as in [51] (single-user setting), then it can respond to the signing queries
under all the public keys since these keys are simulated by re-randomizing the problem
instance.
Forgery. A outputs a signature Σm∗ on message m∗ under public key pk∗.
Computing the solution follows the proof strategy in [51]. Specifically, B computes the
solution from one of the hash queries made by A as follows.
1. B searches list LΠ to find a tuple (X ,A,δ ,k,UX ,yX), where X = m̂ ‖ Σδm̂ contains
a message m̂ and δ valid signature blocks Σδm̂ = (σ1, . . . ,σδ ). It searches LΠ to
find another tuple (X ′,A,δ + 1,OX ′,UX ′,yX ′), where X ′ = m̂ ‖ Σδ+1m̂ contains an
additional valid signature block σδ+1. If any one of the two tuples does not exist,
B aborts.









= (gab)yX ·x j , for some j ∈ [1,N]. Then, it outputs (σδ+1)
1
yX
· 1x j = gab
as the solution to the co-CDH problem instance.
This completes the description of the simulation and solution. Next, we analyze the
advantage of B in solving the co-CDH problem.
Indistinguishability of the simulation. The public parameter PPΠ is set as the problem
instance and the public key pk j is simulated using random exponent x j, for j = 1, . . . ,N.
Therefore, the Setup phase is indistinguishable from the real scheme. The analyses of
Hash Query and Signing Query phases are similar to the proof in [51] since B can
correctly respond to the query using the random exponent x j if it can correctly respond to
the query as the procedure in [51].
Advantage of B. The process that B computes the solution from one of the hash queries
made by A is similar to the proof in [51]. Therefore, if A has advantage ε in breaking




in solving the co-CDH problem. This completes the proof of Lemma 4.1. 
A signature scheme SIG = (SetupΨ,KeyGenΨ,SignΨ,VerifyΨ) that is tightly secure in
the MU-EUF-CMA-C security model introduced in [44] is as follows.
• SetupΨ(1λ ): The parameter generation algorithm takes as input the security
parameter λ . It chooses group (G, p,g), where the CDH and DDH assumptions
hold. Then, it sets the randomness space RΨ, public and secret key spaces
PKΨ×SKΨ, and a pair of functions FΨpk,FΨsk as
RΨ = {0,1}×Zp×G, PKΨ =G2, SKΨ = {0,1}×Zp×G,
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FΨpk(c,zc,g1−c) = (gc,g1−c) = (g
zc,g1−c), FΨsk (c,zc,g1−c) = (c,zc,g1−c).
c
Next, it selects a hash function HΨ : {0,1}∗ → G and a set SΨ of strings. It






• KeyGenΨ(PPΨ): The key generation algorithm takes as input the public param-
eter PPΨ and works as follows.
– Pick randomness (c,zc,g1−c) ∈RΨ
– Compute the public key pk and secret key sk as
pk = (gzc ,g1−c) , sk = (c,zc,g1−c) .
It outputs the key pair (pk,sk).
• SignΨ(PPΨ,sk,m): The signing algorithm takes as input the public parameter
PPΨ, secret key sk, and a message m. It computes the signature Σm on m as
follows.
– Pick a random string s ∈ SΨ and a random element h1−c ∈G.
– Compute h = HΨ(s ‖ m),hc = hzc .
– Generate an non-interactive zero-knowledge proof
πeq,or = ZK.Prv(c,zc;g0,g1,h,h0,h1)
of the fact that loggg0 = loghh0 or loggg1 = loghh1.
It outputs the signature Σm = (s,h0,h1,πeq,or).
• VerifyΨ(PPΨ, pk,m,Σm): The verification algorithm takes as input the public
parameter PPΨ, public key pk, message m, and a signature Σm. It outputs the
verification result “accept” if πeq,or is a valid proof of the fact that loggg0 =
loghh0 or loggg1 = loghh1, i.e.
ZK.Vfy(πeq,or;g0,g1,h,h0,h1) = 1,
where h = HΨ(s ‖ m). Otherwise, it outputs “reject”.
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Lemma 4.2. Suppose HΨ is a random oracle and qΨ,qs are the maximum numbers of
hash and signing queries made by the adversary. If for any PPT adversary, its advantages
in breaking the CDH and DDH assumptions are at most εcdh,εddh respectively, then the
signature scheme SIG is
(
t,2εcdh+ εddh+ qΨqs · negl(λ )
)
-secure in the MU-EUF-CMA-
C security model, where negl(λ ) denotes a negligible value with respect to the security
parameter.
Proof of Lemma 4.2. Please refer to [44] for the comprehensive proof. 
4.5.2 An Example of Public-Key Encryption (PKE) Scheme
To the best of our knowledge, there is no such a PKE scheme available in the literature.
Next, we propose a scheme PKE= (SetupΨ,KeyGenΨ,EncΨ,DecΨ) that is tightly secure
in the MU-IND-CPA-C security model.
• SetupΨ(1λ ): The parameter generation algorithm takes as input the security pa-
rameter λ . It chooses groups PG= (G1,G2,GT , p,e,g,g2) with an admissible
pairing e : G1×G2→ GT , where the co-CDH assumption holds. Then, it sets
the randomness spaceRΨ, public and secret key spaces PKΨ×SKΨ, plaintext
spaceM, and a pair of functions FΨpk,FΨsk as
RΨ = {0,1}×Zp×G1, PKΨ =G21, SKΨ = {0,1}×Zp×G1,M= {0,1}l,
FΨpk(c,zc,g1−c) = (gc,g1−c) = (g
zc ,g1−c), FΨsk (c,zc,g1−c) = (c,zc,g1−c).






• KeyGenΨ(PPΨ): The key generation algorithm takes as input the public param-
eter PPΨ and works as follows.
– Pick randomness (c,zc,g1−c) ∈RΨ
– Compute the public key pk and secret key sk as
pk = (gzc ,g1−c) , sk = (c,zc,g1−c) .
It outputs the key pair (pk,sk).
cThe function Fsk for the secret key is a little different from the definition in [44], this modification is to
make Fsk an identity map for the general construction. The secret key only consists of an additional element,
which is a part of the public key. It is easy to see that this modification does not affect the efficiency or
security of the scheme.
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• EncryptΨ(PPΨ, pk,m): The encryption algorithm takes as input the public pa-
rameter PPΨ, public key pk, and message m ∈ {0,1}l . It encrypts m as follows.
– Pick a random r ∈ Zp and parse pk as (g0,g1).






and CT2 = gr.
– Set (CT0,CT1) = (HΨ(h0)⊕m,HΨ(h1)⊕m).
It outputs the ciphertext CT= (CT0,CT1,CT2).
• DecryptΨ(PPΨ,sk,CT): The decryption algorithm takes as input the public pa-
rameter PPΨ, secret key sk, and ciphertext CT. It decrypts CT as follows.
– Parse sk as (c,zc,g1−c) and CT as (CT0,CT1,CT2).





It outputs the decryption result m.
Lemma 4.3. Suppose HΨ is a random oracle. If for any PPT adversary, its advantage
in breaking the co-CDH assumption is at most ε , then the encryption scheme PKE is
(t,2ε,N,N−1)-secure in the MU-IND-CPA-C security model.
Proof of Lemma 4.3. Suppose there exists an adversary A who can (t,ε,N,N − 1)
break the proposed encryption scheme PKE, we show that there exists a simulator B who
has advantage ε2 in solving the co-CDH problem. B takes as input a co-CDH instance
(g,ga,gb,g2,ga2) from pairing groups PG and its goal is to computes gab. It controls the
random oracle HΨ and computes the solution from one of the hash queries made by A as
follows.
Setup. B sets the public parameter PPΨ as pairing groups PG from the problem instance
and defines the randomness space, key spaces, and functions as the scheme definition. It
simulates the public keys pki, for i = 1, . . . ,N as follows.





a)yi, if ci = 0
g(i)0 = (g
a)yi,g(i)1 = g
xi, if ci = 1
.












is a valid secret key ski corresponding to public key pki.
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Hash Query. B maintains an initially empty list LΨ of structure (X ,UX), where X refers
to the query and UX refers to the value returned to A. On receiving a query X from A,
B first checks whether list LΨ contains the tuple (X ,UX). If yes, it returns UX to A.
Otherwise, it selects a random UX ∈ {0,1}l , returns UX to A, and inserts (X ,UX) into list
LΨ. It is easy to see that B can correctly respond to all the hash queries from A.
Note that for a query X , B can verify whether the following equation holds





, for i ∈ [1,N],
where yi is the random exponent during the simulation of the public key pki. If it satisfies





= e(gab·yi,g2), then X
1
yi = gab is the solution to the co-CDH
problem instance.
Corruption Query. A can adaptively make a corruption query on any public key pki for






as the secret key ski toA. It is easy
to see that B can correctly respond to all the corruption queries without abort.
Challenge. A selects two messages m0,m1 ∈ {0,1}l and an uncorrupted public key pki to
be challenged. B picks random R0,R1 ∈ {0,1}l and sets the challenge ciphertext CT∗ =
(R0,R1,gb). The challenge ciphertext could be seen as an encryption of the message






and the random exponent b if the hash values
of (g(i)0 )
b,(g(i)1 )












It is easy to see that CT∗ is a correct ciphertext and the random value coin is independent









Guess. A outputs a guess coin′ ∈ {0,1} or an error symbol ⊥.
If A outputs an error symbol ⊥, then B aborts. Otherwise, B uses one of the hash
queries from A to compute the solution as explained in the Hash Query phase. This
completes the description of the simulation and solution. Next, we analyze the advantage
of B in solving the co-CDH problem.
Indistinguishability of the simulation. The public parameter PPΨ is set as the problem
instance and the public key pki is simulated using random coin ci and exponents (xi,yi),
for i ∈ [1,N]. The string UX returned to A as the response of a hash query is randomly






returned to A as the response to a corruption query is a
correct secret key of public key pki. The challenge ciphertext is simulated using random
strings R0,R1 and gb from the problem instance. The challenge ciphertext is a correct









the simulation is indistinguishable from the real scheme.









. If the hash query is not made, the value of coin is random
Chapter 4. Tightly Secure Key-Unique Public-Key Cryptographic Schemes in the
Multi-User Setting with Corruptions 66
and unknown to A, which means that it has no advantage in breaking the PKE scheme.
Since A has advantage ε in breaking the scheme. Therefore, it will make such a query
with probability at least ε .
Advantage of B. For an uncorrupted public key pki, the value of ci is independent from








with probability at least ε .




= (gxi)b, B returns a random string from {0,1}l to
A. Then, the challenge ciphertext is no longer correct from A’s view. B cannot
solve the co-CDH problem from the hash query. It happens with probability 12 .




= (ga·yi)b, B computes the solution to the co-CDH
problem instance from this query. It happens with probability 12 .
Overall, B has advantage ε2 in solving the co-CDH problem. This completes the proof
of Lemma 4.3. 
4.6 Chapter Summary
Constructions of tightly secure public-key cryptographic scheme in the multi-user setting
with or without corruptions ([3, 10, 11, 43, 57, 60, 61, 77, 79]) and the optimal security
reductions with impossibility results for certain schemes ([12, 63, 71]) have been exten-
sively studied in the literature. In this chapter, we took an insight into the relationship
between the tight security and key generations in public-key cryptography. We extended
the generalization of key generations in traditional schemes to obtain a different frame-
work consisting of two levels. As an example of its applications, we presented two tightly
secure key-unique schemes, including a signature scheme and a public-key encryption
(PKE) scheme, which circumvented the current impossibility results. It also implies an
alternative approach to constructing tightly secure schemes from two traditional schemes.
The general construction proposed in this chapter is efficient. It combined two tradi-
tional schemes, namely a signature scheme that generates the level-1 keys and a crypto-
graphic scheme that generates the level-2 keys. The public parameter and key pair are
generated once for all. The secret key (i.e. level-1 secret key) of the scheme is used to
compute the level-2 secret key and does not directly take part in the cryptographic func-
tion. The efficiency of the cryptographic functions of the proposed scheme is mainly
determined by the cryptographic scheme. Such a separation is to achieve tight security
and key-uniqueness simultaneously. In practice, the user can only store and use sk[2]. If
the two traditional schemes have some common public parameter (e.g. pairing groups),
then the public parameter can be shared by the two schemes to further improve the effi-
ciency.
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The security considered for signature schemes or public-key encryption (PKE) schemes
in the standard security models is defined in a simplified and ideal setting. In the existen-
tial unforgeability against chosen-message attacks security model (Definition 2.2, page
12) of a signature scheme, the adversary tries to forge a signature under a given public
key, while in the ciphertext indistinguishability against chosen-ciphertext attack security
model (Definition 2.4, page 14) of a PKE scheme, the adversary tries to distinguish the
challenge ciphertext encrypted by a given public key.
Recall the security models of public-key cryptographic schemes in the multi-user set-
ting with corruptions presented in Sec. 4.2, the adversary receives multiple public keys
and can adaptively corrupt the public keys. This reflects the actual scenario and captures
more realistic threats in practical applications. In this chapter, the security of a scheme
refers to the security in the multi-user setting with corruptions without explicit statement.
5.1.2 Related Work and Research Gap
Many efforts have been devoted to achieving tight security public-key cryptographic
schemes, such as signature scheme [11, 44, 10], PKE schemes [13, 62, 78, 80], and
identity-based encryption schemes [9, 15, 29, 30, 48, 49, 64, 65].
At the same time, there are many impossible reduction results available in the literature
[12, 32, 63, 72]. In a recent work [12] by Bader et al., the impossible tight security reduc-
tion for key-rerandomizable schemes under non-interactive assumptions was proposed.
These include the existential unforgeability against chosen-message attacks of a signa-
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ture scheme and indistinguishability against chosen-plaintext attack of a PKE scheme.
Research Gap. The one-more version of cryptographic assumptions [27, 85, 113], such
as one-more computational Diffie-Hellman (n-CDH) are variants of these standard as-
sumptions. Whether we can have tightly secure constructions or the impossible reduction
results also hold for the one-more assumptions remains unknown.
5.1.3 Our Contributions
In this chapter, we study the possibility of constructing tightly secure public-key crypto-
graphic schemes, including the digital signature and PKE schemes under one-more as-
sumptions. Our contributions are three-fold and summarized as follows.
1. We give an affirmative answer to the question that whether it is possible to have
tightly secure constructions under one-more assumptions, which is a supplement to
the impossible tight reduction result by Bader et al. [12].
2. We propose two concrete examples, a signature scheme and a PKE scheme with
tight security under the n-CDH assumption. Both the two schemes are key-unique
and efficient. The sizes of the signature and ciphertext only contain one additional
element compared to the state of the art non-tight constructions. A comparison is
summarized in Table 5.1.
3. Our results also provide evidence from another aspect that there is a gap between
the security of CDH assumption and n-CDH assumption.
Table 5.1: A Comparison of Some Schemes
Reference |pk| |sk| |Σ|/|CT| Sign/Encrypt Verify/Decrypt sec. loss assumption
BLS sig [25] |g2| |Zp| |g1| Th +Te Th +2Tp O(n ·qs)a CDH
ElGamal [1] |g| |Zp| |g|+ lb Th +2Te Th +Te O(n ·qh)a CDH
Our Signature |g| |g| 2|g|c Th +2Te Th +2Tp O(1) n-CDH
Our Encryption 3|g| |g| |g|+2l 2Th +3Te Th +Te O(1) n-CDH
|pk|: the size of the public key, |sk|: the size of the secret key, |Σ|/|CT|: the size of a signa-
ture or ciphertext, Sign/Encrypt: the computation cost of the signing algorithm or encryption algo-
rithm, Verify/Decrypt: the computation cost of the verification algorithm or decryption algorithm.
|g|, |g1|, |g2|: the bit length of an element of group G,G1,G2, respectively. Here, G is a general group
and G1,G2 are pairing groups with an asymmetric pairing e :G1×G2→GT . In particular, our signature
and encryption schemes are implemented using a group G with a symmetric pairing e : G×G→ GT .
Th: a hash operation, Te: a group exponentiation operation, Tp: a bilinear pairing operation.
aHere, qs and qh denote the numbers of signing queries and hash queries the adversary makes, respec-
tively. Namely, the reduction loss of BLS signature and hashed ElGamal is related not only to the number
of users but also to the number of the adversary’s queries.
bHere, l denotes the length of the output of a hash function H : {0,1}∗→{0,1}l
cThe signature contains two group elements and a random bit from {0,1} which we do not count.
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5.2 Preliminaries
For reading convenience, we present the definitions (Definition 4.1, page 45, Defini-
tion 4.2, page 46) of security models in the multi-user setting with corruptions again
in this section. The details come as follows.
Recall that a signature scheme (Definition 2.1, page 11) is composed of four algo-
rithms, namely the parameter generation algorithm Setup, key generation algorithm Key-
Gen, signing algorithm Sign, and verification algorithm Verify. The existential unforge-
ability against adaptive chosen-message attacks in the multi-user setting with corruptions
security model of a signature scheme is defined as the following game. It consists of four
phases, namely Setup, Corruption Query, Signing Query, and Forgery.
• Setup. C runs the parameter generation algorithm Setup to generate the public
parameter and the key generation algorithm KeyGen to generate n public and secret
key pairs. Then, it returns the public parameter and n public keys to A.
• Corruption Query. A can adaptively make a corruption query (at most n−1 times)
on a public key. C returns the corresponding secret key to A.
• Signing Query. A can adaptively make a signing query on a message under an
uncorrupted public key. C runs the signing algorithm Sign with the corresponding
secret key as input and returns the signature to A.
• Forgery. A outputs a signature Σm∗ on message m∗ under public key pk∗.
We say A wins the game if it never makes a corruption query on pk∗, a signing query
on m∗ under pk∗, and Σm∗ is valid. The advantage of the adversary is defined to be the
probability that it wins the game.
Definition 5.1 (MU-EUF-CMA-C Security [12]). A signature scheme is (t,qs,ε,n,n−1)-
secure in the MU-EUF-CMA-C security model if for any probabilistic polynomial-time
adversary A that runs within time t and makes at most qs signing queries, its advantage
is at most ε .
Recall that a public-key encryption (PKE) scheme (Definition 2.3, page 13) is com-
posed of four algorithms, namely the parameter generation algorithm Setup, key genera-
tion algorithm KeyGen, encryption algorithm Encrypt, and decryption algorithm Decrypt.
The ciphertext indistinguishability against chosen-plaintext attack in the multi-user set-
ting with corruptions security model of a PKE scheme is defined as the following game.
It consists of four phases, namely Setup, Corruption Query, Challenge, and Guess.
• Setup. C runs the parameter generation algorithm Setup to generate the public
parameter and the key generation algorithm KeyGen to generate N public and secret
key pairs. Then, it returns the public parameter and N public keys to A.
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• Corruption Query. A can adaptively make a corruption query (at most N − 1
times) on a public key. C returns the corresponding secret key to A.
• Challenge. A selects two messages (m0,m1) from the plaintext space and a public
key pk∗ to be challenged. C randomly picks one message and runs the encryption
algorithm Enc with pk∗ as input to generate the challenge ciphertext CT∗. Then, it
returns CT∗ to A.
• Guess. A outputs a guess of which message is encrypted to generate the challenge
ciphertext.
We say A wins the game if it never makes a corruption query on pk∗, a decryption query
on CT∗ under pk∗, and its guess is correct. The advantage of the adversary is defined to
be the probability that it wins the game minus 12 .
Definition 5.2 (MU-IND-CPA-C Security). A PKE scheme is (t,ε,n,n−1)-secure in the
MU-IND-CPA-C security model if for any probabilistic polynomial-time adversaryA that
runs within time t, its advantage is at most ε .
5.3 Contribution 1: A Tightly Secure Signature Scheme
from One-More CDH Assumption
In this section, we propose a tightly secure key-unique signature scheme. Its security is
based upon the one-more computational Diffie-Hellman (n-CDH) assumption. Next, we
give a description of n-CDH assumption.
Recall that the CDH assumption (Definition 2.8, page 17) states that given (G, p,g,ga,gb),
it is intractable to compute gab. Boldyreva introduced a chosen-target version of CDH
(CT-CDH) assumption in [17]. The chosen-target version of CDH assumption returns
multiple “target points” through a target oracle and provides a helper oracle to return a
CDH solution of a target point. The description of the formal definition comes as follows.
Definition 5.3 (CT-CDH Problem [17]). For group G of order p with generator g and
a random exponent a ∈ Zp, let T and H be two oracles, namely the target oracle and
helper oracle. The target oracle T returns a random element z ∈G and the helper oracle
H takes as input a group element z and returns the group element za. Suppose T and
H are queried qt and qh times respectively, where qt > qh. Given (G, p,g,ga,T ,H), the
CT-CDH problem is to output qt pairs of group elements (vi,zi), such that vi = zai , for
i = 1, . . . ,qt .
We say the CT-CDH assumption holds in group G if for any probabilistic polynomial-
time algorithm A, its advantage in solving the CT-CDH problem is negligible,
Advct-cdhA = Pr
[
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where negl(λ ) denotes a negligible function with respect to the security parameter.
Later, the chosen-target computational assumptions were generalized as one-more as-
sumptions [27]. The one-more CDH (n-CDH) assumption is defined as follows
Definition 5.4 (n-CDH Problem [27]). For group G of order p with generator g and a
random exponent a ∈ Zp, letH be the helper oracle defined as above. SupposeH can be
queried at most n− 1 times. Given (G, p,g,ga,H) and n random elements (h1, . . . ,hn),
the n-CDH problem is to output n elements
(





We say the n-CDH assumption holds in group G, if for any probabilistic polynomial-
time algorithm A, its advantage in solving the n-CDH problem is negligible,
Advn-cdhA = Pr
[(






g,ga,h1, . . . ,hn,H
)]
≤ negl(λ ),
where negl(λ ) denotes a negligible function with respect to the security parameter.
5.3.1 Scheme Construction
Our construction combines the techniques of Boneh-Boyen signature [19] and Katz-Wang
signature [74]. Specifically, the key generation algorithm and signing algorithm combine
the technique of Boneh-Boyen signature scheme [19]. For each public key pk = gα , the
secret key is sk = gα1 . This guarantees the secret key is unique and is also an answer
to a computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) problem instance. To make the reduction loss
independent of the adversary’s signing queries, the signing algorithm in our construction
combines the technique of Katz-Wang signature [74]. It flips a random coin c ∈ {0,1},
computes the hash of the message concatenated with the random coin, and the signature
is composed of an additional bit.
Let PG = (G,GT , p,e,g) denote the pairing groups G,GT of order p, where g is a
generator of group G and e : G×G→GT refers to the pairing. The detailed description
comes as follows.
• Setup(1λ ): On input a security parameter λ , the parameter generation algo-
rithm chooses pairing groups PG = (G,GT , p,e,g). Then, it selects a random
exponent a∈Zp, computes g1 = ga, and a hash function H : {0,1}∗→G. Next,
it sets the public and secret key spaces PK×SK, message spaceM, and sig-
nature space S
PK =G, SK =G,M= {0,1}∗, S =G2×{0,1}.
It outputs the public parameter PP= (PG,g1,H) with the definitions of spaces.
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• KeyGen(PP): On input the public parameter PP, the key generation algorithm
selects a random α ∈ Zp and computes (gα ,gα1 ). Then, it outputs the public
and secret key pair (pk,sk) as
pk = gα , sk = gα1 .
• Sign(PP, pk,sk,m): On input the public parameter PP, public key pk, secret
key sk, and a message m, the signing algorithm flips a random coin c ∈ {0,1},
selects a random r ∈ Zp, and computes
σ1 = sk ·H(pk ‖ m ‖ c)r, σ2 = gr,
where ‖ denotes concatenation. Then, it sets σ3 = c and outputs the signature
σm on message m as σm = (σ1, σ2, σ3). Note that we require the signing
algorithm always uses the same random coin c for the same message m.d
• Verify(PP, pk,m,σ): On input the public parameter PP, public key pk, message
m, and a signature σm, the verification algorithm outputs “accept” if
e(σ1, g) = e(g1, pk) · e
(
H(pk ‖ m ‖ σ3), σ2
)
,
where ‖ denotes the concatenation operation. Otherwise, it outputs “reject”.
Correctness Analysis. For any public key pk = gα , secret key sk = gα1 , and a message
m, a signature σm generated from the signing algorithm is
σm = (σ1, σ2, σ3) =
(
sk ·H(pk ‖ m ‖ c)r, gr, c
)
,
for random coin c ∈ {0,1} and exponent r ∈ Zp. It holds that Verify(PP, pk,m,σm) =
“accept”, since
e(σ1, g) = e
(
sk ·H(pk ‖ m ‖ c)r, g
)
= e(gα1 , g) · e
(
H(pk ‖ m ‖ c)r, g
)
= e(g1, gα) · e
(
H(pk ‖ m ‖ c), gr
)
= e(g1, pk) · e
(
H(pk ‖ m ‖ σ3), σ2
)
.
dAs pointed out by Katz et al. [74], this is straightforward to achieve in practice. For example, using a
pseudo random function F or hash function H ′ to compute the random coin c ∈ {0,1} as c = F(sk,m) or
c = H ′(sk,m). In the security proof, the function F or H ′ will be treated as a random oracle.
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5.3.2 Security Analysis
Theorem 5.1. Suppose H is a random oracle. If for any probabilistic polynomial-time
adversaryA, its advantage in solving the n-CDH problem is at most ε , then the proposed
digital signature scheme is (t,2ε,n,n−1)-secure in the MU-EUF-CMA-C security model.
Proof. Suppose there exists an adversary A who can (t,2ε,n,n− 1) break the proposed
scheme in the MU-EUF-CMA-C security model. We construct a simulator B that has
advantage ε in solving the n-CDH problem. B takes as input an n-CDH problem instance
(
G, p,g,ga,h1, . . . ,hn,H
)
from pairing groups PG, where H is the helper oracle as described above. Its goal is to
output (ha1, . . . ,h
a
n). B controls the random oracle H and interacts with A as follows.
Setup. B first sets g1 = ga and public keys pki = hi, for i = 1, . . . ,n from the prob-
lem instance. Then, it returns the public parameter PP = (PG,g1) and n public keys
(pk1, . . . , pkn) to A. Note that for public key pki = hi = gbi (for some unknown exponent
bi ∈ Zp), the corresponding secret key ski = gbi1 = ga·bi = hai .
Global State. B maintains a global state list LG, which is initially empty. The list stores
tuples of the form (pk,m,b), which consists of a public key pk, a message m, and a coin
b ∈ {0,1}. Whenever B receives a new hash query or signing query on public key pk and
message m, it flips a random coin b ∈ {0,1} and inserts (pk,m,b) into list LG.
Note that this operation and the maintenance of the global state list LG are conducted
by B itself only during the simulation. These operations are not explicitly included in the
description of the scheme.
Corruption Query. A can adaptively make corruption queries on any public key it re-
ceives. On receiving the corruption query on public key pki, B makes a query on element
hi to the helper oracle H and gets hai . It returns ski = hai as the corresponding secret key
to A. Note that hai is the correct secret key of public key pki = hi. There exists at least
one uncorrupted public key if A wins the game and hence A can make at most n− 1
corruption queries. Therefore, B can respond to all the corruption queries without abort.
Hash Query. B maintains a hash list LH , which is initially empty. The list stores tuples of
the form (X ,bX ,rX ,hX), which consists of the query X , a coin bX , a random exponent rX ,
and the hash value hX returned to A. On receiving a new hash query on X , B first parses
X as a public key pk, a message m, and a coin c. If it does not satisfy, B selects a random
hX ∈ G, returns hX to A, and inserts (X ,−,hX) into list LH . Otherwise, it searches list
LG to find the tuple (pk,m,b). If the tuple does not exist, B makes a global state query
on (pk,m). Then, B records the coin value b in list LG and works as follows (suppose the
public key pk in this query equals to hi, for i ∈ [1,n]).
• If c = b, it sets bX = b, selects a random rX ∈ Zp and computes hX = hrXi .
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• If c 6= b, it sets bX = b, selects random rX ∈ Zp and computes hX = grX .
Next, it returns hX to A and inserts (X ,bX ,rX ,hX) into list LH .
Signing Query. A can adaptively make signing queries on any message under an uncor-
rupted public key. On receiving a signing query on message m under public key pk, B first
searches list LG to find the tuple (pk,m,b). If the tuple does not exist, it makes a global
state query on (pk,m). Then, B records the coin value b in list LG. Next, it searches
list LH to find the tuple (X ,bX ,rX ,hX), where X = (pk,m,b). If the tuple does not exist,
B sets bX = b, selects a random rX ∈ Zp, computes hX = hrXi , and inserts (X ,bX ,rX ,hX)
into list LH . It records (bX ,rX ,hX), selects a random sX ∈ Zp, and computes (suppose the
public key pk in this query equals to hi, for i ∈ [1,n])
σ1 = h
rX ·sX
i , σ2 = g
− 1rx
1 ·g
sX , σ3 = b.
B returns σm = (σ1,σ2,σ3) as the signature to A. Note that σm is valid, since
e(σ1, g) = e
(
hrX ·sXi , g
)
= e(hrXi ,g













= e(g1, pk) · e
(
H(pk ‖ m ‖ σ3), σ2
)
.
Therefore, B can correctly respond to all the signing queries without abort.
Forgery. Finally, A outputs its forgery (pk∗,m∗,σ∗m) of an uncorrupted public key, a
message, and a signature.
If A wins the game, which means that it never makes a corruption query on public





3 ) is valid, i.e.
e(σ∗1 , g) = e(g1, pk
∗) · e
(
H(pk∗ ‖ m ‖ σ∗3 ), σ∗2
)
. (5.1)
Then, B searches list LG to find the tuple (pk∗,m∗,b∗). If σ∗3 = b∗, B aborts. Otherwise,





rX . From Eq. (5.1), we have (suppose the public key pk
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For the uncorrupted key pk∗, B does not need to query the helper oracle H to answer







a together with the n− 1 elements
returned from the helper oracleH as the solution to the n-CDH problem.
This completes the description of the simulation and solution procedure. Next, we
analyze the advantage of the simulator B in solving the n-CDH problem.
Indistinguishability of Simulation. The public parameter PP and public keys pk1, . . . , pkn
are set from the problem instance. The coins during the Global State query are randomly
flipped. The secret keys returned during the Corruption Query are returned from the
helper oracle H. The signatures returned during the Signing Query are valid. The hash
values returned during the Hash Query are computed from random exponents. Therefore,
the simulation is indistinguishable from the real scheme.
Advantage of B. A outputs its forgery (pk∗,m∗,σ∗m), where σ∗m = (σ∗1 ,σ∗2 ,σ∗3 ). B aborts
if σ∗3 = b
∗, where b∗ is the coin value of the tuple (pk∗,m∗,b∗) in listLG. SinceA does not
make a signing query on message m∗ under public key pk∗, the coin value b∗ is random
and independent from A’s view. Therefore, B aborts with probability 1/2. Otherwise, B
computes the value h∗i from A’s forgery σ∗m with probability 1/2. If A has advantage 2ε
in breaking the proposed scheme, then B has advantage ε in solving the n-CDH problem.
This completes the proof of Theorem 5.1. 
5.4 Contribution 2: A Tightly Secure Public-Key Encryp-
tion (PKE) Scheme from One-More CDH Assump-
tion
In this section, we propose an efficient construction of tightly secure public-key encryp-
tion (PKE) scheme in the MU-IND-CPA-C security model. The construction is also built
upon the n-CDH problem defined over pairing groups PG= (G,GT , p,e,g).
5.4.1 Scheme Construction
our construction combines the techniques of hashed ElGamal encryption [1, 40] and
Gjosteen-Jager signature [44]. Specifically, the key generation algorithm is similar to the
signature scheme with two additional elements that combines the technique of Gjosteen-
Jager signature [44]. The public key consists of three elements pk = (d,u0,u1), where
d = gα and the secret key is gα1 . This guarantees the secret key is unique and an answer to
a CDH problem instance. The two elements u0,u1 are computed from a hash function H1
with the secret key as input. The encryption algorithm combines the technique of hashed
ElGamal encryption [1], where a random exponent r is selected and two elements ur0,u
r
1
are computed. The ciphertext is composed of an additional element.
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Let PG = (G,GT , p,e,g) denote the pairing groups G,GT of order p, where g is a
generator of group G and e : G×G→GT refers to the pairing. The detailed description
comes as follows.
• Setup(1λ ): On input a security parameter λ , the parameter generation algo-
rithm chooses pairing groups PG= (G,GT , p,e,g). Then, it selects hash func-
tions H1 : {0,1}∗→ {0,1}×Zpe and H2 : {0,1}∗→ {0,1}l . Next, it selects a
random exponent a ∈ Zp, computes g1 = ga, and sets the public and secret key
spaces PK×SK, plaintext space P , and ciphertext space CT as
PK =G3, SK =G, P = {0,1}l, CT = {0,1}l×{0,1}l×G.
It outputs the public parameter PP= (PG,g1,H1,H2).
• KeyGen(PP): On input the public parameter PP, the key generation algorithm
selects a random α ∈ Zp and computes d = gα . Then, it computes gα1 and sets
secret key sk as
sk = gα1 .
Next, it computes H1(sk) = (c,βc) ∈ {0,1}×Zp,uc = gβc , selects a random
element u1−c ∈G, and sets public key pk as
pk = (d,u0,u1).
It outputs the public and secret key pair (pk,sk).
• Encrypt(PP, pk,m): On input the public parameter PP, public key pk =
(d,u0,u1), and a message m, the encryption algorithm selects a random r ∈ Zp.











and ⊕ denotes the string XOR operation.
• Decrypt(PP,sk,CT): On input the public parameter PP, secret key sk, and
ciphertext CT = (CT0,CT1,CT2), the decryption algorithm first computes
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Correctness Analysis. For any public key pk = (d,u0,u1) = (gα ,gβc,u1−c), secret key






for random exponent r ∈ Zp. The decryption algorithm Decrypt first computes H1(sk) =

























Theorem 5.2. Suppose H1,H2 are random oracles. If for any probabilistic polynomial-
time adversary A, its advantage in solving the n-CDH problem is at most ε , then the
proposed PKE scheme is (t,2ε,n,n−1)-secure in the MU-IND-CPA-C security model.
Proof of Theorem 5.2. Suppose there exists an adversary A who can (t,2ε,n,n− 1)
break the proposed PKE scheme in the MU-IND-CPA-C security model. We construct
a simulator B that has advantage ε in solving the n-CDH problem. B takes as input an
n-CDH problem instance (
G, p,g,ga,h1, . . . ,hn,H
)
from pairing groups PG, where H is the helper oracle as described above. Its goal is to
output
(




. B controls the random oracles H1,H2 and interacts withA as follows.
Setup. B first sets g1 = ga from the problem instance. Denote the i-th public key B returns
toA by pki = (di,ui0,ui1), B sets di = hi from the problem instance, for i = 1, . . . ,n. Then,
it randomly selects a coin ci ∈ {0,1} and exponents (β ic,β i1−c) ∈ Zp and computes uici =
gβ
i
c ,ui1−ci = (hi)
β i1−c . Next, it returns the public parameter PP = (PG,g1) and n public
keys (pk1, . . . , pkn) to A. Note that for public key pki = (di,ui0,ui1), where di = hi = gbi
(for some unknown exponent bi), the corresponding secret key ski = g
bi
1 = g
a·bi = hai .
Corruption Query. A can adaptively make corruption queries on any public key it re-
ceives. On receiving the corruption query on public key pki = (di,ui0,u
i
1), B makes a
query on element di = hi to the helper oracle H and gets hai . Then, it returns ski = hai as
the corresponding secret key to A and inserts the tuple
(
hai ,ci ‖ β ic
)
into list L1.




1). There exists at
least one uncorrupted public key ifA wins the game and henceA can make at most n−1
corruption queries. Therefore, B can correctly respond to all the corruption queries.
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Hash Query on H1. B maintains a hash list L1, which is initially empty. The list stores
tuples of the form (X ,hX), where X and hX refer to the query and the hash value returned
toA, respectively. On receiving a new hash query on X , B first checks whether one of the
following equations holds (where di is from public key pki) and works as follows,
e(X ,g) = e(di,g1), for i = 1, . . . ,n.
• If the equations do not hold, B randomly selects a coin cX ∈ {0,1} and an exponent
βX ∈ Zp, sets hX = cX ‖ βX , and return hX to A.
• If the i-th equation, it means that X equals to the corresponding secret key ski = hai .
Then, B sets hX = ci ‖ β ic and returns hX to A.
Next, B inserts the tuple (X ,hX) into list L1.
Note that for a query on a correct secret key ski of public key pki, B can detect by
checking the pairing equation. Then, it returns with the random coin ci and exponent β ic.
Therefore, this query phase is indistinguishable from the real scheme.
Hash Query on H2. B maintains a hash list L2, which is initially empty. The list stores
tuples of the form (Y,hY ), where Y and hY refer to the query and the hash value returned
to A, respectively. On receiving a new hash query on Y , B selects a random string hY ∈
{0,1}l , returns hY to A, and inserts the tuple (Y,hY ) into list L2.
For a query Y after the Challenge phase, B takes the following additional operation.






β ∗c ,(h∗i )
β ∗1−c,
)
where the random coin c ∈ {0,1} and exponents (β ∗c ,β ∗1−c) ∈ Zp are used to simulate







where gr1 = g
a·r is from the challenge ciphertext CT∗. If the equation holds, it means that
Y equals to (h∗i )
β ∗1−c·a·r. Then, B can compute a solution (h∗i )a from the query.
Challenge. A chooses two message (m0,m1) ∈ {0,1}l and an uncorrupted public key
pk∗ = (d∗,u∗0,u
∗
1). B randomly selects an exponent r ∈ Zp and two strings (R0,R1) ∈








where gr1 = g
a·r. Note that the challenge ciphertext CT∗ can be seen as the encryption of















Guess. Finally, A outputs its guess c′ or ⊥.
If A makes a hash query on Y = (h∗i )β
∗
1−c·a·r to oracle H2, B can detect this query by








β∗1−c·r = (h∗i )
β∗1−c·a·r
β∗1−c·r = (h∗i )
a.
For the uncorrupted key pk∗, B does not need to query the helper oracle H to answer the
corruption query. At last, it outputs (h∗i )
a together with the n−1 elements returned from
the helper oracleH as the solution to the n-CDH problem.
This completes the description of the simulation and solution procedure. Next, we
analyze the advantage of the simulator B in solving the n-CDH problem.
Indistinguishability of Simulation. The public parameter PP and public keys pk1, . . . , pkn
are set from the problem instance and random exponents β ic,β
i
1−c. The secret keys re-
turned during the Corruption Query are returned from the helper oracle H. The hash
values returned during both Hash Query on H1 and Hash Query on H2 phases are ran-
domly selected. The challenge ciphertext CT∗ is simulated using ga·r with the random ex-
ponent r and random strings R1,R2. It is a correct ciphertext of message mcoin ∈ (m0,m1)
encrypted by public key pk∗ = (d∗,u∗0,u
∗





grammed to be R0⊕mcoin and R1⊕mcoin. Therefore, the simulation is indistinguishable
from the real scheme from A’s view before it makes the hash query on (u∗0)a·r or (u∗1)a·r.
Advantage of A. The decryption result of the challenge ciphertext depends on the hash
value of (u∗0)
a·r or (u∗1)
a·r. Before A makes such a query, which message is encrypted is
random and independent from A’s view. In other words, A has no advantage in distin-
guishing the challenge ciphertext. According to the breaking assumption, A has advan-




Advantage ofB. For the uncorrupted public key pk∗=(d∗,u∗c ,u∗1−c)=
(
h∗i ,g
β ∗c ,(h∗i )
β ∗1−c
)
simulated by the random coin c and exponents β ∗c ,β
∗
1−c, the value of coin c is random and
independent fromA’s view. Amakes the hash query on (u∗0)a·r or (u∗1)a·r with probability
2ε and B works as follows.
• If A makes a query on (u∗c)a·r = gβ
∗
c ·a·r, this does not help B in solving the n-CDH
problem and B aborts. This happens with probability 12 .
• If A makes a query on (u∗1−c)a·r = (h∗i )
β ∗1−c·a·r, B can detect this query and solves
the n-CDH problem. This happens with probability 12 .
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Overall, if A has advantage 2ε in breaking the scheme, B has advantage ε in solving
the n-CDH problem. This completes the proof of Theorem 5.2. 
5.5 Chapter Summary
In this chapter, we studied the possibility of constructing tightly secure public-key cryp-
tographic schemes under one-more assumptions. We proposed two schemes, namely a
digital signature scheme and a public-key encryption (PKE) scheme as concrete exam-
ples of achieving tight security in the multi-user with adaptive corruption setting. The
signature scheme and the PKE scheme are key-unique and achieve the existential un-
forgeability against chosen-message attacks (MU-EUF-CMA-C) and indistinguishability
against chosen-plaintext attack (MU-IND-CPA-C) security respectively. Our results can
be seen as a supplement to the impossible reduction results in [12]. Following the gen-
eral transformation technique [38], our PKE scheme can be easily transformed to achieve
stronger security, i.e. indistinguishability against chosen-ciphertext attack.
Part II







The integrity of the data stored in the cloud server is an important security issue in cloud
storage platforms. To check the integrity of the uploaded data, an auditing mechanism is
required in a cloud auditing system. There are many cryptographic solutions to this secu-
rity issue, such as provable data possession (PDP) [7], proofs of retrievability (PoR) [70],
and proofs of storage (PoS) [8]. For example, the PDP protocol introduced by Ateniese
et al. allows the user to verify whether the cloud server still possesses the uploaded data
without retrieving it. Specifically, three entities are involved in the system, namely the
cloud server, user, and third-party auditor (TPA). The user first divides the file into file
blocks and generates a tag for each file block. The uploaded data include both the file
blocks and tags. The TPA generates a challenge with the user’s public key and runs the
PDP protocol with the cloud server.
The auditing process running a PDP protocol is efficient. However, new challenges
arise in some applications. For example, anonymity is required in many scenarios like an
electronic voting system. Since the challenge is computed from the user’s public key pk,
the TPA needs the user’s public key during an auditing process. Therefore, it not only
verifies the integrity of the data but also learns which user uploads the data as shown in
Fig. 6.1. To guarantee the anonymity of the user, additional techniques need to be applied.
In this chapter, we refer to such a security issue as user’s identity privacy and the cloud
auditing schemes that deal with this issue as privacy-preserving cloud auditing schemes.
6.1.2 Related Work and Research Gap
There are many cloud auditing schemes [7, 36, 89, 95, 98, 96, 101, 102, 103, 104, 109,
110, 111] available in the literature. Some of them [36, 95, 96, 98, 101, 106, 110, 111]
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Figure 6.1: Identity Privacy in Cloud Auditing
achieve the privacy-preserving property. The basic idea of most schemes applies the ring
signature or group signature techniques. In [98], a privacy-preserving auditing scheme
is proposed, the tag generation algorithm of which is similar to that in a ring signature
scheme. As a result, the size of the tag and the computation cost of verifying the server’s
response are both linear with the number of the uploaders. Feng et al. [36] gave a security
analysis of the scheme in [98] together with a novel construction. The tag size and com-
putation cost are also linear in the number of uploaders. Another scheme that is suitable
for larger groups was presented in [96]. The tag generation algorithm borrows the idea
of the short group signature by Boneh et al. in [21]. The size of the tag and the com-
putation cost of verifying responses are constant, which is independent of the number of
uploaders. However, the tag still consists of 11 group elements and the verification cost
requires 7 pairing computations. Yu et al. put forward a construction [110] that is suitable
for small-scale groups, where all the uploaders share the same key pair. The anonymity
of the uploader is guaranteed while the key management and update become inefficient.
The scheme in [95] also enjoys the advantage of small size tags and low computation
cost during an auditing process. However, it requires a fully-trusted third party, named
security-mediator (SEM). The introduction of a fully-trusted third party is impractical in
implementations.
Research Gap. The straightforward solutions to achieving privacy-preserving cloud au-
diting schemes, such as sharing the same key among all the users or resorting to a fully-
trusted SEM is impractical for implementation. Applying the ring signature or group
signature techniques in the tag generation algorithm is feasible, however, the tag is not
compact. Note that this could cause a waste of the storage space since most space will be
used to store the tags.
Chapter 6. Privacy-Preserving Cloud Auditing 84
6.1.3 Our Contributions
In this chapter, we explore the construction of privacy-preserving cloud auditing schemes
with compact tags. We put forward a novel construction of privacy-preserving cloud
auditing scheme together with the security proofs.
Compared with current known constructions, our scheme enjoys the following advan-
tages. We do not apply ring signature or group signature techniques in the tag generation
algorithm. As a result, the tag of a file block only contains one group element, which is as
compact as the BLS short signature scheme [25]. Meanwhile, we do not require the user
to share the same key or a fully-trusted third party in our scheme to guarantee the user’s
identity privacy. To verify a response from the cloud server, the TPA only needs one pair-
ing operation, which is more efficient than previous constructions. A brief comparison is
given in Table 6.1.
Table 6.1: Comparison of Some Privacy-Preserving Auditing Schemes
Scheme Tag Size Tag Generation Cost Verification Cost
FMY15 [36] 2(n+1) · |g| (2n+1) ·Te +Th 2n ·Te +2n ·Tm +2n ·Tp
WLL12b [96] 4 · |g|+ |gT |+6|Zp| 15Te +2Th +3Tp 15Te +Th +7Tp
WLL12a [98] n · |g| 2n ·Te +Th 2Te +Th +(n+1) ·Tm +(n+2) ·Tp
Our Scheme |g| 2Te +Th 3Te +Tp
Suppose there are n users, |g| and |gT | denote the bit length of an element in group G and GT , where
e : G×G→GT denotes a symmetric pairing. Te: exponentiation in group G, Tm: multiplication in the
finite field where group GT is defined, Th: hash operation, Tp: bilinear pairing operation.
6.2 Preliminaries
Recall that a cloud auditing scheme (Definition 2.5, 14) is composed of six algorithms,
namely the parameter generation algorithm Setup, key generation algorithm KeyGen, tag
generation algorithm TagGen, challenge algorithm Challenge, response algorithm Re-
spond, and verification algorithm Verify. A privacy-preserving cloud auditing scheme
is similar to the aforementioned definition except that the input of challenge algorithm
contains multiple public keys of multiple users to guarantee the identity privacy of the
real uploader. The detailed description comes as follows.
Definition 6.1 (Privacy-Preserving Cloud Auditing). A privacy-preserving cloud audit-
ing scheme is composed of six algorithms namely, the parameter generation algorithm,
key generation algorithm, tag generation algorithm, challenge algorithm, response al-
gorithm, and verification algorithm. These algorithms are denoted by Setup, KeyGen,
TagGen, Challenge, Respond, and Verify, respectively.
• Setup(1λ ): On input a security parameter λ , the parameter generation algorithm
outputs the public parameter PP, which includes the definitions of the public and
secret key spaces PK×SK, file block space F , and tag space T .
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• KeyGen(PP): On input the public parameter PP, the key generation algorithm
outputs a public and secret key pair (pk,sk) ∈ PK×SK.
• TagGen(PP,sk, i,m): On input the public parameter PP, secret key sk, index i, and
a message m ∈F , the tag generation algorithm outputs a tag σ ∈ T on message m.
• Challenge(PP,{pk j}nj=1,I): On input the public parameter PP, public keys {pk j}nj=1,
and a set I of indexes, the challenge algorithm outputs a challenge ∆.
• Respond(PP,∆,M,Σ): On input the public parameter PP, challenge ∆, and the
corresponding stored messages M and tags Σ, the response algorithm outputs a
response Π.
• Verify(PP,∆,Π): On input the public parameter PP, challenge ∆, and response Π,
the verification algorithm outputs the verification result, i.e. “accept” or “reject”.
Correctness. The correctness requirement of a privacy-preserving cloud auditing scheme
states that for any public and secret key pairs {pk j,sk j}nj=1 generated by the key genera-
tion algorithm KeyGen, any challenge ∆ generated by the public keys {pk j}nj=1 and index
set I, and the response Π generated by the challenge ∆, the corresponding messages M
and tags Σ, it holds that
Verify(PP,∆,Π) = “accept”,
where M = {mi ∈ F | i ∈ I} are messages from the file block space and Σ = {σi j | i ∈ I}
are tags on the messages M. In particular, σi j denotes a tag stored at the storage space
indexed by i and generated by the j-th secret key sk j from the tag generation algorithm
TagGen.
In practice, the cloud server might accidentally or maliciously delete the stored data
due to the technical problems or damage of its storage devices. When such an event
happens, the server may try to hide this failure and deceive others that the data is still
well stored. Then, it needs to cheat the third-party auditor (TPA) by correctly responding
the challenge without the corresponding messages and tags. Therefore, a secure privacy-
preserving cloud auditing scheme should guarantee that a dishonest cloud server cannot
cheat the TPA if it does not store the corresponding data. We refer such a security issue
as uncheatability and the security model is defined through a game between a challenger
C and an adversary A. It consists of four phases, namely
• Setup. C runs the parameter generation algorithm Setup to generate the public
parameter PP and key generation algorithm KeyGen to generate a public and secret
key pair (pk,sk). Then, it returns the public parameter PP and public key pk to A.
• Tag Generation Query. A can adaptively make the tag generation queries on any
messages. On receiving a tag generation query on a message m ∈ F , C runs the tag
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generation algorithm TagGen with the secret key sk as input to generate a tag σm
on message m and returns σm to A.
• Challenge. A chooses a set I∗ of indexes, such that there exists at least one index
in i∗ that it never makes a tag generation query. C runs the challenge algorithm with
the public key pk as input to generates a challenge ∆ and returns ∆ to A.
• Response. Finally, A outputs its response Π.
We say A wins the game if the response it outputs is valid, i.e.
Verify(PP,∆,Π) = “accept”.
Definition 6.2. A privacy-preserving cloud auditing scheme is (t,ε)-uncheatable if for
any probabilistic polynomial-time adversary A that runs within time t, its advantage in
winning the above game is at most ε , i.e.
Adv(A) = Pr [Verify(PP,∆,Π) = “accept” | Π←A(∆)]≤ ε.
Another aspect of security with regard to a privacy-preserving cloud auditing scheme is
the identity privacy of the user. During an auditing process, a curious TPA might attempt
to distinguish who uploads the data. Hence, a secure privacy-preserving cloud auditing
scheme should also guarantee the identity privacy of the user. We refer to such a security
issue as anonymity and the security model is defined through a game between a challenger
C and an adversary A. For simplicity, we assume that there is only one index involved in
the challenge phase and A tries to distinguish that C uses the tag generated by which user
to generate the response. It consists of four phases, namely
• Setup. C runs the parameter generation algorithm Setup to generate the public
parameter PP and key generation algorithm KeyGen to generate n public and secret
key pairs (pk j,sk j), for j = 1, . . . ,n. Then, it returns the public parameter PP and
public keys pk1, . . . , pkn to A.
• Challenge. A chooses an index i and runs the challenge algorithm Challenge to
generate a challenge ∆. Then, it returns ∆ to C.
• Response. C picks a j ∈ [1,n] at random and runs the tag generation algorithm
TagGen with the jth secret key sk j as input to generate a tag σm j. Then, it runs the
response algorithm Respond with the message m and tag σm j as input to generate a
response Π and returns Π to A.
• Guess. A first checks the validity of the response Π. If Π is valid, then A outputs
its guess j′ ∈ [1,n].
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We say A wins the game if j′ = j.
Definition 6.3. A privacy-preserving cloud auditing scheme is information-theoretically
anonymous if for any adversary A, its advantage in winning the above game is zero, i.e.
Adv(A) =
∣∣∣∣Pr[ j′ = j | j′←A(Π)]− 1n
∣∣∣∣= 0.
6.3 Contribution 1: A Privacy-Preserving Cloud Audit-
ing Scheme with Compact Tags
6.3.1 A Variant of Bilinear Diffie-Hellman (vBDH) Assumption
In this section, we introduce a variant of bilinear Diffie-Hellman (BDH) assumption called
vBDH assumption that is the underlying hardness assumption of our construction. Recall
that the BDH assumption (Definition 2.9, page 17) defined over pairing groups PG =
(G,GT , p,e,g) states that given (g,ga,gb,gc) to compute e(g,g)abc is intractable.
Definition 6.4 (vBDH Problem). For pairing groups PG = (G,GT , p,e,g). The vBDH
problem is given (g,ga,gb,gac), for random exponents a,b,c ∈ Z∗p to compute e(g,g)bc.
We say the vBDH assumption holds in pairing groups PG if for any probabilistic






where negl(λ ) denotes a negligible function with respect to the security parameter.
In [20], Boneh et al. introduced the general Diffie-Hellman exponent problem and gave
a security proof of the hardness of these problems in the generic group model [92] in the
following theorem.
Definition 6.5. Let P,Q ∈ Fp[X1, . . . ,Xn]s be two s-tuples of n-variate polynomials over
Fp. Write P = (p1, . . . , ps) and Q = (q1, . . . ,qs), where p1 = q1 = 1. We say that a
polynomial f ∈ Fp[X1, . . . ,Xn] is dependent on the sets (P,Q) if there exist s2+s constants










For polynomial f , we use d f denote the degree of f and define dP = max{d f | f ∈
P}. We say a polynomial f is independent on sets (P,Q) if it does not satisfy the above
definition.
Let two random encodings ξ1,ξ2 of the additive group Z+p , i.e. injective maps ξ1,ξ2 :
Z+p →{0,1}m. We write Gi = {ξi(x) | x∈Z+p } , for i = 1,2. The following theorem gives
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a lower bound on advantage of a generic algorithm in solving decisional (P,Q, f )-Diffie-
Hellman problem.
Theorem 6.1. Let P,Q ∈ Fp[X1, . . . ,Xn]s be two s-tuples of n-variate polynomials over Fp
and let f ∈ Fp[X1, . . . ,Xn]. Let d = max(2dP,dQ,d f ), ξ1,ξ2,G1,G2 be defined as above.
If f is independent of (P,Q) then for any A that makes at most q queries to the oracles
computing the group operation in G1,G2 and bilinear map e : G1×G1→G2, we have:∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
Pr
A




x1, . . . ,xn,y←R Fp,
b←R {0,1},








Theorem 6.2. The variant bilinear Diffie-Hellman (vBDH) assumption holds in pairing
groups PG in the generic group model.
Proof of Theorem 6.2. The vBDH problem is given (g,ga,gb,gac) to compute e(g,g)bc.
Therefore, we have P=(1,a,b,ac),Q=(1) and f = bc. It is easy to compute polynomials
f ′ = f0 + f1a+ f2b+ f3a2 + f4b2 + f5ab+ f6ac+ f7a2c+ f8abc+ f9a2c2,
from sets (P,Q) for any coefficients f0, . . . , f9 but not polynomial f = bc. In other words, f
is independent of sets (P,Q) as defined in the above definition. According to Theorem 6.1,
the advantage in solving the vBDH problem is negligible for any algorithm, i.e. the vBDH
assumption holds in generic group model. This completes the proof of Theorem 6.2. 
6.3.2 Scheme Construction
• Setup(1λ ): On input the security parameter λ , the parameter generation algo-
rithm chooses pairing groups PG = (G,GT ,e, p,g). Then, it randomly selects
another generator u ∈ G and hash functions H : {0,1}∗→ G. Next, it sets the
public and secret key spaces PK×SK, file block space F , and tag space T as
PK =G,SK = Zp,F = Zp,T =G.
It outputs the public parameter PP= (PG,u,H) with the definitions of spaces.
• KeyGen(PP): On input the public parameter PP, the key generation algorithm
selects a random x ∈Zp and computes gx. Then, it outputs the public and secret
key pair (pk,sk) as
pk = gx,sk = x.
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• TagGen(PP,sk, i,m): On input the public parameter PP, secret key sk = x, an





and outputs σm as the tag to be stored at the storage space indexed by i.
• Challenge(PP,{pk j}nj=1,I): On input the public parameter PP, public keys
{pk j}nj=1, and a set I of indexes chosen randomly, the challenge algorithm first
randomly chooses si ∈ Zp for each i ∈ I, w ∈ Zp, and h ∈G. Then, it computes
pkchal = (pkw1 , . . . , pk
w
n ,h,h
w) and outputs the challenge as
∆ = (Q, pkchal),
where Q = {(i,si) | i ∈ I}.
• Respond(PP,∆,M,Σ): On input the public parameter PP, challenge ∆ =
(Q, pkchal), and the corresponding stored messages M and tags Σ, the response
algorithm first checks whether
e(pkwj ,h)
?




si ·mi, σres = ∏
(i,si)∈Q
e(σ sii j , pk
w
j ),
from the stored messages M = {mi | i ∈ I} and tags Σ = {σi j | i ∈ I}, where
σi j denotes that the tag stored at the storage space indexed by i is generated by
the j-th secret key sk j. It outputs the response as Π = (µ,σres).
• Verify(PP,∆,Π): On input the public parameter PP, challenge ∆, response Π,
and the secret information w used to generate the challenge, the verification








Otherwise, it outputs “reject”.
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Correctness Analysis. This completes the description of the scheme construction. Next,
we give the correctness analysis of the scheme. For public keys pk j = gx j , j = 1, . . . ,n,





For any challenge ∆=(Q, pkchal), where Q= {(i,si) | i∈I} and pkchal=(pkw1 , . . . , pkwn ,h,hw),
the response Π = (µ,σres) is computed as µ = ∑(i,si)∈Q si ·mi and
σres = ∏
(i,si)∈Q
























For a given challenge ∆ = (Q, pkchal), response Π = (µ,σres), and the secret information
































Theorem 6.3. Suppose hash function H is a random oracle that the adversary makes
at most qH queries. If for any probabilistic polynomial-time adversary A, its advantage
in solving the vBDH problem is at most ε , then the proposed privacy-preserving cloud
auditing scheme is (t,qH · ε)-uncheatable.
Proof of Theorem 6.3. Suppose there exists an adversary A who can (t,qH · ε) break the
uncheatability of the proposed privacy-preserving cloud auditing scheme. We construct a
simulator B that has advantage ε in solving the vBDH problem. B takes as input a vBDH
problem instance (PG,ga,gb,gac) from pairing groups PG and its goal is to compute
e(g,g)bc. B controls the random oracle H and interacts with A as follows.
Setup. B first chooses random r0,r1, . . . ,rn,∈ Zp and sets
u = (ga)r0, pk j = (ga)r j , for j = 1, . . . ,n.
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Then, it returns the public parameter PP= (PG,u) and public keys pk1, . . . , pkn to A.
Hash Query. B maintains an initially empty list LH and selects a random i′ ∈ [1,qH ]. On
receiving a new hash query on index i, it selects a random ti ∈ Zp and works as follows.
• If i = i′, it sets hi = (gb)ti .
• If i 6= i′, it sets hi = (ga)ti .
Then, it returns hi to A and inserts (i, ti,hi) into list LH .
Tag Generation Query. On receiving a tag generation query on message m ∈ Zp, index
i, and public key pk j, B first checks whether i = i′. If yes, it aborts. Otherwise, it searches
list LH for the tuple (i, ti,hi) and works as follows.
• If the tuple (i, ti,hi) does not exist, it selects a random ti ∈ Zp, computes hi = (ga)ti ,
and inserts (i, ti,hi) into list LH .
• Otherwise, it records ti.
Then, it computes σi j = (gti ·gr0·m)
1
r j and returns σi j as the tag to A. We can see that σi j
is a valid tag since
σi j = gti/r j ·gr0·mi/r j





Challenge. A chooses an index i∗. If i∗ 6= i′, then B aborts. Otherwise, B generates the
challenge as follows. B first selects random exponents s∗i ,y ∈ Zp and computes
pkchal =
(
(gac)r1 , . . . ,(gac)rn,(ga)y,(gac)y
)
.
Then, it returns the challenge ∆ = (Q, pkchal) to A, where Q = (i∗,s∗i ). Note that the ele-
ments (gac)r j in pkchal satisfy (gac)r j = (ga·r j)c = pkcj. Therefore, the secret information
in generating the challenge is equivalent to c, which is an unknown value to B.
Response. Finally, A outputs its response Π = (µ,σres).
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as the solution to the vBDH problem instance.
This completes the description of the simulation and solution. Next, we analyze the
advantage of B. Whether B can output the solution depends on the following events.
1. B does not abort during the Tag Generation Query phase.
2. B does not abort during the Challenge phase.
3. A outputs a valid response.
According to the definition of security model, A cannot make tag generation query on
the index it chooses in the Challenge phase. As a result, if B does not abort during the
Challenge phase (i.e. i∗ = i′), then it does not abort during the Tag Generation Query
phase. SinceA can make at most qH queries to the random oracle and B randomly selects
an i′ ∈ [1,qH ], the probability that i∗ = i′ is 1qH . Therefore, B does not abort during the
simulation with probability at least 1qH . If A can (t,qH · ε) break the proposed scheme,
then B has advantage at least ε in solving the vBDH problem. This completes the proof
of Theorem 6.3. 
Theorem 6.4. The proposed privacy-preserving cloud auditing scheme is information-
theoretically anonymous, i.e. for any adversary A, its advantage in distinguishing the
identity of the user during an auditing process is zero.
Proof of Theorem 8.3. The simulator B interacts with the adversary A as follows.
Setup. B runs the parameter generation algorithm Setup and key generation algorithm
KeyGen to generate the public parameter PP and n public and secret key pairs (pk j,sk j),
for j = 1, . . . ,n. Then, it returns the public parameter PP and public keys pk1, . . . , pkn to
A.
Challenge. A chooses index i and w∈Zp. Then, it generates a challenge ∆ = (Q, pkchal),
where Q = (i,si) and pkchal = (pkw1 , . . . , pk
w
n ,h,h
w). Next, it submits ∆ to B.
Response. B first checks whether
e(pksj,h)
?
= e(pk j,hs), for j = 1, . . . ,n.
If the equations holds, then it randomly picks a j ∈ [1,n] and a message m ∈ Zp. Then, it
runs the tag generation algorithm TagGen with the j-th secret key sk j as input to generate
a tag σi j on message m. Next, it runs the response algorithm Respond with the message
m and tag σi j as input to generate the response Π = (µ,σres), where µ = si ·m,σres =
e(σi j, pkwj ). At last, B returns Π to A.
Guess. Finally, A outputs its guess j′ ∈ [1,n] if the response Π is valid.
It is easy to see that the tag σi j is valid since it is generated by the secret key sk j
and hence the response Π is valid. Moreover, for a given challenge ∆ = (Q, pkchal),
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where Q = (i,si), we analyze two responses Π = (µ,σres),Π′ = (µ ′,σ ′res) generated from
two tags σi j,σi j′ . Here, the tags σi j,σi j′ are generated by the j-th and j′-th secret keys





































Therefore, for any challenge, the two responses Π,Π′ generated from two tags by two
users are identical. As a result, A cannot gain any more information from the response
than randomly guessing. This completes the proof of Theorem 8.3. 
6.3.4 Performance Comparison
Suppose there are n uploaders, we run the schemes for n = 5,15,25,35,45, respectively.
We use the Pairing Based Cryptography library (PBC-0.5.14) in comparing our scheme,
the scheme in [96] and [98] using type A and type D curves respectively. The hardware
and software specification is shown in Table 6.2.
Table 6.2: Implementation Details
CPU Intel Core i5-2500 @3.3GHz
RAM 8GB DDR3 1333 MHz
Operation System 64-bit Ubuntu Linux 14.04
Compiler GNU C&C++ Compiler 4.8.4
There are two main types of pairings, namely symmetric pairing and asymmetric pair-
ing. For a specific construction of pairing e : G1×G2 → GT , if G1 = G2, it is called
symmetric pairing. Otherwise, it is asymmetric pairing. In PBC library, a particular im-
plementation of symmetric pairing is type A and some implementations of asymmetric
pairings, such as type D. Briefly speaking, symmetric pairing requires larger (binary pre-
sentation) prime in defining the underlying elliptic curve while the pairing computation
is comparatively faster than asymmetric pairing. Asymmetric pairing allows shorter pre-
sentation of the prime in defining the elliptic curve and hence is suitable for constructing
short signature schemes. On the other hand, the pairing computation is slightly slower.
In achieving 80-bit security level, the size of q in defining the elliptic curve E(Fq) is
at least 160-bit, where exists a subgroup of at least 160-bit order p. The size of qk in
defining the target group GT of the pairing is at least 1024-bit. For symmetric pairing,
such as the type A pairing implemented in PBC library, the embedding degree k equals
to 2. Therefore, the size of q is at least 512-bit. Specifically, the parameter of the type A
pairing is shown in Table 6.3.
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Equation y2 = x3 + x
p 0x8000000000000800000000000000000000000001
Table 6.4: Parameter Details of Type D Pairing
q 0x6DA035D6C365B49575D31C38205468FCFD6A65C5
Equation




On the other hand, asymmetric pairing such as the type D pairing implemented in PBC
library has embedding degree k = 6. Therefore, a 159-bit q can roughly provides 80-
bit security level (qk is 954-bit, which approximately equals to 1024-bit). The detailed
parameter of the D-159 pairing is shown in Table 6.4.
(a) Size of a Tag (Type A) (b) Size of a Tag (Type D)
Figure 6.2: Comparison of Tag Size
From Fig. 6.2(a) and Fig. 6.2(b), we can see that the size of a tag in our scheme is
constant and more compact than the scheme in [96]. The tag size is smaller using type D
pairing than type A pairing.
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(a) Generating a Tag (Type A) (b) Generating a Tag (Type D)
Figure 6.3: Comparison of Time Cost in Generating a Tag
(a) Verifying a Challenge (Type A) (b) Verifying a Challenge (Type D)
Figure 6.4: Comparison of Time Cost in Verifying a Challenge
From Fig. 6.3(a) and Fig. 6.3(b), we can see that the time cost of generating a tag in
our scheme is constant, which is independent of the number of uploaders. Our scheme
requires less time cost than the scheme in [96]. Moreover, the time cost is smaller using
type D pairing than type A pairing.
From Fig. 6.4(a) and Fig. 6.4(b), we can see that the time cost of verifying a challenge
in our scheme is also constant and is smaller than the scheme in [96]. For verifying a
challenge, type A pairing is more efficient than type D pairing.
6.4 Chapter Summary
In this chapter, we concentrated on the identity privacy of a cloud auditing scheme. We
refer to the scheme that guarantees identity privacy against a curious third-party auditor
(TPA) as a privacy-preserving cloud auditing scheme. Traditional cryptographic solu-
tions to constructing privacy-preserving cloud auditing schemes apply the ring signature
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or group signature technique. Its main limitation is that the tag of these schemes is not
compact. We proposed an efficient construction with compact tags. We applied the prop-
erty of bilinear map instead of ring signature or group signature technique. This modifi-
cation paved the way for achieving the tag generation algorithm similar to the compact
proof of retrievability scheme introduced by Shacham and Waters [89]. The tag of our
scheme consists of only one group element. The transmission and verification costs of






In a cloud storage platform, the users outsource their data to the cloud server instead of
maintaining the data in their local storage devices. Along with the conveniences brought
by cloud storage, security issues arise. For example, after being uploaded to the cloud
server, the data becomes out of control by the users. Cloud auditing schemes are the
cryptographic solution to this issue.
In many applications, there is the requirement of guarantee the anonymity of the users,
such as in an electronic voting system. In this thesis, we refer to the cloud auditing
schemes that protect the identity privacy of the user against the third-party auditor (TPA)
as privacy-preserving cloud auditing scheme. In a privacy-preserving cloud auditing sys-
tem, the TPA generates a challenge with multiple users’ public keys. In this sense, the
TPA audits the data integrity on behalf of multiple users while it cannot learn which mem-
ber among them uploads the data.
The notion of threshold in cryptography can be traced back to Shamir’s secret sharing
scheme [91] proposed in 1979. This (t,n)-threshold secret sharing scheme can be used
to divide a secret S into n shares (S1, . . . ,Sn) and at least t shares are required to recover
the secret S. Moreover, any t−1 shares do not reveal any information about the secret S.
The concept of threshold can be extended to many cryptographic primitives [34], such as
threshold signature and threshold public-key encryption (PKE) schemes. In a threshold
cryptographic scheme, at least a threshold number of users are required to work together
to conduct an operation like signing a signature or decrypting a ciphertext. As for a
privacy-preserving cloud auditing system, a threshold scheme has many applications. In
such a scheme, each user generates a tag piece on a message and at least t tag pieces
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are needed in order to generate a response to the TPA’s challenge. A threshold privacy-
preserving cloud auditing scheme enjoys both the advantages of threshold cryptography
and privacy-preserving cloud auditing. In particular, the traditional privacy-preserving
cloud auditing scheme can be seen as a special example of a (1,n) threshold scheme.
7.1.2 Related Work and Research Gap
After the notion of privacy-preserving cloud auditing was introduced in [103], many con-
structions [36, 95, 96, 98, 101, 106, 110, 111] are available in the literature. Some
schemes [95, 110] have efficient constructions, but require additional prerequisites, such
as sharing the same key among all the users [110] or resorting to a fully-trusted third
party [95]. Most other constructions apply the ring signature or group signature tech-
niques. As a result, these schemes do not achieve compact tags. Recently, an efficient
privacy-preserving auditing scheme with compact tags [106] was proposed by Wu et al.
The scheme does not apply ring signature or group signature techniques. There is no need
of sharing the same key among all users or introducing a third party in the system. Every
user generates his or her own public and secret key pair and the tag individually. The tag
generation algorithm is similar to the BLS signature scheme [25] and is as efficient as the
compact proof of retrievability scheme [89] by Shacham and Waters. A tag only consists
of one group element.
Research Gap. Although there are many constructions of privacy-preserving cloud au-
diting schemes, there sill lacks studies of the constructions in the threshold setting. In
particular, a threshold privacy-preserving cloud auditing scheme with compact tags.
7.1.3 Our Contributions
In this chapter, we propose an efficient (t,n)-threshold privacy-preserving cloud auditing
scheme with compact tags. Our construction combines the secret sharing technique and
the scheme with compact tags [106]. During an auditing process, the TPA generates
a challenge from n users’ public keys and applies a (t,n) secret sharing scheme (e.g.
Shamir’s secret sharing [91]). To correctly respond to the challenge, the cloud server
needs at least t tag pieces generated by t different users for each message. The advantages
of our construction are summarized as follows.
1. The tag generation algorithm is similar to the scheme in [106], which does not apply
ring signature or group signature techniques. Therefore, the tag piece generated by
a user is compact and consists of only one group element.
2. Every user generates the public and secret key pair and the tag piece individually.
There is no need of a third party in our scheme, such as a key distribution center for
distributing keys or a dealer for sharing the secret to achieve the threshold function.
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3. Our scheme can be easily extended to dynamic groups. If there are newly enrolled
members or the threshold value changes, every user runs the same as before. Only
the TPA needs to update the newly enrolled users’ public keys and the threshold
value to generate the challenge.
We use the pairing-based cryptography library (PBC-0.5.14) in implementing our scheme.
Specifically, we use type A and type D curves to analyze the efficiency of our construc-
tion respectively. Briefly speaking, in type A curves, the bit length of the group element
is long while the pairing computation is fast. On the other hand, for type D curves, the bit
length of group elements is short and the pairing computation is comparatively slower.
7.2 Preliminaries
Recall that a privacy-preserving cloud auditing scheme (Definition 6.1, page 84) is com-
posed of six algorithms, namely the parameter generation algorithm Setup, key generation
algorithm KeyGen, tag generation algorithm TagGen, challenge algorithm Challenge, re-
sponse algorithm Respond, and verification algorithm Verify. A threshold scheme is sim-
ilar to the above definition except that each user only generates a tag piece on a message
and at least a threshold number of tag pieces on each message are required to generate a
response. The detailed description comes as follows.
Definition 7.1 (Threshold Privacy-Preserving Cloud Auditing). A threshold privacy-preserving
cloud auditing scheme is composed of six algorithms namely, the parameter generation
algorithm, key generation algorithm, tag generation algorithm, challenge algorithm, re-
sponse algorithm, and verification algorithm. These algorithms are denoted by Setup,
KeyGen, TagGen, Challenge, Respond, and Verify, respectively.
• Setup(1λ ): On input a security parameter λ , the parameter generation algorithm
outputs the public parameter PP, which includes the definitions of the public and
secret key spaces PK×SK, file block space F , and tag space T .
• KeyGen(PP): On input the public parameter PP, the key generation algorithm
outputs a public and secret key pair (pk,sk) ∈ PK×SK.
• TagGen(PP,sk, i,m): On input the public parameter PP, secret key sk, index i,
and a message m ∈ F , the tag generation algorithm outputs a tag piece σ ∈ T on
message m.
• Challenge(PP,{pk j}nj=1,I): On input the public parameter PP, public keys {pk j}nj=1,
and a set I of indexes, the challenge algorithm outputs a challenge ∆.
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• Respond(PP,∆,M,Σ): On input the public parameter PP, challenge ∆, and the
corresponding stored messages M and tag pieces Σ, the response algorithm outputs
a response Π. Here, at least a threshold number of tag pieces on each message
m ∈M are required to generate response Π.
• Verify(PP,∆,Π): On input the public parameter PP, challenge ∆, and response Π,
the verification algorithm outputs the verification result, i.e. “accept” or “reject”.
Correctness. The correctness requirement of a threshold privacy-preserving cloud au-
diting scheme states that for any public and secret key pairs (pk j,sk j), j = 1, . . . ,n, any
challenge ∆ generated from public keys pk1, . . . , pkn and any set I, and the response Π
generated from the messages M and tag pieces Σ, it holds that
Verify(PP,∆,Π) = “accept”.
For each message m ∈ M, at least a threshold number of tag pieces {σ j | j ∈ J } are
required, where J is any subset of t different integers between [1,n] and σ j is generated
by secret key sk j.
Similar to the traditional privacy-preserving cloud auditing schemes, two security is-
sues are considered in a threshold scheme, namely the uncheatability and anonymity.
In a (t,n)-threshold scheme, we allow the adversary to compromise at most t− 1 users
(i.e. hold t − 1 secret keys). Specifically, uncheatability refers to the security that the
cloud server cannot cheat the third-party auditor (TPA) by generating valid responses if it
does not store the corresponding messages and tag pieces. The security model is defined
through a game between a challenger C and an adversary A.
• Setup. C runs the parameter generation algorithm Setup to generate the public
parameter PP and key generation algorithm KeyGen to generate n public and secret
key pairs (pk j,sk j), for j = 1, . . . ,n. It returns the public parameter PP, public keys
(pk1, . . . , pkn) and t−1 secret keys (sk1, . . . ,skt−1) to A.
• Tag Generation Query. A can adaptively make the tag generation queries on any
message, index, and public key it receives. On receiving a tag generation query on
message m ∈ F , index i, and public key pk j, for j ∈ [t,n], C runs the tag generation
algorithm TagGen with secret key sk j as input to generate a tag piece σm on message
m and returns σm to A.
• Challenge. A chooses an index i∗, such that it never makes a tag generation
query on index i∗. C runs the challenge algorithm Challenge with the public keys
(pk1, . . . , pkn) as input to generate a challenge ∆ and returns ∆ to A.
• Response. Finally, A outputs its response Π.
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We say A wins the game if the response Π it outputs is valid, i.e.
Verify(PP,∆,Π) = “accept”.
Definition 7.2. A threshold privacy-preserving cloud auditing scheme is (t,ε)-uncheatable
if for any probabilistic polynomial-time adversaryA that runs within time t, its advantage
in winning the above game is at most ε , i.e.
Adv(A) = Pr[Verify(PP,∆,Π) = “accept” | Π←A(∆)]≤ ε.
Another security issue is the identity privacy of the user. To prevent a curious TPA
from distinguishing the identity of the user that uploads the data during an auditing pro-
cess, a secure threshold privacy-preserving cloud auditing scheme should also guarantees
anonymity of the user. The security model is defined through a game between a challenger
C and an adversary A.
• Setup. C runs the parameter generation algorithm Setup to generate the public
parameter PP and key generation algorithm KeyGen to generate n public and secret
key pairs (pk j,sk j), for j = 1, . . . ,n. Then, it returns the public parameter PP,
public keys (pk1, . . . , pkn), and t−1 secret keys (sk1, . . . ,skt−1) to A.
• Challenge. A chooses an index i and runs the challenge algorithm challenge to
generate a challenge ∆. Then, it returns ∆ to B.
• Response. C picks a random message m and j ∈ [t,n]. Then, it runs the tag gener-
ation algorithm TagGen with the secret keys (sk1, . . . ,skt−1) and the j-th secret key
sk j as input to generate t tag pieces (σ1, . . . ,σt−1,σ j). Next, it runs the response
algorithm Respond with the message m and tag pieces (σ1, . . . ,σt−1,σ j) as input to
generate a response Π and returns Π to A.
• Guess. A first checks the validity of the response Π. If Π is valid, then A outputs
its guess j′ ∈ [t,n].
We say A wins the game if j′ = j.
Definition 7.3. A threshold privacy-preserving cloud auditing scheme is information-
theoretically anonymous if for any adversaryA, its advantage in winning the above game
is zero, i.e.
Adv(A) =
∣∣∣∣Pr[ j′ = j | j′←A(Π)]− 1n− t +1
∣∣∣∣= 0.
Chapter 7. Threshold Privacy-Preserving Cloud Auditing 102
7.3 Contribution 1: A Threshold Privacy-Preserving Cloud
Auditing Scheme with Compact Tags
7.3.1 A Variant of Bilinear Diffie-Hellman (T-BDH) Assumption
In this section, we introduced a variant of we introduce a variant of bilinear Diffie-
Hellman (BDH) assumption called threshold bilinear Diffie-Hellman (T-BDH) assump-
tion that is the underlying hardness assumption of our construction. Recall that a variant
of BDH (vBDH) assumption (Definition 6.4, page 87) introduced in last chapter is defined
over pairing groups PG = (G,GT , p,e,g) that states given (g,ga,gb,gac) to compute gbc
is intractable. The T-BDH assumption is defined as follows.
Definition 7.4 (T-BDH Problem). For pairing groups PG = (G,GT , p,e,g) The T-BDH
problem is given a tuple of (g,ga,gb,gac,g1/a), for random exponents a,b,c ∈ Zp to-
gether with some extra elements
(
gc1 ,gc2, . . . ,gct−1,(ga)ct , (ga)ct+1, . . . ,(ga)cn
)
to com-
pute e(g,g)bc is intractable, where (c1, . . . ,cn) are n shares of the exponent c generated
by a (t,n) secret sharing scheme.
We say the T-BDH assumption holds in pairing groups PG if for any probabilistic





gc1 , . . . ,gct−1,
(ga)ct , . . . ,(ga)cn

≤ negl(λ ),
where negl(λ ) denotes a negligible function with respect to the security parameter.
Similar to the hardness analysis of vBDH assumption, the hardness of T-BDH assump-
tion can be analyzed from the generic security result (Theorem 6.1, page 88) introduced
by Boneh et al. [20]. For reading conveniences, we present the security result in the
generic group model as the following theorem again in this section.
Theorem 7.1. Let P,Q ∈ Fp[X1, . . . ,Xn]s be two s-tuples of n-variate polynomials over Fp
and let f ∈ Fp[X1, . . . ,Xn]. Let d = max(2dP,dQ,d f ), two random encodings ξ1,ξ2 of the
additive group Z+p , i.e. injective maps ξ1,ξ2 : Z+p → {0,1}m. We write Gi = {ξi(x) | x ∈
Z+p } , for i= 1,2. If f is independent of (P,Q) then for anyA that makes at most q queries
to the oracles computing the group operation in G1,G2, we have:∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
Pr
A




x1, . . . ,xn,y←R Fp,
b←R {0,1},
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Theorem 7.2. The threshold bilinear Diffie-Hellman (T-vBDH) assumption holds in pair-
ing groups PG in the generic group model.
Proof of Theorem 7.2. The T-vBDH problem is given (g,ga,gb,gac,g1/a) together with(
gc1 , . . . ,gct−1,(ga)ct , . . . ,(ga)cn
)
to compute e(g,g)bc. For a (t,n)-secret sharing scheme,
given (c1, . . . ,ct−1) does not reveal any information about c. Therefore, (gc1, . . . ,gct−1)
are random and independent from G and do not reveal any information about gc. We have
P = (1,a,b,ac,1/a,a · ct , . . . ,a · cn), Q = (1)









fi ·a · ci · fvBDH+ fvBDH,
where fvBDH = f0 + f1a+ f2b+ f3ac+ f4 1a + f5ab+ f6a
2c+ f7abc+ f8 ba , for any coeffi-
cients f0, . . . , f8 ∈ Zp. It is not hard to see that polynomial f ′ and f = bc are independent.
In other words, f is independent of sets (P,Q). According to Theorem 7.1, the T-vBDH
assumption holds in the generic group model. 
7.3.2 Scheme Construction
• Setup(1λ ): On input the security parameter λ , the parameter generation algo-
rithm chooses pairing groups PG = (G,GT , p,e,g). Then, it randomly selects
generators h,u ∈G and hash functions H : {0,1}∗→G. Next, it sets the public
and secret key spaces PK×SK, file block space F , and tag space T as
PK =G2,SK = Zp,F = Zp,T =G.
It outputs the public parameter PP = (PG,h,u,H), which includes the above
definitions of spaces.
• KeyGen(PP): On input the public parameter PP, the key generation algorithm
selects a random x ∈ Zp and computes (gx,h1/x). Then, it outputs the public
and secret key pair (pk,sk) as
pk = (pk1, pk2) = (gx,h1/x),sk = x.
• TagGen(PP,sk, i,m): On input the public parameter PP, secret key sk = x, an
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and outputs σm as the tag to be stored at the storage space indexed by i.
• Challenge(PP,{pk j}nj=1,I): On input the public parameter PP, public keys
{pk j}nj=1 =
(
(pk11, pk12), . . . ,(pkn1, pkn2)
)
,
and a set I of indexes chosen randomly, the challenge algorithm first randomly
chooses si ∈ Zp for each i ∈ I, w ∈ Zp. Then, it uses a (t,n) secret sharing
scheme to divide w into n shares (w1, . . . ,wn) and computes
pkchal =
(






(gx1)w1, . . . ,(gxn)wn
)
.
Next, it outputs the challenge as ∆ = (Q, pkchal), where Q = {(i,si) | i ∈ I}.
• Respond(PP,∆,M,Σ): On input the public parameter PP, challenge ∆ =
(Q, pkchal), and the corresponding stored messages M and tag pieces Σ, the






pkw jj1 , pk j2





pkw jj1 , pk j2
)L j),
where J1 and J2 are two different random sets of t integers from [1,n] and L j
is the corresponding Lagrange coefficient. Then, it computes
µ = ∑
(i,si)∈Q









from the stored messages M = {mi | i ∈ I} and tag pieces Σ = {σi j | i ∈ I},
where σi j denotes that the tag stored at the storage space indexed by i is gener-
ated by the j-th secret key sk j and at least t different tag pieces σi j are required
for each message mi ∈M. It outputs the response as Π = (µ,σres).
• Verify(PP,∆,Π): On input the public parameter PP, challenge ∆, response Π,
and the secret information w used to generate the challenge, the verification
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Otherwise, it outputs “reject”.
Correctness Analysis. This completes the description of the scheme construction. Next,
we give the correctness analysis of the scheme. For public keys pk j = (gx j ,h1/x j), j =





For any challenge ∆=(Q, pkchal), where Q= {(i,si) | i∈I} and pkchal=(pkw111 , . . . , pk
wn
n1 ),











































For a given challenge ∆ = (Q, pkchal), response Π = (µ,σres), and the secret information
































Theorem 7.3. Suppose hash function H is a random oracle that the adversary makes
at most qH queries. If for any probabilistic polynomial-time adversary A, its advantage
in solving the threshold bilinear Diffie-Hellman (T-BDH) problem is at most ε , then the
proposed threshold privacy-preserving cloud auditing scheme is (t,qH · ε)-uncheatable.
Proof of Theorem 7.3. Suppose there exists an adversary A who can (t,qH · ε) break the
uncheatability of the proposed privacy-preserving cloud auditing scheme. We construct
a simulator B that has advantage ε in solving the T-BDH problem. B takes as input an
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instance of the T-BDH problem from pairing groups PG asPG,g
a,gb,gac,g1/a
gc1, . . . ,gct−1,
(ga)ct , . . . ,(ga)cn
 ,
and its goal is to compute e(g,g)bc. B controls the random oracle H and works as follows.
Setup. B first randomly picks r0,r1, . . . ,rn,rh ∈ Zp, sets h = grh,u = (ga)r0 and{
pk j = (gr j ,h1/r j), for j = 1, . . . , t−1,
pk j = (ga)rt ,(g1/a)rh/rt ), for j = t, . . . ,n.
Then, it returns the public parameter PP= (PG,h,u), public keys
PK =
(
(pk11, pk12), . . . ,(pkn1, pkn2)
)
,
and t−1 secret keys (sk1, . . . ,skt−1) = (r1, . . . ,rt−1) to A.
Hash Query. B maintains an initially empty list LH and selects random i′ ∈ [1,qH ]. On
receiving a new hash query on index i, it selects a random ti ∈ Zp and works as follows.
• If i = i′, it sets hi = (gb)ti .
• If i 6= i′, it sets hi = (ga)ti .
Then, it returns hi to A and inserts (i, ti,hi) into list LH .
Tag Generation Query. On receiving a tag generation query on message m ∈ Zp, index
i, and public key pk j, B first checks whether i = i′. If yes, it aborts. Otherwise, it searches
list LH for the tuple (i, ti,hi). If the tuple does not exist, B selects a random ti ∈ Zp,
computes hi = (ga)ti , and inserts (i, ti,hi) into list LH . Then, it computes σi j = (g)ti/r j ·
gr0·mi/r j and returns σi j as the tag to A. We can see that σi j is a valid tag since
σi j = gti/r j ·gr0·mi/r j





Challenge. A chooses an index i∗. If i∗ 6= i′, then B aborts. Otherwise, B selects a random
s∗i ∈ Zp and computes
pkchal =
(
(gc1)r1, . . . ,(gct−1)rt−1,(ga·ct )rt , . . . ,(ga·cn)rn
)
.
Then, it returns the challenge ∆ = (Q, pkchal) to A, where Q = {i∗,s∗i }. For the n shares
(c1, . . . ,cn) of secret c from a (t,n) secret sharing scheme, the secret information in gen-
erating the challenge is equivalent to c, which is an unknown value to B.
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Response. Finally, A outputs its response Π = (µ,σres).

















































as the solution to the T-BDH problem instance.
This completes the description of the simulation and solution. Next, we analyze the
advantage of B. Whether B can output the solution depends on the following events.
1. B does not abort during the Tag Generation Query phase.
2. B does not abort during the Challenge phase.
3. A outputs a valid response.
According to whether the simulation aborts during the TagGen Query and Challenge
phases and whether the adversary can output a valid response of the challenge. The sim-
ulator randomly selects i∗ ∈ {1, . . . ,qH}, therefore, for the i′ of the index the adversary
chooses, the probability that it equals to i∗ is 1/qH , i.e. Pr[i′= i∗] = 1/qH . During TagGen
Query, all the indexes i the adversary submits satisfy that i 6= i′, i.e. i 6= i∗ if i′ = i∗. The
probability that the simulator does not abort is
Pr(qabortB) = Pr[i′ = i∗] = 1/qH .
According to the definition of security model, A cannot make tag generation query on
the index it chooses in the Challenge phase. As a result, if B does not abort during the
Challenge phase (i.e. i∗ = i′), then it does not abort during the Tag Generation Query
phase. SinceA can make at most qH queries to the random oracle and B randomly selects
an i′ ∈ [1,qH ], the probability that i∗ = i′ is 1qH . Therefore, B does not abort during the
simulation with probability at least 1qH . If A can (t,qH · ε) break the proposed scheme,
then B has advantage
Adv(B) = Pr(qabortB) ·Adv(A)≥ ε
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in solving the T-BDH problem. This completes the proof of Theorem 7.3. 
Theorem 7.4. The proposed threshold privacy-preserving cloud auditing scheme is information-
theoretically anonymous, i.e. for any adversary A, its advantage in distinguishing the
identity of the user during an auditing process is zero.
Proof of Theorem 7.4. The simulator B interacts with the adversary A as follows.
Setup. B runs the parameter generation algorithm Setup and key generation algorithm
KeyGen to generate the public parameter PP and n public and secret key pairs (pk j,sk j),
for j = 1, . . . ,n. Then it returns the public parameter PP, public keys
PK =
(
(pk11, pk12), . . . ,(pkn1, pkn2)
)
,
and t−1 secret keys (sk1, . . . ,skt−1) to A.
Challenge. A chooses index i and w ∈ Zp. Then, it uses a (t,n) secret sharing scheme
to divide w into n shares (w1, . . . ,wn) and generates a challenge ∆ = (Q, pkchal), where
Q = (i,si) and pkchal = (pk
w1
11 , . . . , pk
wn
n1 ). Next, it submits the challenge ∆ to B.















where J and J ′ are two random sets of t integers in [1,n]. If the equation holds, then
it randomly picks a j ∈ [t,n] and a message m ∈ Zp. Then, it runs the tag generation
algorithm TagGen with the secret keys (sk1, . . . ,skt−1) and the j-th secret key sk j as input
to generate the tag pieces {σi j | j ∈ J }, where J = (1, . . . , t − 1, j). Next, it runs the
response algorithm Respond with the message m and tag pieces as input to generate the
response Π = (µ,σres), where µ = si ·m and σres = ∏
j∈J
(





. At last, B
returns the response Π to A.
Guess. Finally, A outputs its guess j′ ∈ [t,n] if the response Π is valid.
It is easy to see that the tag pieces {σi j | j ∈ J } are valid since they are generated by
the secret keys {sk j | j ∈ J }, where J = (1, . . . , t− 1, j). Therefore, the response Π is
valid. Moreover, for a given challenge ∆ = (Q, pkchal), where Q = (i,si), we analyze two
responses Π = (µ,σres),Π′ = (µ ′,σ ′res) generated from two sets of tag pieces {σi j | j ∈
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Therefore, for any challenge, the two responses Π,Π′ generated from two sets of tag
pieces are identical. As a result, A cannot gain any more information from the response
than randomly guessing. This completes the proof of Theorem 7.4. 
7.4 Chapter Summary
In this chapter, we explored the construction of threshold privacy-preserving cloud audit-
ing scheme. Such a scheme enjoys the advantages of both privacy-preserving property
and threshold cryptography. We proposed a concrete construction by combining the tech-
nique of the scheme in [106] and Shamir’s secret sharing scheme [91]. As a result, the
tag generation algorithm is as efficient as the compact proof of retrievability scheme pro-
posed by Shacham and Waters [89] and the tag piece generated by a user only contains
one group element. To respond to a challenge from the third-party auditor (TPA), the
cloud server needs at least t tag pieces on each message. In our construction, every user
generates his or her public and secret key pair and tag pieces individually. There is no
need of a trusted third party. The update of group member or the threshold value is very
efficient, where no change is required for the users and only the TPA needs to use the
updated public keys or the threshold value to generate the challenge.
There exists a straightforward improvement to make our scheme anonymous not only
against the TPA but also the cloud server. We allow every user to hold two pairs of public
and secret keys. One key pair is used as in traditional public key cryptography, which is
related to his or her identity by the certificate. The other key pair is randomly generated
intended for our construction. Every user generates a ring signature on his or her second
key pair using the first key pair to provide the authenticity. Therefore, it is possible to
verify the validity of the users’ second key pairs without learning the owner of each key
pair. In such a system, both the cloud server and the TPA cannot learn the identity of the






Cloud storage is one of the most fundamental services in cloud computing. Data integrity
is a primary security issue in cloud storage since when the data is uploaded to the cloud
servers it is no longer maintained locally by the user. Cloud auditing is a cryptographic so-
lution to checking the integrity of uploaded data. Many techniques exist, such as provable
data possession (PDP) [7], proofs of retrievability (PoR) [70], and proofs of storage (PoS)
[8]. In a cloud storage system that supports auditing, an auditing process is conducted via
a challenge and response interaction between a third-party auditor (TPA) and the cloud
server. The TPA generates the challenge and verifies the response from the cloud server
on behalf of the user.
Certificateless cryptography was introduced in [5]. It not only merely getting rid of
the complicated certificate management in traditional public key cryptography, but it also
avoids the inherent key escrow problem of identity-based cryptography. As for the cloud
storage setting, it is impractical to set up a public key infrastructure (PKI) for a large
number of users in such a system. The identity-based cryptography, where a fully-trusted
center called private key generator (PKG) is required is not suitable for the large-scale
internet environment. Certificateless cryptography is an alternative option since it enjoys
the benefit that no certificate involved while does not rely on a fully-trusted third party.
In certificateless cryptographic schemes, there is an entity called key generation center
(KGC) that generates the public parameter and partial private keys for other entities. The
architecture of a cloud storage system in the certificateless setting is shown in Fig. 8.1.
The basic idea of cloud auditing schemes is allowing a user to generate a tag using his
or her private key on each file block. The data uploaded to the cloud server includes both
110
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Figure 8.1: Main Entities of a Certificateless Cloud Auditing System
the files and tags. Then, the TPA generates a challenge from the user’s public key. To
correctly respond to the challenge, the cloud server needs to compute a response from the
stored files and tags and return the response to the TPA for verification. If the data is not
well maintained in the server, it cannot compute the response and hence gets detected.
In the scenario that multiple users are involved in uploading and requesting auditing
operations, new security requirements arise. For example, the challenge is generated from
the user’s public key. Therefore, the TPA knows which user uploads the data. On the other
hand, the identity privacy is required in many applications, such as an electronic voting
system. We refer to a certificateless cloud auditing (CLCA) scheme that guarantees the
identity privacy for the users as certificateless privacy-preserving cloud auditing scheme.
In such a scheme, the TPA can only verify whether the data is well stored but it cannot
learn which user uploads the data among multiple users.
8.1.2 Related Work and Research Gap
There are many schemes available in the literature that achieve identity privacy of upload-
ers in the traditional PKI setting, such as [36, 67, 82, 87, 94, 97, 99, 101, 103, 106, 107,
110]. The main technique in preserving the identity privacy is resorting to ring signa-
ture or group signature techniques. There exists an exception [106] that using a different
method to guarantee identity privacy. As a result, it achieves very compact tags. As for
the certificateless setting [54, 55, 56, 66, 68, 73, 75, 100, 108, 115], some schemes [54,
55, 66, 100] consider the data privacy against the TPA, some schemes [55, 68] support
batch verification for multiple users in a group, some scheme [115] prevents collusion
attacks between different entities, and some scheme [108] requires a public log file share
within the system.
To construct certificateless auditing schemes that preserving the identity privacy, a
straightforward way is applying the certificateless ring signature [50, 114], certificate-
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less group signature [112], or zero-knowledge proof technique [108]. However, similar
to schemes [36, 97, 99, 103] in the PKI setting, the tag in such a scheme is not compact.
Since one individual tag consists of many group elements, the main limitation of these
schemes is the storage efficiency. Specifically, if the tag is not compact, then most of the
storage space is used to store the tag but not the data.
Research Gap. Recently, Wu et al. proposed an efficient privacy-preserving cloud au-
diting scheme [106] with compact tags in the traditional PKI setting. The tag generation
algorithm does not apply ring signature or group signature techniques and the tag con-
sists of only one group element. Unfortunately, the technique in [106] cannot be directly
applied in the certificateless setting. Therefore, there still lacks the study of constructing
certificateless privacy-preserving cloud auditing schemes with compact tags.
8.1.3 Our Contributions
In this chapter, we concentrate on the identity privacy of a certificateless cloud auditing
(CLCA) scheme. We present a concrete construction of certificateless privacy-preserving
cloud auditing scheme with compact tags. To achieve this goal, we combine the tech-
niques of the private key extraction algorithm in Water’s identity-based encryption scheme
[105] and the tag generation algorithm in the scheme by Wu et al. [106]. Our contribu-
tions are three-fold and summarized as follows.
1. We propose the security model of certificateless privacy-preserving cloud auditing
schemes. Specifically, the uncheatability against normal type I adversary and strong
type II adversary in certificateless cryptography and the information-theoretical
anonymity against the third-party auditor (TPA).
2. We put forward a certificateless privacy-preserving cloud auditing scheme. We
prove that it achieves uncheatability if a variant of bilinear Diffie-Hellman (BDH)
assumption holds. Moreover, the anonymity of the user is information-theoretically
guaranteed against the TPA during an auditing process.
3. The tag generation algorithm in our construction does not apply ring signature or
group signature techniques. Therefore, the tag in our scheme is compact, which
consists of only one group element.
A brief comparison of two certificateless cloud auditing (CLCA) schemes proposed
recently, a certificateless ring signature (CL-Ring) scheme, a certificateless group (CL-
Group) signature scheme, and our scheme is given in Table 8.1.
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CLCA in [56] |g| 2Te +Tm +Th ×
CLCA in [73] 2|g| 4Te +2Th ×
CL-Ring [114] |g|+n|gT | (3n+1)Te +(n+1)Th +2Tp X
CL-Group [112] 9|g| 9Te +2Ti X
Our scheme |g| 2Te +Th X
Suppose there are n users, |g| and |gT | denote the bit length of an element in groups G and GT , where
e : G×G→ GT denotes a symmetric pairing. Te: exponentiation in group G, Tm: multiplication in
finite field, Th: hash operation, Tp: pairing operation, Ti: inversion in finite field Fp.
8.2 Preliminaries
In a certificateless cloud auditing (CLCA) scheme, there exists an authority named key
generation center (KGC) who sets up the system and generates each user’s partial private
key on its identity. Then, every user generates its public key and secret value. The private
key includes both the partial private key and the secret value. Generating a challenge and
verifying a response need both the identity and public key of the user. A certificateless
privacy-preserving cloud auditing scheme is similar to a CLCA scheme except that the
input of challenge algorithm contains multiple identities and public keys of multiple users
to guarantee the identity privacy. The detailed description comes as follows.
Definition 8.1 (Certificateless Privacy-Preserving Cloud Auditing). A certificateless privacy-
preserving cloud auditing scheme is composed of nine algorithms, namely the master
key generation algorithm, partial private key extraction algorithm, secret value setting
algorithm, public key setting algorithm, private key setting algorithm, tag generation
algorithm, challenge algorithm, response algorithm, verification algorithm. These al-
gorithms are denoted by Setup, PartialKeyExt, SetSecretValue, SetPublicKey, SetPri-
vateKey, TagGen, Challenge, Respond, and Verify, respectively.
• Setup(1λ ): On input a security parameter λ , the master key generation algorithm
outputs a master public and secret key pair (mpk,msk). The master public key mpk
includes the definitions of the public key space PK, secret value space SV , private
key space SK, file block space F , and tag space T .
• PartialKeyExt(mpk,msk, ID): On input the master public key mpk, master secret
key msk, and a user’s identity ID, the partial private key extraction algorithm out-
puts the partial private key dID for the user with identity ID.
• SetSecretValue(mpk): On input the master public key mpk, the secret value setting
algorithm outputs a secret value vID ∈ SV for the user with identity ID.
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• SetPublicKey(mpk,dID,vID): On input the master public key mpk, partial private
key dID, and secret value vID, the public key setting algorithm outputs the public key
pkID ∈ PK for the user with identity ID.
• SetPrivateKey(mpk,dID,vID): On input the master public key mpk, partial private
key dID, and secret value vID, the private key setting algorithm outputs the private
key skID = (dID,vID) ∈ SK for the user with identity ID.
• TagGen(mpk,skID, i,m): On input the master public key mpk, private key skID, in-
dex i, and a message m ∈ F , the tag generation algorithm outputs a tag σ ∈ T on
message m generated by private key skID.
• Challenge(mpk,{ID j, pkID j}nj=1,I): On input the master public key mpk, identities
and public keys {ID j, pkID j}nj=1, and a set I of indexes, the challenge algorithm
outputs a challenge ∆.
• Respond(mpk,∆,M,Σ): On input the master public key mpk, challenge ∆, and cor-
responding messages M and tags Σ, the response algorithm outputs a response Π.
• Verify(mpk,∆,Π): On input the master public key mpk, challenge ∆, and response
Π, the verification algorithm outputs the result, i.e. “accept” or “reject”.
Similar to traditional privacy-preserving cloud auditing schemes, we consider two se-
curity issues in a certificateless privacy-preserving cloud auditing scheme, namely the
uncheatability and anonymity. Uncheatability refers to the security requirement that an
adversary cannot cheat the third-party auditor (TPA) by generating valid responses if it
does not store the corresponding messages and tags. The security models are defined
through games between a challenger C and an adversary A. Two types of adversaries,
namely the type I adversary AI and type II adversary AII) are considered. Briefly speak-
ing, AI can replace the public key of any identity by its choice, while it does not hold
the master secret key. In contrast, AII holds the master secret key but it cannot replace
the public key of the identity it chooses. Following [69], we further divide each type of
adversary into two kinds, namely normal adversary and strong adversary.
We first describe some oracles that can be queried by the adversary.
• Partial Private Key Extract Oracle Od(ID j): The adversary submits identity ID j, it
returns the partial private key dID j of the user with identity ID j.
• Secret Value Extract Oracle Osv(ID j): The adversary submits identity ID j, it re-
turns the secret value vID j of the user with identity ID j.
• Private Key Extract OracleOsk(ID j): The adversary submits identity ID j, it returns
the private key skID j of the user with identity ID j, which includes the partial private
key dID j and secret value vID j .
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• Public Key Oracle Opk(ID j): The adversary submits identity ID j, it returns the
public key pkID j of the user with identity ID j.
• Public Key Replace Oracle Orpl(ID j,v′ID j , pk
′
ID j
): The adversary submits identity
ID j, secret value v′ID j , and public key pk
′
ID j
computed from v′ID j , it updates the
public key of the user with identity ID j to be pk′ID j .
• Normal Tag Generation Oracle OnTag(ID j, i,m): The adversary submits identity
ID j, index i, and message m, it returns the tag on message m under identity ID j and




• Strong Tag Generation Oracle OsTag(ID j, i,m): The adversary submits identity
ID j, index i, and message m, it returns the tag on message m under identity ID j and




Next, we present the definition of security model against normal type I adversary. The
game between the challenger C and adversary AI consists of the following phases.
• Setup. C runs the master key generation algorithm Setup to generate the master
public and secret key pair (mpk,msk). Then, it returns the master public key mpk
to AI .
• Query. AI can adaptively query the partial private key extract oracle Od, private
key extract oracle Osk, public key oracle Opk, public key replace oracle Orpl, and
normal tag generation oracle OnTag. C returns the responses as defined before.
• Challenge. AI submits an identity ID∗j , index i∗, and message m∗. C runs the
Challenge algorithm to generate the challenge ∆ and returns ∆ to AI .
• Respond. Finally, AI outputs its response Π.
We say AI wins the game if it never queries the partial private key extract oracle and
private key extract oracle on identity ID∗j , normal tag generation oracle on identity ID
∗
j ,
index i∗, and message m∗. Moreover, the response Π it outputs is valid, i.e.
Verify(mpk,∆,Π) = “accept”.
Definition 8.2. A certificateless privacy-preserving cloud auditing scheme is (t,ε)-uncheatable
against normal type I adversary if for any probabilistic polynomial-time adversaryAI that
runs within time t, its advantage in winning the above game is at most ε , i.e.
Adv(AI) = Pr[Verify(mpk,∆,Π) = “accept” | Π←AI(Od,sk,pk,rpl,nTag,∆)].
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The security model against strong type II adversary is defined through the game be-
tween a challenger C and an adversary AII .
• Setup. C runs the master key generation algorithm Setup to generate the master
public and secret key pair (mpk,msk). Then, it returns the master public and secret
key pair (mpk,msk) to AII .
• Query. AII can adaptively query the secret value extract oracle Osv, public key
oracle Opk, public key replace oracle Orpl, and strong tag generation oracle OsTag.
C returns the responses as defined before.
• Challenge. AII submits an identity ID∗j , index i∗, and message m∗. C runs the
Challenge algorithm to generate the challenge ∆ and returns ∆ to AII .
• Respond. Finally, AII outputs its response Π.
We say AII wins the game if it never queries the secret value extract oracle and public
key replace oracle on identity ID∗j , strong tag generation oracle on identity ID
∗
j , index i
∗,
and message m∗. Moreover, the response it outputs is valid, i.e.
Verify(mpk,∆,Π) = “accept”.
Definition 8.3. A certificateless privacy-preserving cloud auditing scheme is (t,ε)-uncheatable
against strong type II adversary if for any probabilistic polynomial-time adversary AII
that runs within time t, its advantage in winning the above game is at most ε , i.e.
Adv(AII) = Pr[Verify(mpk,∆,Π) = “accept” | Π←AII(Osv,pk,rpl,sTag,∆)].
Anonymity refers to the security requirement that a curious TPA cannot learn the iden-
tity of the user who uploads the data during an auditing process. The anonymity in our
construction is information-theoretically guaranteed, which means that the adversary can-
not distinguish which user uploads the data even if it has unbounded computational power.
Therefore, there is no need to classify type I or type II adversaries. The security model is
defined through a game between a challenger C and an adversary A.
• Setup. C runs the master key generation algorithm Setup to generate the master
public and secret key pair (mpk,msk). Then, it chooses n identities ID j, generates
the corresponding partial private keys dID j and secret values vID j , for j = 1, . . . ,n.
Next, it computes the corresponding public keys pkID j , for j = 1, . . . ,n and returns
the master public key mpk, n identities and public keys {ID j, pkID j}nj=1 to A.
• Challenge. A selects an index i and runs the challenge algorithm Challenge to
generate a challenge ∆. Then, it returns ∆ to C.
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• Response. C picks a random message m ∈ F and j ∈ [1,n] and runs the tag gen-
eration algorithm TagGen with the j-th private key skID j = (dID j ,vID j) as input to
generate a tag σm j. Then, it runs the response algorithm Respond with the message
m and tag σm j as input to generate the response Π and returns Π to A.
• Guess. A first checks the validity of the response Π. If Π is valid, then A outputs
its guess j′ ∈ [1,n].
We say A wins the game if j′ = j.
Definition 8.4. A certificateless privacy-preserving cloud auditing scheme is information-
theoretically anonymous if for any adversaryA, its advantage in winning the above game
is zero, i.e.
Adv(A) =
∣∣∣∣Pr[ j′ = j | j′←A(Π)]− 1n
∣∣∣∣= 0.
8.3 Contribution 1: A Certificateless Privacy-Preserving
Cloud Auditing Scheme with Compact Tags
8.3.1 Scheme Construction
Recall that the bilinear Diffie-Hellman (BDH) assumption (Definition 2.9, page 17) de-
fined in pairing groups PG= (G,GT ,e, p) with a bilinear map e : G×G→GT states that
given (g,ga,gb,gc) ∈G to compute e(g,g)abc ∈GT is intractable.
Divisible computational Diffie-Hellman (D-CDH) assumption is an extension of the
standard CDH assumption, which states that given (g,ga,gb) to compute g
a
b is intractable.
Similar to the above extension, the divisible BDH assumption can be defined as given
(g,ga,gb,gc) to compute e(g,g)
ac
b is intractable.
With the above observations, we are ready to introduce a variant of BDH assumption
called double-BDH assumption. It can be seen as a combination of the BDH assumption
and the divisible BDH assumption. If both the two assumptions hold, then the double-
BDH assumption also holds.
Definition 8.5 (Double-BDH Problem). On input of pairing groups PG= (G,GT ,e, p,g)
and a tuple (g,ga,gb,gc), where p is the order of the groups and g is a generator of G.
The double-BDH problem is to compute e(g,g)abc or e(g,g)
ac
b .










We say the double-BDH assumption holds if, for any probabilistic polynomial-time algo-
rithm, its advantage in solving the double-BDH problem is negligible.
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In [106], a variant of the BDH assumption called vBDH assumption was introduced.
Next, we give a review of the vBDH assumption.
Definition 8.6 (vBDH Problem [106]). On input of pairing groups PG= (G,GT ,e, p,g)
and a tuple (g,ga,gb,gac), where p is the order of the groups and g is a generator of G.
The vBDH problem is to compute e(g,g)bc.






We say the vBDH assumption holds if, for any probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm,
its advantage in solving the vBDH problem is negligible.
The detailed description of our construction comes as follows.
• Setup(1λ ): On input the security parameter λ , the master key generation al-
gorithm chooses pairing groups PG = (G,GT ,e, p,g) and two hash functions
H1,H2 : {0,1}∗→ G1. Then, it randomly selects α ∈ Zp,g2,u ∈ G1 and com-
putes g1 = gα . It sets the public key space PK, secret value space SV , private
key space SK, file block space F , and tag space T as
PK =G2,SV = Zp,SK =G×Zp,F = Zp,T =G.
It outputs the master public and secret key pair (mpk,msk) as
mpk = (PG,g1,g2,u,H1,H2), msk = gα2 .
• PartialKeyExt(mpk,msk, ID): On input the master public key mpk, master se-
cret key msk = gα2 , and identity ID, the partial private key algorithm selects a
random γ ∈ Zp and computes
dID = (d1, d2) =
(
gα2 ·H1(ID)γ , gγ
)
.
Then, it outputs dID as the partial private key for the user with identity ID.
• SetSecretValue(mpk): On input the master public key mpk, the secret value
setting algorithm selects a random β ∈ Zp and outputs vID = β as the secret
value for the user with identity ID.
• SetPublicKey(mpk,dID,β ): On input the master public key mpk, partial private
key dID = (d1,d2) =
(
gα2 ·H1(ID)γ , gγ
)
, and the secret value vID = β , the public
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key setting algorithm computes g1/β and outputs
pkID = (pk1, pk2) = (gγ ,g1/β )
as the public key for the user with identity ID.
• SetPrivateKey(mpk,dID,vID): On input the master public key mpk, partial pri-
vate key dID = (d1,d2) =
(
gα2 ·H1(ID)γ , gγ
)
, and the secret value vID = β , the










as the private key for the user with identity ID.
• TagGen(mpk,skID, i,m): On input the master public key mpk, private key




, index i, and a message m ∈ Zp, the
tag generation algorithm computes












and outputs σ as the tag on message m generated by private key skID. The
validity of the tag can be verified by checking whether
e(σ , pk2) = e
((
gα2 ·H1(ID)γ
)β · (H2(i) ·um)β , g1/β)
















• Challenge(mpk,{ID j, pkID j}nj=1,I): On input the master public key mpk, iden-





(pk11, pk12), . . . ,(pkn1, pkn2)
)
,
and a set I of indexes, the challenge algorithm randomly selects a w ∈ Zp and
{vi ∈ Zp | i ∈ I}. Then, it computes
IDchal = {H1(ID j)w | j = 1, . . . ,n}, pkchal = {pkwj2 | j = 1, . . . ,n}
and outputs the challenge ∆ = (Q, IDchal, pkchal), where Q = {(i,vi) | i ∈ I}.
• Respond(mpk,∆,M,Σ): On input the master public key mpk, challenge ∆, and
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where σi j denotes the tag stored at the storage space indexed by i is generated
by the user with identity ID j. Then, it outputs the response Π = (µ,σres).
• Verify(mpk,∆,Π): On input the master public key mpk, challenge ∆, response
Π, and the secret information w used to generate the challenge, the verification
algorithm outputs “accept” if








H2(i)vi ·uµ , gw
)
.
Otherwise, it outputs “reject”.














e(g2, g1) · e
(






























Theorem 8.1. Suppose H1,H2 are random oracles. If there is a Normal Type I adversary
AI that makes at most qH1 and qH2 hash queries on H1 and H2 and has advantage ε1
in breaking the CLCA scheme, then we can construct a simulator BI that has advantage
ε1
2·qH1 ·qH2
in solving the double-BDH problem.
Proof of Theorem 8.1. Suppose BI receives a double-BDH problem instance
(PG,g,ga,gb,gc)
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and its goal is to compute e(g,g)abc or e(g,g)
ac
b . BI constructs two simulations, namely
Simulation 0 and Simulation 1 and randomly selects one of them to interact with the
adversary. The description of each simulation comes as follows.
BI simulates the scheme in Simulation 0 such that it can succeed in solving the
double-BDH problem if AI does not replace the public key of the identity it chooses.
The details are as follows.
Setup. BI selects a random r0 ∈Zp and sets g1 = ga,g2 = gb,u= gr02 from the problem
instance. Then, it returns the master public key
mpk = (PG,g1,g2,u)
to AI , where H1,H2 are two random oracles controlled by BI .
Hash Query on H1. BI maintains a hash list L1, which is initially empty and stores
tuples of the form ( j, ID j,r j,s j,h j, pk j1). It selects a random j′ ∈ {1, . . . ,qH1}. On
receiving the hash query on identity ID j, BI first searches L1 for the tuple containing
ID j. If the tuple does not exist, it selects random r j,s j ∈ Zp and works as follows.
• If j = j′, set h j = g
− 1r j
2 , pk j1 = g
r j
1 ·gs j and insert ( j, ID j,r j,s j,h j, pk j1) to L1;
• If j 6= j′, set h j = g
− 1r j
2 ·gs j , pk j1 = g
r j
1 and insert ( j, ID j,r j,s j,h j, pk j1) to L1.
Then, BI finds h j from the tuple and returns h j to AI .
Hash Query on H2. BI maintains a hash list L2, which is initially empty and stores
tuples of the form (i,ri,hi). It selects a random i′ ∈ {1, . . . ,qH2}. On receiving the
hash query on index i, BI first searches L2 for the tuple containing i. If the tuple does
not exist, it selects a random ri ∈ Zp and works as follows.
• If i = i′, set hi = gri1 and insert (i,ri,hi) to L2;
• If i 6= i′, set hi = gri2 and insert (i,ri,hi) to L2.
Then, BI finds hi from the tuple and returns hi to AI .
Partial Private Key Extraction Query. A submits identity ID j and BI first searches
hash list L1 for the tuple containing ID j. If the tuple does not exist, BI makes a hash
query of ID j on H1 (without returning h j to AI). Then, BI finds ( j,r j,s j) from the
tuple and works as follows.
• If j = j′, abort;




1 ) as the partial private key dID j of identity
ID j to AI .
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Note that dID j is valid since
e(g2, g1) · e
(
H1(ID j), d j2
)





s j , gr j1
)
= e(gs j , gr j1 )
= e(gr j·s j1 , g)
= e(d j1, g)
Private Key Query. AI submits identity ID j and BI first checks whether j = j′. If
yes, BI aborts. Otherwise, it makes a partial private key query on ID j. Then, BI
searches secret value list Lsv for the tuple containing ID j. If the tuple does not exist, it
makes a public key query on ID j (without returning (pk j1, pk j2) to AI). Next, it finds
β j from the tuple and returns β j to AI . Note that the partial private key and the secret
value compose the private key skID j of ID j.
Public Key Query. BI maintains a secret value list Lsv, which is initially empty and
stores tuples of the form (ID j,β j, pk j2). On receiving the public key query on ID j, BI
first searches hash list L1 and secret value list Lsv for the two tuples containing ID j. If
the tuple does not exist in L1, BI makes a hash query of ID j on H1 (without returning
h j to AI). If the tuple does not exist in Lsv, BI selects a random β j ∈ Zp.
• If j = j′, set pk j2 = g
1/β j
2 and insert (ID j,β j, pk j2) to Lsv;
• If j 6= j′, set pk j2 = g1/β j and insert (ID j,β j, pk j2) to Lsv.
Then, BI finds pk j1, pk j2 from the two tuples and returns (pk j1, pk j2) to AI .
Public Key Replace Query. AI submits (ID j,r′j, pk′j1,β ′j, pk′j2) and BI first searches
hash list L1 and secret value list Lsv for the two tuples containing ID j. If the tuple
does not exist, BI makes a public key query of ID j (without returning (pk j1, pk j2) to
AI). Then, it records two extra items (r′j, pk′j1) for the tuple from L1 and two extra
items (β ′j, pk
′
j2) for the tuple from Lsv.
Tag Generation Query. AI submits (ID j, i,m) and BI first checks whether j = j′. If
j 6= j′, BI makes a private key query on ID j (without returning skID j toAI) to generate
skID j . Then, it uses skID j to generate the tag σ and returns σ to AI . If j = j′, BI finds
(r j,s j) from the tuple in L1, β j from the tuple in Lsv, ri from the tuple in L2 (if the
tuple does not exist, it makes the corresponding query), and works as follows.
• If i = i′, abort;





r j ·gri ·gr0·m
)β j
and return σ to AI .
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Note that σ is a valid tag, since



































= e(g2, g1) · e
(







Challenge. AI submits (ID∗j , i∗,m) and BI first checks whether j∗ = j′, ID∗j’s pub-
lic key has not been replaced, and i∗ = i′. If yes, it finds r∗j from the tuple in
L1, β ∗j from the tuple in Lsv, and computes IDchal = (gc)
− 1r∗j , pkchal = (gc)
1/β ∗j .
Otherwise, it aborts. Then, BI selects a random vi ∈ Zp and returns challenge












j , pkchal = (gc)
1/β ∗j .
Note that fromAI’s view, IDchal = H1(ID∗j)w, pkchal = (pk∗j2)w. Here, w = c/b, which
is an unknown value to BI .
Respond. Finally, AI outputs response Π = (µ,σres).
If the response Π is valid, it satisfies that
σres = e(g2, g1)w·vi · e
(
H2(i∗) ·uµ , gw
)
.
Note that w = c/b and H2(i∗) = g
ri′
1 , since i
∗ = i′. Then, BI outputs
(
σres




e(g2, g1)w·vi · e
(
H2(i∗) ·uµ , gw
)






b ·vi · e(ga·ri′ , gc/b) · e(gb·r0·µ , gc/b)





as the solution to the double-BDH problem.
This completes the description of the simulation and solution. Next, we analyze the
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advantage of the simulator. Whether the BI can output the solution to the problem instance
depends on whether it aborts during Partial Private Key Query, Private Key Query, Tag
Generation Query, and Challenge phases and whether the adversary can output a valid
response. BI randomly selects j′ ∈ {1, . . . ,qH1} and i′ ∈ {1, . . . ,qH2}, therefore, for the
identity ID∗j and index i
∗ the adversary chooses, the probability that j′ = j∗ and i′ = i∗ is
1
qH1 ·qH2
. During the partial private key query, private key query, and tag generation query
phases, the identity ID j and index i AI submits satisfy that j 6= j∗ and i 6= i∗. As a result,
if j′ = j∗ and i′ = i∗, BI does not abort during the partial private key query, private key
query and tag generation query phases.
In Simulation 0, BI does not abort during the Challenge phase if AI does not replace
the public key of the identity it chooses. In Simulation 1, BI does not abort if AI replaces
the public key. BI randomly selects one simulation to interact with AI , therefore, the
probability that it does not abort during the Challenge phase in both simulations is 1/2.









Since AI has advantage ε1 in breaking the scheme, the advantage of BI in solving the
problem instance through Simulation 0 is ε12·qH1 ·qH2
.
BI simulates the scheme in Simulation 1 such that it can succeed in solving the
double-BDH problem if AI replaces the public key of the identity it chooses. The
details are as follows.
Setup. BI selects a random r0 ∈Zp and sets g1 = ga,g2 = gb,u= gr01 from the problem
instance. Then, it returns the master public key
mpk = (PG,g1,g2,u)
to AI , where H1,H2 are two random oracles controlled by BI .
Hash Query on H1. BI maintains a hash list L1, which is initially empty and stores
tuples of the form ( j, ID j,r j,s j,h j, pk j1). It selects a random j′ ∈ {1, . . . ,qH1}. On
receiving the hash query on identity ID j, BI first searches L1 for the tuple containing
ID j. If the tuple does not exist, it selects random r j,s j ∈ Zp and works as follows.
• If j = j′, set h j = gs j , pk j1 = g
r j
1 and insert ( j, ID j,r j,s j,h j, pk j1) to L1;
• If j 6= j′, set h j = g
− 1r j
2 ·gs j , pk j1 = g
r j
1 and insert ( j, ID j,r j,s j,h j, pk j1) to L1.
Then, BI finds h j from the tuple and returns h j to AI .
Hash Query on H2. BI maintains a hash list L2, which is initially empty and stores
tuples of the form (i,ri,hi). On receiving the hash query on index i, BI first searches
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L2 for the tuple containing i. If the tuple does not exist, it selects a random ri ∈ Zp,
sets hi = g
ri
1 , and inserts (i,ri,hi) to L2. Then, BI finds hi from the tuple and returns
hi to AI .
Partial Private Key Extraction Query. A submits identity ID j and BI first searches
hash list L1 for the tuple containing ID j. If the tuple does not exist, BI makes a hash
query of ID j on H1 (without returning h j to AI). Then, BI finds ( j,r j,s j) from the
tuple and works as follows.
• If j = j′, abort;




1 ) as the partial private key dID j of iden-
tity ID j to AI .
Note that the partial private key is valid since
e(g2, g1) · e
(
H1(ID j), d j2
)





s j , gr j1
)
= e(gs j , gr j1 )
= e(gr j·s j1 , g)
= e(d j1, g)
Private Key Query. AI submits identity ID j and BI first checks whether j = j′. If
j = j′, BI aborts. Otherwise, it makes a partial private key query on ID j. Then, BI
searches secret value list Lsv for the tuple containing ID j. If the tuple does not exist, it
makes a public key query on ID j (without returning (pk j1, pk j2) to AI). Next, it finds
β j from the tuple and returns β j to AI . Note that the partial private key and the secret
value compose the private key skID j of ID j.
Public Key Query. BI maintains a secret value list Lsv, which is initially empty and
stores tuples of the form (ID j,β j, pk j2). On receiving the public key query on ID j, BI
first searches hash list L1 and secret value list Lsv for the two tuples containing ID j. If
the tuple does not exist in L1, BI makes a hash query of ID j on H1 (without returning
h j to AI). If the tuple does not exist in Lsv, BI selects a random β j ∈ Zp.
• If j = j′, set pk j2 = g
1/β j
1 and insert (ID j,β j, pk j2) to Lsv;
• If j 6= j′, set pk j2 = g1/β j and insert (ID j,β j, pk j2) to Lsv.
Then, BI finds (pk j1, pk j2) from the two tuples and returns (pk j1, pk j2) to AI .
Public Key Replace Query. AI submits (ID j,r′j, pk′j1,β ′j, pk′j2) and BI first searches
hash list L1 and secret value list Lsv for the two tuples containing ID j. If the tuple
does not exist, BI makes a public key query of ID j (without returning (pk j1, pk j2) to
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AI). Then, it records two extra items (r′j, pk′j1) for the tuple from L1 and two extra
items (β ′j, pk
′
j2) for the tuple from Lsv.
Tag Generation Query. AI submits (ID j, i,m) and BI first checks whether j = j′. If
j 6= j′, BI makes a private key query on ID j (without returning skID j toAI) to generate
skID j . Then, it uses skID j to generate the tag σ and returns σ to AI . If j = j′, BI finds
(r j,s j) from the tuple in L1, β j from the tuple in Lsv, and ri from the tuple in L2
(if the tuple does not exist, it makes the corresponding query). Next, it computes
σ =
(
g2 ·gr j·s j ·gri · (gr0)m
)β j and returns σ to AI . Note that σ is a valid tag, since
e(σ , pk j2) = e
((
g2 ·gr j·s j ·gri · (gr0)m
)β j , g1/β j1 )
= e(g2, g1) · e(gr j·s j , g1) · e
(
gri · (gr0)m, g1
)
= e(g2, g1) · e
(









= e(g2, g1) · e
(







Challenge. AI submits (ID∗j , i∗,m) and BI first checks whether j∗ = j′ and ID j’s






j2. If yes, it finds s
∗
j from the tuple
in L1, β ′j from the tuple in Lsv, and computes IDchal = (gc)
s∗j , pkchal = (gc)
1/β ′j .
Otherwise, it aborts. Then, BI selects a random vi ∈ Zp and returns challenge
∆ = ({i,vi}, IDchal, pkchal) to AI . In this challenge,
H1(ID∗j) = g
s∗j , IDchal = (gc)
s∗j , pk∗j2 = g
1/β ′j , pkchal = (gc)
1/β ′j .
Note that from AI’s view, IDchal = H1(ID∗j)w, pkchal = (pk∗j2)w. Here, w = c, which
is an unknown value to BI .
Respond. Finally, AI outputs response Π = (µ,σres).
If the response Π is valid, it satisfies that
σres = e(g2, g1)w·vi · e
(
H2(i∗) ·uµ , gw
)
.
Note that w = c and H2(i∗) = g
ri∗
1 . Then, BI outputs(
σres
e(ga, gc)ri∗ · e
(
(ga)r0·µ , gc
))1/vi = (e(g2, g1)w·vi · e(H2(i∗) ·uµ , gw)




e(gb, ga)c·vi · e(ga·ri∗ , gc) · e(ga·r0·µ , gc)
e(g, g)a·c·ri∗ · e(g, g)a·r0·µ·c
)1/vi
= e(g, g)abc
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as the solution to the double-BDH problem.
This completes the description of the simulation and solution. Next, we analyze the
advantage of the simulator. Whether BI can output the solution to the problem instance
depends on whether it aborts during Partial Private Key Query, Private Key Query, and
Challenge phases and whether the adversary can output a valid response. BI randomly
selects j′ ∈ {1, . . . ,qH1}, therefore, for the identity ID
∗
j the adversary chooses, the prob-
ability that j∗ = j′ is 1qH1
. During the partial private key query and private key query
phases, the identity satisfies that j 6= j∗. As a result, if j′ = j∗, BI does not abort during
these phases. Similar to Simulation 0, BI does not abort during the Challenge phase in










Since AI has advantage ε1 in breaking the scheme, the advantage of BI in solving the
problem instance is ε12·qH1
.
For the two simulations, and BI randomly selects one of them to interact with AI , its













This completes the proof of Theorem 8.1. 
Theorem 8.2. Suppose H1,H2 are random oracles. If there is a Strong Type II adversary
AII that makes at most qH1 and qH2 hash queries on H1 and H2 and has advantage ε2 in
breaking the CLCA scheme, then we can construct a simulator BII that has advantage at
least ε2qH1 ·qH2
in solving the vBDH problem.
Proof of Theorem 8.2. SupposeBII receives a vBDH problem instance (PG,g,ga,gb,gac)
and its goal is to compute e(g,g)bc. BII interacts with AII as follows.
Setup. BII selects random t,r0 ∈ Zp and sets g1 = gt ,g2 = gb,u = (ga)r0 from the
problem instance. Then, it returns the master public key
mpk = (PG,g1,g2,u)
and the master secret key msk = gbt to AII , where H1,H2 are two random oracles
controlled by BII . Note that for g1 = gt and g2 = gb, gbt = gt2 is the valid master
secret key.
Hash Query on H1. BII maintains a hash list L1, which is initially empty and stores
tuples of the form ( j, ID j,r j,s j,h j, pk j1). It selects a random j′ ∈ {1, . . . ,qH1}. On
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receiving the hash query on identity ID j, BII first searches L1 for the tuple containing
ID j. If the tuple does not exist, it selects random r j,s j ∈ Zp and works as follows.
• If j = j′, set h j = (ga)s j , pk j1 = gr j , and insert ( j, ID j,r j,s j,h j, pk j1) to L1;
• If j 6= j′, set h j = gs j , pk j1 = gr j , and insert ( j, ID j,r j,s j,h j, pk j1) to L1.
Then, BII finds h j from the tuple and returns h j to AII .
Hash Query on H2. BII maintains a hash list L2, which is initially empty and stores
tuples of the form (i,ri,hi). It selects a random i′ ∈ {1, . . . ,qH2}. On receiving the
hash query on index i, BI first searches L2 for the tuple containing i. If the tuple does
not exist, it selects a random ri ∈ Zp and works as follows.
• If i = i′, set hi = gri2 and insert (i,ri,hi) to L2;
• If i 6= i′, set hi = g−t2 · (ga)ri and insert (i,ri,hi) to L2.
Then, BII finds hi from the tuple and returns hi to AII .
Secret Value Query. AII submits identity ID j and BII first checks whether j = j′. If
yes, it aborts. Otherwise, BII searches secret value list Lsv for the tuple containing
ID j. If the tuple does not exist, it makes a public key query on ID j (without returning
the public key to AII). Then, it finds β j from the tuple and returns β j to AII .
Public Key Query. BII maintains a secret value list Lsv, which is initially empty and
stores tuples of the form (ID j,β j, pk j2). On receiving the public key query on ID j,
BII first searches hash list L1 and secret value list Lsv for the two tuples containing
ID j. If the tuple does not exist in L1, BII makes a hash query of ID j on H1 (without
returning h j to AII). If the tuple does not exist in Lsv, BII selects a random β j ∈ Zp
and works as follows.
• If j = j′, set pk j2 = (ga)1/β j and insert (ID j,β j, pk j2) to Lsv;
• If j 6= j′, set pk j2 = g1/β j and insert (ID j,β j, pk j2) to Lsv.
Then, BII finds (pk j1, pk j2) from the two tuples and returns (pk j1, pk j2) to AII .
Public Key Replace Query. AII submits (ID j,r′j, pk′j1,β ′j, pk′j2) and BII first checks
whether j = j′. If yes, it aborts. Otherwise, BII searches hash list L1 and secret value
list Lsv for the two tuples containing ID j. If the tuple does not exist, BII makes a
public key query on ID j (without returning (pk j1, pk j2) toAII). Then, it records extra
items (r′j, pk
′
j1) for the tuple in L1 and (β ′j, pk′j2) for the tuple in Lsv.
Tag Generation Query. AII submits (ID j, i,m) and BII first checks whether j = j′.
If j 6= j′, then BII searches the the hash lists L1 and secret value list Lsv for the two
tuples containing ID j (if the tuple does not exist, it makes the corresponding queries).
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Next, it finds r j from the tuple in L1 and β j from the tuple in Lsv (or r′j and β ′j, if the
public keys have been replaced). With the master secret key, BII computes the partial
private key of ID j, generates the tag using the partial private key and secret value and
returns the tag to AII . If j = j′, BII searches the hash lists L1, L2, and secret value
list Lsv for the two tuples containing ID j (if the tuple does not exist, it makes the
corresponding queries). It finds (r j,s j) from the tuple in L1, ri from the tuple in L2,
and β j from the tuple in Lsv, and works as follows.
• If i = i′, abort;
• If i 6= i′, compute σ = (gr j·s j ·gri ·gr0·m)β j and return σ to AII .
Note that σ is a valid tag, since
e(σ , pk j2) = e
(
(gr j·s j ·gri ·gr0·m)β j , (ga)1/β j
)
= e(g2, g1) · e(gr j·s j , ga) · e(g2, g1)−1 · e(gri ·gr0·m, ga)
= e(g2, g1) · e(ga·s j , gr j) · e(g−t2 , g) · e
(
(ga)ri · (ga)r0·m, g
)
= e(g2, g1) · e
(







Challenge. AII submits (ID∗j , i∗,m) and BII first checks whether j∗ = j′. If j∗ 6= j′,
it aborts. If j∗ = j′, it finds s j from the tuple in L1, β j from the tuple in Lsv, and
computes IDchal = (gac)s j , pkchal = (gac)1/β j . Then, BII selects a random vi ∈ Zp and
returns challenge ∆ = ({i,vi}, IDchal, pkchal) to AII . In this challenge,
H1(ID j) = (ga)s j , IDchal = (gac)s j , pk j2 = (ga)1/β j , pkchal = (gac)1/β j .
Note that from AII’s view, IDchal = H1(ID j)w, pkchal = pkwj2. Here, w = c, which is a
unknown value to BII .
Respond. Finally, AII outputs response Π = (µ,σres).
If the response Π is valid, it satisfies that
σres = e(g2, g1)w·vi · e
(
H2(i) ·uµ , gw
)
.
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Note that w = c and H2(i) = g
ri








e(g2, g1)w·vi · e
(












as the solution to the vBDH problem.
This completes the description of the simulation and solution. Next, we analyze the ad-
vantage of the simulator. Whether the BII can output the solution to the problem instance
depends on whether it aborts during Secret Value Query, Public Key Replace Query, Tag
Generation Query, and Challenge phases and whether the adversary can output a valid
response. BII randomly selects j′ ∈ {1, . . . ,qH1} and i′ ∈ {1, . . . ,qH2}, therefore, for the
identity ID∗j and index i
∗ the adversary chooses, the probability that j∗ = j′ is 1qH1
and
i∗ = i′ is 1qH2
. During the secret value query and public key replace query phases, the
identity satisfy that j 6= j∗. During the tag generation query phases, the index satisfy that
i 6= i∗. As a result, BI does not abort during the simulation if j∗ = j′ and i∗ = i′, i.e.
Pr[¬abortBI ] = Pr[ j
∗ = j′∧ i∗ = i′] = 1
qH1 ·qH2
.
Since AII has advantage ε2 in breaking the proposed scheme, BII has at least advantage
ε2
qH1 ·qH2
in solving the vBDH problem. This completes the proof of Theorem 8.2. 
Theorem 8.3. For any adversaryA, its advantage in distinguishing the user that uploads
the data during an auditing process is zero.
Proof of Theorem 8.3. The anonymity follows readily from the fact that two responses
computed from two tags generated by two different users are identical. Therefore, upon
receiving a response, the adversary cannot gain any more advantage in distinguishing the
identity of the user who uploads the data than randomly guessing. The details of the
analysis are as follows.
For a challenge ∆ = (i,vi, IDchal, pkchal), where
IDchal = {H1(ID j)w | j = 1, . . . ,n}, pkchal = {pkwj2 | j = 1, . . . ,n},
C randomly selects a message m ∈ Zp and two users ID j and ID j′ for j, j′ ∈ [1,n]. Then,
it computes the tags σ j,σ j′ of index i and message m using private keys skID j ,skID j′ re-
spectively. Next, it computes the responses Π j,Π j′ from the message and tags. Suppose
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Π j = (µ,σres) and (Π′j = µ
′,σ ′res), we have
µ = vi ·m, σres =
e(σ j, pkwj2)
vi
e(H1(ID j)w, pk j1)vi
,
µ
′ = vi ·m, σ ′res =
e(σ j, pkwj′2)
vi
e(H1(ID j′)w, pk j′1)vi
.




e(H1(ID j)w, pk j1)vi
=
(
e(g2,g1) · e(H1(ID j), pk j1) · e(H2(i) ·um,g)
e(H1(ID j), pk j1)
)w·vi










e(H1(ID j′)w, pk j′1)vi
=
(
e(g2,g1) · e(H1(ID j′), pk j′1) · e(H2(i) ·um,g)
e(H1(ID j′), pk j′1)
)w·vi





Therefore, for any challenge, the responses computed from any two tags by two different
users are identical. This completes the proof of Theorem 8.3. 
8.4 Chapter Summary
In this chapter, we explored the identity privacy in certificateless cloud auditing (CLCA)
schemes. This issue refers to the fact that in a system where multiple users maintain
the storage space together, the third-party auditor (TPA) cannot learn which user uploads
the data during an auditing process. We defined the security models of certificateless
privacy-preserving cloud auditing schemes, which include the uncheatability against a
dishonest cloud server and anonymity against a curious TPA. A secure scheme satisfies
that a dishonest cloud server cannot cheat the TPA by correctly responding the challenge
if it does not store the corresponding messages and tags. Moreover, the identity privacy
holds against a curious TPA. Then, we proposed an efficient construction with compact
tags. Specifically, it is uncheatable against normal type I adversary and strong type II ad-
versary and achieves information-theoretical anonymity against the TPA. In other words,
the TPA cannot gain any more advantage in distinguishing the user who uploads the data
than randomly guessing even if it has an unbounded computational capability. The basic
idea is to guarantee the fact that the responses computed from any two tags generated by
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any two users are the same. To achieve this goal, we combined the private key extraction
in Water’s IBE [105] and the technique in the privacy-preserving cloud auditing scheme
[106]. This enables us to guarantee the tag of our scheme is as compact as the scheme in
[106], i.e. consists of only one group element.
Part III
Conclusion and Future Work
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Chapter 9
Conclusion and Future Work
We explored the constructions of tightly secure public-key cryptographic schemes and
privacy-preserving cloud auditing schemes with compact tags in this thesis. In this chap-
ter, we summarize the work presented in previous chapters and put forward several po-
tential topics of our future work.
9.1 Tightly Secure Schemes in the Multi Security Models
Tightly Secure Encryption Schemes in the Multi-Ciphertext Setting. In Chapter 3,
we introduced a paired-simulation technique for security reductions of the ciphertext in-
distinguishability (IND) security of a public-key encryption scheme to a decisional as-
sumption. Unlike a traditional security reduction, where we construct a simulation that is
either indistinguishable from the real scheme or the challenge ciphertext(s) is(are) equiv-
alent to one-time pad(s) (Real-or-OTP structure), the paired-simulation technique works
with two simulations and has a reduction loss of merely 2. The requirements of the two
simulations do not include the Real-or-OTP structure and if we can program the secu-
rity reduction with such two simulations, we have a tight security proof of the proposed
encryption scheme. We presented a tight IND-CCA1 security proof of Cramer-Shoup en-
cryption [33] in the multi-ciphertext setting as an example to show the applications of the
paired-simulation technique.
Tightly Secure Key-Unique Schemes in the Multi-User Setting. The optimal security
reductions with impossibility results [12, 63, 71] for certain schemes (e.g. key-unique
schemes) had been extensively studied in the literature. We took an insight into possi-
ble constructions from the following two aspects in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5, respec-
tively. First, we generalized the key generations of a public-key cryptographic scheme
and extended it to a different framework. The extended framework can be seen as a
two-round iteration of a traditional scheme. We put forward a general construction of a
scheme under the extended framework from two traditional schemes. Then, we demon-
134
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strated that tightly secure key-unique schemes in the multi-user setting with corruptions
are achievable with two concrete examples, namely a signature scheme and an encryp-
tion scheme. Second, we considered whether it is possible to construct tightly secure
key-unique schemes from one-more variants of the standard assumptions. We provided
an affirmative answer to the question with two concrete constructions. Both of the two
construction (a signature scheme and an encryption scheme) are based on the one-more
computational Diffie-Hellman (n-CDH) assumption and the efficiency is compatible with
the state-of-the-art schemes that do not achieve tight security.
Future Work. We consider the following topics as our future work related to the tightly
secure schemes in the “multi” security models. Regarding the tightly secure encryption
schemes in the multi-ciphertext setting, constructing efficient and tightly IND-CCA2 se-
cure encryption schemes still remains to be an open problem. Instead of seeking a security
proof from a traditional security reduction, the paired-simulation technique is an alterna-
tive option. We ask whether an efficient encryption scheme can be constructed with tight
IND-CCA2 security to fill this gap. Here, efficient means that the public key, secret key,
and ciphertext contain only a constant number of group elements. In terms of the tightly
secure key-unique schemes in the multi-user setting with corruptions, the constructions
proposed in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 were proved in the random oracle model. We leave
the constructions that can be analyzed in the standard model (i.e. without resorting to the
random oracle heuristic) as the future work. The studies include both the schemes based
on the standard assumptions as well as their one-more variants.
9.2 Privacy-Preserving Cloud Auditing Schemes with Com-
pact Tags
Identity privacy is one of the primary concerns in many applications, such as an electronic
voting system. In such a system where cloud auditing technique is applied, preserving the
identity privacy of the users against the auditor is an essential security requirement. Ap-
plying ring signature and group signature techniques is a possible solution, except that
the tag of the scheme is not compact. We explored constructing privacy-preserving cloud
auditing schemes with compact tags and proposed three concrete constructions in differ-
ent settings. Specifically, a privacy-preserving cloud auditing scheme in the traditional
public-key infrastructure (PKI) setting, a threshold scheme, and a certificateless scheme
are presented in Chapter 6, Chapter 7, and Chapter 8, respectively. One of the main advan-
tages of our schemes is that the tag is compact, which consists of only one group element.
The tag is as compact as the BLS signature scheme [25] and the tag generation algorithm
is as efficient as the compact proof of retrievability scheme [89] proposed by Shacham
and Waters. Our constructions are more efficient in saving storage spaces compared with
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the traditional construction of privacy-preserving cloud auditing schemes that apply the
ring signature or group techniques.
Future Work. To find more possible constructions of privacy-preserving cloud auditing
in the identity-based or certificate-based settings is of independent interest. The main
challenging task in achieving privacy-preserving schemes with compact tags in such set-
tings is that the technique applied in the constructions presented in Chapter 6 and Chapter
8 cannot be transformed into an identity-based scheme or a certificate-based scheme in
a straightforward way. Therefore, seeking a solution to constructing the aforementioned
schemes is also one of the topics in our future work.
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